IV Will Hutton: Great business organisations are that, they are great organisations. And if you’re going to run an organisation, you understand very quickly that there’s enormous tension between
And actually trying to build an organisation which has a social view of itself at its core, what I call an organisational reason to be. Great organisations in Europe and America have that organisational reason to be. One of the things I look at in the book is Boeing, a great company that was founded by a great engineer and a great American, William Boeing. And in the 1960s bet the entire value of that company in conferring on the world the jumbo jet. It nearly made that company bankrupt, it was a technological, breathtaking thing to do at that time, and very nearly it did make Boeing bankrupt, but no-one in Boeing thought a thing about it, except it must be done, because it was the "Boeing" way. Of course Boeing - as a company - committed to building the best planes that flew furthest, fastest, most safely, must do this. That’s what you got out of bed in the morning to do, that was its organisational reason to be.
The new A3-80, the 750-passenger strong workhorse that will fly from capital city to capital city, is going to be built by Airbus. In fact all of the innovative new planes are going to be built by Airbus. Airbus has now got a longer order book in every category of aircraft manufacture than Boeing, and it has a much lower subsidy than Boeing. It doesn’t get the fat defence contracts, and the free cheques to fund R&D that Boeing gets, but people who work for Airbus - like they used to do at Boeing - believe they’re doing something fantastic, they’re building great planes to serve an idea of aviation, to serve an idea of travel, to serve an idea of mobility, to serve an idea of what it means to be in the 21st century. They’re not just profit maximisers.
Great organisations have that at their core, because they’re not just about
And I contend that the great story of the last 35 years - and here’s another surprise for you all: · in the mid-1960s productivity measured as output for every hour that was worked, across the EEC of the six, as it was then, was about two-thirds of America. · A generation later, and the EEC, now the EU, has overtaken America. o France has higher output per man hour, o so does Holland, o so does Belgium, o so does North Italy, o so does Germany, except there are bits of East Germany that have just recently joined; o Scandinavia, level pegging. o Even Ireland’s output per man hour has now jumped to match that with America. And do you know the one country in Europe where the gap remains as big as it was 35 years ago, and which is under Mrs Thatcher and to a degree under Mr Blair, following the American way, do you know what that country is? You know, it’s us. We’ve not set about building great business organisations
We’ve chased this nation, so that all that matters is to create a ‘hire and fire’ culture. A culture in which directors can make themselves enormously rich, as if that is all we need to do to create productivity and enterprise. It’s a much more sophisticated and subtle nation and in my new role as chief executive of the Work Foundation I spend a lot of time now with directors and chief executives of other companies. When we sit down for lunch or supper or meet, their preoccupation is exactly the one I’ve described. They say how the Cities (CEOs? REH) are breathing down their necks to insist they raise their profits every quarter, making it all the harder to run an organisation rather than easier. They are all questing for a way of actually imparting to the people who work in the organisation that this is a great thing to do, that these are great organisations, and they want to do that. That’s what’s on their mind. What’s not on their mind, and it’s surprising, you’d be astonished, all of you, that what’s not on their mind is the agenda that you get from the right-wing economists, that all they want to do is to break trade unions and pay as little as they can. That’s not what’s on their mind. They want to build great organisations that are here tomorrow and have a purpose.
So:
still the European - the tortoise - steadily investing, steadily looking after people, steadily having a social view of what enterprise is all about, outstripped that hare. And that hare - that American hare - with the bubble imploding, yes bubbles can implode; can bubbles implode? I think bubbles deflate. Bubbles can be pricked and deflated, I think we’ll leave implosion aside. And with the pricking of that bubble, it becomes more obvious that that American hare had profound defects in the way it organises economy. V And what about the last value system that actually I think connects all Europeans? Which we in Britain in many respects are more European than almost the Europeans. That’s a belief in what I call public-ness. The idea of the public realm, public-ness. Now public-ness is not just about democracy and politics and political debate, although that’s part of it. Public-ness is the great nation that emerged in the Enlightenment. We can argue,
Public-ness.
We in Europe wanted that information to be free to humanity. Public to humanity. The Americans argued it should be privatised and patented and given to giant corporations so they could exploit it. Public-ness against private. This notion of public-ness is deeply embedded in my view in the West’s view of itself. It’s the great notion in Aristotelian writing between the private, the household, the public realm, the polis, where you argue and debate. None of us are only private beings. We need public-ness in order to complete, to connect, to express our interdependence.
But the conservative tradition argues that public is coercive, that any expression of the public apart from political exchange in a political democracy - and of course you must have that - but to go beyond that, to say the States should do this, or the committee should do that, that’s to get in the way of individualism and liberty, and that those are the values that any civilisation must hold at its heart.
· you work hard and · you worship God and · you have no truck with the State, · you accept no welfare cheque, and any society constructed around that (public) model is amoral and incorrect. We in Europe don’t take that view. These three great classes of values:
underpin what we in Europe do, and I submit that the core value that links all those three things is interdependence, either expressing it or doing it. Kirsten Garrett: At this
point in his talk, Will Hutton addressed one of the points made by his critics,
a point about unemployment in Europe as compared to America. Hutton points out
that 7 of the 15 European countries have lower unemployment than America, but he
concedes that in the other 8 there are problems, and there have to be changes to
policies so as to create more jobs and encourage more people into the workforce.
