>From The Jobs Letter, with permission. >F E A T U R E >------------------ >from >T H E J O B S L E T T E R 1 0 2 >a subscriber-based letter >published in New Zealand 29 June 1999 > ------------------------------------- > >INSECURITY AND THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER >RICHARD SENNETT on the personal consequences of work in the new >economy. > >ON FLEXIBILITY >* The emphasis is on flexibility. Rigid forms of bureaucracy are >under attack, as are the evils of blind routine. Workers are asked to >behave nimbly, to be open to change on short notice, to take risks >continually, to become ever less dependent on regulations and >formal procedures. > >This emphasis on flexibility is changing the very meaning of >work, and so the words we use for it. > >"Career", for instance, in its English origins meant a road for >carriages, and as eventually applied to labour meant a lifelong >channel for one's economic pursuits. Flexible capitalism has blocked >the straight roadway of career, diverting employees suddenly from >one kind of work into another. > >The word "job" in English of the fourteenth century meant a >lump or piece of something that could be carted around. Flexibility >today brings back this arcane sense of the job, as people do lumps of >labour, pieces of work, over the course of a lifetime. > >* It is quite natural that flexibility should arouse anxiety; >people do not know what risks will pay off, what paths to pursue. To >take the curse off the phrase "capitalist system" there has developed >in the past many circumlocutions, such as the "free enterprise" or >"private enterprise" system. > >Flexibility is used today as another way to lift the curse of >oppression from capitalism. In attacking rigid bureaucracy and >emphasising risk, it is claimed, gives people more freedom to shape >their lives. In fact, the new order substitutes new controls rather >than simply abolishing the rules of the past -- but these new >controls are also hard to understand. The new capitalism is an often >illegible regime of power. > >ON CHARACTER >* Perhaps the most confusing aspect of flexibility is its impact >on personal character. Character is the ethical value we place on our >own desires and on our relations to others. The character of a man >depends on his connections to the world. > >Character particularly focuses upon the long-term aspect of our >emotional experience. Character is expressed by loyalty and mutual >commitment, or through the pursuit of long-term goals, or by the >practice of delayed gratification for the sake of a future end. >Character concerns the personal traits which we value in ourselves >and for which we seek to be valued by others. > >* These are the questions about our character posed by the >new, flexible capitalism: > >How do we decide what is of lasting value in ourselves in a >society which is impatient, which focuses on the immediate moment? > >How can long-term goals be pursued in an economy devoted to >the short-term? > >How can mutual loyalties and commitments be sustained in >institutions which are constantly breaking apart or continually being >redesigned? > >ON NO LONG TERM >* Business leaders and journalists emphasise the global >marketplace and the use of new technologies as the hallmarks of the >capitalism of our time. This is true enough, but misses another >dimension of change: new ways of organising time, particularly >working time. > >The most tangible sign of that change might be the motto "no >long term". In work, the traditional career progressing step by step >through the corridors of one or two institutions is withering; so is >the deployment of a single set of skills through the course of a >working life. > >Today, a young American with at least two years of college can >expect to change jobs at least eleven times in the course of working, >and change his or her skill base at least three times during those >forty years of labour. > >"No long term" is a principle that corrodes trust, loyalty and >mutual commitment. The short time frame of modern institutions >limits the ripening of informal trust. Strong ties depend, in >contrast, on long association. And, more personally, they depend on a >willingness to make commitments to others. > >* Short-term capitalism threatens to corrode our characters, >particularly those qualities of character which bind human beings to >one another and furnishes each with a sense of sustainable self. > >Transposed to the family realm, "no long term" means keep >moving, don't commit yourself, and don't sacrifice. How can we >protect family relations from succumbing to short-term behaviour, >and above all the weakness of loyalty and commitment which mark >the modern workplace? In the place of the chameleon values of the >new economy, family values emphasise formal obligation, >trustworthiness, commitment, and purpose. These are all long-term >virtues. > >This conflict between family and work poses some questions >about adult experience itself. How can long-term purposes be >pursued in a short-term society? How can durable social relations be >sustained? How can a human being develop a narrative of identity >and life history in a society composed of episodes and fragments? >The conditions of the new economy feed instead on experience which >drifts in time, from place to place, from job to job. > >* Through most of human history, people have accepted the >fact that their lives will shift suddenly due to wars, famines or >other disasters, and that they will have to improvise in order to >survive. > >What is peculiar about uncertainty today is that it exists without >any looming historical disaster; instead it is woven into the everyday >practices of a vigorous capitalism. Instability is meant to be normal, >the entrepreneur is served up as an ideal Everyman. "No long term" >disorients action over the long term, loosens bonds of trust and >commitment, and divorces will from behaviour. > >ON "RE-ENGINEERING" FANTASIES >* The most salient fact about "re-engineering" is the >downsizing of jobs. Estimates of the numbers of American workers >who have been downsized from jobs in the major corporates, from >1980 to 1995, vary from a low count of 13m people, to as high as 39m. >Downsizing has had a direct connection to growing inequality, since >only a minority of the middle-aged workers squeezed out have >found replacement labour at the same or higher wages. > >The declaration of "re-engineering" evokes efficiency -- doing >more with less -- conjuring up a tighter operation achieved by >making a decisive break from the past. But the overtones of efficiency >can be misleading. Irreversable change occurs because "re- >engineering" can be a highly chaotic process. > >* It became clear to many business leaders by the mid-1990s >that only in the highly paid fantasy life of consultants can a large >organisation define a new business plan, trim staff and re-engineer >itself to suit, then steam forward to realise the new design. > > Many, even most, re-engineering efforts fail largely because >institutions become dysfunctional during the people-squeezing >process: the morale and motivation of workers drop sharply in the >various plays of downsizing. Surviving workers wait for the next >blow of the axe rather than exulting in competitive victory over those >who are fired... > > Institutional changes, instead of following the path of the >guided arrow, head in different and often conflicting directions: >business plans are discarded and revised; expected benefits turn out >to be ephemeral; the organisation loses direction, a profitable >operating unit is suddenly sold, for example, yet a few years later >the parent company tries to get back the business in which it knew how >to make money before it sought to reinvent itself..." > >* In the early 1990s, the American Management Association >conducted studies of firms which had engaged seriously in >downsizing. The AMA found that repeated downsizings produce >"lower profits and declining worker productivity..." Another study >by the Wyatt Companies found that "less than half the companies >achieved their expense reduction goals; fewer than one-third >increased their profitability and less than one third increased their >productivity..." > >* Inefficiency or disorganisation does not mean, however, that >there is no rhyme or reason to the practice of sharp, disruptive >change. Because institutional re-structurings signal to the finance >markets that change is "for real", the stock prices of institutions in >the course of re-organisation often rises, as though "any changes are >better than continuing on as before." In the operation of modern >markets, the disruption of organisations becomes profitable. > > While the disruption may not be justifiable in terms of >productivity, the short-term returns to stockholders provide a strong >incentive to the powers of chaos disguised by that seemingly >reassuring word "re-engineering". Perfectly viable businesses are >gutted or abandoned, capable employees are set adrift rather than >rewarded, simply because the organisation must prove to the market >that it is capable of change. > >ON MOVING SIDEWAYS >* As pyramidal hierarchies are replaced by looser networks, >people who change jobs experience more often what sociologists >have called "ambiguously lateral moves". These are moves in which >a person in fact moves sideways even while believing he or she is in >fact moving up in the loose network. This crablike motion accurs >even though incomes are becoming more polarised and unequal, and >job categories are becoming more amorphous. > >* People often experience "retrospective losses" in a flexible >network. Since people who risk making moves in a flexible >organisation often have little hard information about what a new >position will entail, they realise only in retrospect they've made bad >decisions. They wouldn't have taken the risk if only they'd known. >But organisations are so often in a state of internal flux that its >useless to attempt rational decision-making about one's future based >on the current structure of one's company. > >ON FLEXIBILITY