The full arguments can be found in his book, ‘The World We’re In’. VI Will Hutton: Next criticism about Europe, made by the American Right in the wake of September 11th. Europe is the dark continent, the Holocaust and anti-Semitism and racism hangs over us. That our attitude that France’s vote for Le Pen, that Holland’s vote for Pym Fortuna that Denmark’s vote for the People’s Party are all part of a dark side of Europe, and that the temptation to reproduce what was done in the 1930s and 1940s is ever-present in this dark continent.
But there were 200 years of slavery in the States, the treatment of American blacks even now is still appalling. There’s 4.3-million people in American jails, 2% of the adult population, and most of them are black. Of the 3,000 a year being on death row, the vast majority are black. When you go to an American prison, those 4.3-million, you become a felon, and most states in the union, once you’ve been to prison in America, you don’t get your civil rights back, and there’s an enormous population of felons in America, both in jail, you’ve left jail, you don’t have the vote, and the vast bulk of those felons are guess what the colour of their skin is.
So within the European Commission system - that’s transparent - it can be tested by the European Court if you don’t like it. It has the European Parliament as a watchdog, there’s all that process, and on top of all that, it has to go through each member State in order to happen. Actually it’s unbelievably transparent, and very democratic. It is just hyperbole from the Right, that we are "enemies of the nation" that we must express interdependence. They are name-calling things that are much more better run than anyone acknowledges. Is it perfect? No, it’s not. Should it be reformed? Yes it should. Should it be more transparency, democracy and accountability still? Yes, there should. But, question: Do you engage with it to pull those reforms off, or do you walk away from it and say ‘A plague on it, I won’t go near it’ like The Daily Telegraph or The Daily Mail?
VII
We don’t spend as much on defence, and in this argument with Iraq we’ve been worried about being seen to be legitimate, seen to behave multilaterally, and here my reply is unambiguous. It is true the European Union,
is hesitant about war; believes in legitimacy. And I think that we are right to make that argument. Think about Iraq. Suppose we go into Iraq without a UN resolution. Suppose the British government, the American government send 20,000 men into Iraq and we’ll win actually because we’ve got the weapon systems that will overwhelm Saddam. We could win actually in very quick time, we could win in six weeks. What happens next? Who’s going to succeed Saddam? We’ve acted unilaterally and pre-emptively, we’ve got to put someone in place, a regime in place. Anybody we nominate is going to be seen to be an American Anglo puppet and have zero legitimacy, not just with their own people, but with the Arab world around. We’re going to be stuck there for years and years and years, defending the indefensible rather like we tried to do in South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s, until finally we’ll pull out. Legitimacy, respecting the rule of law is not just a moral obligation, it’s a matter of self-interest. Interdependence abroad, interdependence at home. Those must be the values with which we seek to act in the 21st century, because if we don’t, then it’s an open door to the creeds, the loyalties of race, blood, tribe, nation, winner take all, survival of the fittest, the strong rules. That can’t be the framework for the 21st century, and we in Britain have to stand up and say so. We have to stand up and say that interdependence underpins the way we’re going to run our hospitals and schools and transport and pensions. Interdependence is going to underpin the way we run our great organisations in the public and private sector alike. Public-ness is something we’re going to hold dear, we’re not going to privatise every damn thing that moves. We’re going to insist on working with other Europeans who share our values, to build great institutions that incorporate those values, and we’re going to champion them in the way that globalisation which is enormous opportunity, is governed and regulated in the years ahead. That must be what we stand for. Must be what we stand for. It’s what we believe in, it’s what we are, it’s what our civilisation is about, and as I said at the very beginning, it’s under threat. It’s under threat from the new orthodoxies that have come from the very particular and eccentric philosophy of the United States, and that means that we Europeans have to engage with and argue with America and we do it better if we do it by acting - together - so that we sing from the same damn hymn sheet.
I’ve got myself in a lot of trouble over the last ten years - both in this book I’ve just written - in arguing that · you can have the profit motive, · you can have the market principle, · you can make very distinct economic and social choices within it, and that capitalism isn’t just "to comply to a kind of Marxist iron laws" but actually, you can shape it and contour it. Now that’s my view and in a sense actually, everything you’ve heard about the economic and social model is predicated upon that. If you don’t buy it, then a significant part of my argument falls. And the reason why I try to argue that I’m right on this. First of all - Marxist predictions went wrong, - there hasn’t been a kind of millenarian moment of revolution where capitalism is right at a point of crisis because capitalism has demonstrated its enormous adaptability, and one of its adaptabilities is conforming to the social mores and moral principles of the societies in which it operates. That I think is a truth about capitalism which means that you can configure it.
Now the dark side of globalisation is twofold:
And I’ll finish off on this note. I think that inequality is the sleeping dog in British politics. I don’t believe that whether it’s our children who can’t buy a house or a flat in a place like Cheltenham until they’re in their 30s, whether it’s people in their 40s and 50s worrying themselves sick about what they’re going to live on on retirement, because pensions are so insecure. Whether it’s the competition. As state schools get better, the competition by state school students for the limited number of high quality places at universities is going to lead to a huge shout from people who’ve been paying for private schools, but it all being unfair and a huge shout from those who have been working hard at state schools how unfair it is that so few of them get to these top universities still. Inequality, and how to deal with it is going to become the real hot issue in British politics, and we’re going to be reminded again that in our approach to inequality our attitude is fundamentally European, and the prizes will fall to those politicians, those institutions that can manage the emerging crisis best but it will be managed best I believe, if the kinds of things I’ve been saying today are really taken to heart.
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