AND THE OLDER WORKER >* The new economy places an emphasis on youth, and a >consequence of this is the compression of working life. > >The number of men aged 55-64 at work in the United States has >dropped from nearly 80% in 1970 to 65% in 1990. The figures for the >United Kingdom, France and Germany are similar. There is also a >slight abridgement at the beginning of a working life, the age young >people enter the labour force has been delayed a few years because of >the increased emphasis on education. > >The sociologist Manuel Castells predicts that "the actual >working lifetime could be shortened to about 30 years (from 24 to >54), out of a real lifetime span of about 75-80 years". That is, the >productive life span is being compressed to less than half the >biological life span, with older workers leaving the scene long before >they are physically or mentally unfit. > >* For older workers, the prejudices against age send a >powerful message: as a person's experience accumulates, it loses >value. What an older worker has learned over the course of the years >about a particular company or profession may get in the way of new >changes dictated by superiors. From the institution's vantage point, >the flexibility of the young makes them more malleable in terms of >both risk-taking and immediate submission. > >ON OVERQUALIFICATION >* Overqualification is a sign of the polarisation which marks >the new regime. There are, to be sure, solid material reasons to get a >degree. American data shows that increases in income in the last >decade were about 34% more for workers with a college degree than >for workers with a high school diploma. Yet only a fifth of jobs in >the labour force in America require a college degree, and the >percentage of these highly qualified jobs is only slowly rising. > >ON WINNERS TAKING ALL >* An immense shift is taking place in society: a huge transfer of >wealth from lower-skilled middle-class workers to the owners of >capital assets and a new technological aristocracy. Under these >conditions, a kind of extreme risk-taking takes form in which large >numbers of young people gamble that they will be one of the chosen >few. > >Such risk-taking occurs in what economists call "winner-take-all >markets". In this competitive landscape, those who succeed sweep >the board of gains, while the mass of losers have crumbs to divide up >amongst themselves. > >Flexibility is a key element in allowing such a market to form. >Without a bureaucratic system to channel wealth gains throughout a >hierarchy, rewards gravitate to the most powerful. In an unfettered >institution, those in a position to grab everything, do so. > >* Failure is the great modern taboo. Popular literature is full of >recipes for how to succeed, but largely silent on how to cope with >failure. > >Failure is no longer the normal prospect of facing only the very >poor or disadvantaged. It has become more familiar as a regular >event in the lives of the middle classes. The shrinking size of the >elite makes achievement more elusive. The winner-take-all market is a >competitive structure which disposes large numbers of educated >people to fail. > >Downsizings and re-engineerings impose on middle-class >people sudden disasters which were in an earlier capitalism much >more confined to the working classes. The sense of failing one's >family by behaving flexibly and adaptively at work is more subtle, >but equally powerful. > >[sidebox] > >RICO AS EVERYMAN >* Richard Sennett begins his book with an interview with >"Rico", a man who knows all about downsizing, company "re- >engineering", teamwork and short contracts. According to Sennett, >Rico and his wife are the "very acme of the adaptable, mutually >supportive couple", but "both often fear that they are on the edge of >losing control over their lives" in a world where there is only short- >term work and short-term profits. > >Rico's experiences of changing jobs and becoming a consultant >where he has no fixed role and never really belongs to a company >have "set his inner and emotional life adrift." He is haunted by a >sense that he cannot provide his children with the ethical discipline >that his parents instilled in him. > >Rico's working life, with its constant changes, doesn't provide >his children with examples of values such as loyalty, trust and >service. Rico told Sennett: "You can't imagine how stupid I feel when >I talk to my kids about commitment. Its an abstract virtue to them, >they don't see it anywhere ..." > >* For Sennett, Rico is Everyman whose dilemmas show how >"short-term capitalism threatens to corrode his character, >particularly those qualities of character which bind human beings to >one another and furnishes each with a sense of sustainable self ... >the flexible self which has brought him success is weakening his own >character in ways for which there exists no practical remedy..." > >The Corrosion of Character >-- The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism >by Richard Sennett >(pub 1998 by W.W.Norton and Company) >ISBN 0-393-04678-8 >available on www.amazon.com >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393046788/thejobsresearc >tr > > >SENNETT LECTURE ON THE INTERNET >A RealVideo lecture (60 mins) by Richard Sennett on "The New >Work Ethic" was given to an audience at the New York Public >Library on the 20th March, 1999. This talk is part of the American >Perspectives lecture series hosted by c-span.org > >link for the RealVideo lecture by Richard Sennett >http://38.217.109.100/ram/amerpers/ap032099v3.ram > >American perspectives link at c-span.org >http://38.217.109.100/guide/society/perspectives/ap032099.ht >m > >link for free RealVideo player >http://www.real.com/ > >V O I C E >------------------ >ON INSECURITY AND RE-DEFINING WORK > "Rising unemployment can no longer be ascribed to cyclical >economic crises; it is a consequence of the success of a >technologically advanced capitalism. We have to change our economic >language. Economic growth, for example, is no longer a valid indicator >of job creation, just as job creation is no longer a valid indicator >of employment and employment is no longer an indicator of income >levels and secure status. > >"Even the life of the affluent is becoming insecure and today's >success is no guarantee against tomorrow's fall. The job miracle in >the US hides the political economy of uncertainty: the US is the only >advanced society in which productivity has been steadily rising over >the past two decades while the income of the majority -- eight out >of ten -- has stagnated or fallen. This has happened in no other >advanced democracy. > >"Endemic insecurity will in future characterise the lives, and the >foundations of the lives, of the majority of the population -- even in >the apparently affluent centre of society. If this diagnosis is >basically right then we face two political options. > >"First, there is the "nevertheless" policy, which enforces full >employment after the end of normal full employment. This "New >Labour" policy believes that only work guarantees order and the >inclusive society. In this view, waged work has the monopoly of >inclusiveness. > >"The second option is to rethink and redefine work as we have >done with respect to the family. But this also implies rethinking how >we deal with the risks of fragile work ... > > "Has work always had the monopoly of inclusiveness? If the >ancient Greeks could listen to our debates about the anthropological >need to work in order not only to be an honourable member of >society but a fully valued human being, they would laugh. The value >system that proclaims the centrality of work and only work in >building and controlling an inclusive society is a modern invention of >capitalism and the welfare state. > > "We need to see that there is a life beyond the alternatives of >unemployment and stress at work. We need to see that the lack of >waged work can give us a new affluence of time. We need also to see >that the welfare state must be rebuilt so that the risks of fragile >work are socialised rather than being borne increasingly by the >individual. > >"I would argue for a citizen's (or basic) income. My argument is >that we need a new alternative centre of inclusion -- citizen work >combined with citizen income -- creating a sense of compassion and >cohesion through public commitment. The decoupling of income >entitlements from paid work and from the labour market would, in >Zygmunt Bauman's words, remove "the awesome fly of insecurity >from the sweet ointment of freedom". > >"We must, in short, turn the new precarious forms of >employment into a right to discontinuous waged work and a right to >disposable time. It must be made possible for every human being >autonomously to shape his or her life and create a balance between >family, paid employment, leisure and political commitment. And I >truly believe that this is the only way of forming a policy that will >create more employment for everybody ..." >-- German sociologist Ulrich Beck, from "Goodbye To All That >Wage Slavery" New Statesman 5 March 1999. > > > >C R E D I T S >------------------- >edited by Vivian Hutchinson for the Jobs Research Trust >P.O.Box 428, New Plymouth, New Zealand >phone 06-753-4434 fax 06-759-4648 >Internet address -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >The Jobs Letter -- an essential information and media watch >on jobs, employment, unemployment, the future of work, >and related economic and education issues. > >The Jobs Research Trust -- a not-for-profit Charitable Trust >constituted in 1994 to develop and distribute information that >will help our communities create more jobs and reduce >unemployment and poverty in New Zealand. > >Our internet website at > > http://www.jobsletter.org.nz/ > >contains our back issues and key papers, >and hotlinks to other internet resources. > >ends >------ > >The Jobs Letter >essential information on an essential issue >[EMAIL PROTECTED] >phone 06-753-4434 fax 06-759-4648 >P.O.Box 428 >New Plymouth, Taranaki, New Zealand > >visit The Jobs Research Website at >http://www.jobsletter.org.nz/ >
