I recently saw another article that
referred to the Islamic teachings on failure and defeat; turning back to
the pure and old ways, not embracing progressive or new ways, as we in the
West have assumed they would after being "liberated" by being defeated in
battle.
No, this is not the same as defeated
Germany or defeated Japan.
Our invasion of Iraq is vindicating proof to hardline Islamic
fundamentalists that the prophecies about the Apocalypse are being
fulfilled.
There is more good reading in the
current issue of Foreign Policy online. Check it out. -
KWC
The
American Mongols
To win the
war against terrorism, the United States must overcome the burden of
history
By Husain Haqqani in
Foreign Policy, March - April 2003 @ http://www.foreignpolicy.com
An invading army is
marching toward Baghdad-again. The last
time infidels conquered the City of Peace was in 1258, when the
Mongol horde, led by Genghis Khan's grandson Hulegu, defeated the Arab
Abbasid caliphate that had ruled for more than five centuries. And if the
ripple effects of that episode through Islam's history are any guide, the
latest invasion of Iraq will unleash a new cycle of hatred-unless the
United States can find ways to bolster the credibility of moderate Islamic
thinkers.
Saddam Hussein, who has
led Iraq's Baathist socialist regime for nearly 25 years, is no caliph.
The U.S. military has come as self-declared liberators, not as conquerors.
Yet the U.S. invasion of Iraq resonates strongly with fundamentalist
Muslims because they see Saddam's downfall-and the broader humiliation of
the Arab world at the hands of the latter-day Mongols-as
righteous punishment. Since the
13th
century, Islamic theologians have argued that military defeat at the hands
of unbelievers results when Muslims embrace pluralism and worldly
knowledge. The story is drilled
into Muslim children from Morocco to Indonesia: nearly 2 million people
put to the sword; the caliph trampled to death; and the destruction of the
great library, the House of Wisdom. The
Ottoman Empire fell in 1918 for the same reason Muslims lost Baghdad in
1258: The rulers and their people had gone soft,
approaching religion with tolerance
and accommodation rather than viewing
civilization as divided between Islam and
infidels
The U.S.-led invasion
of secular Iraq is
the ultimate
vindication of this worldview, the capstone of a
series of
modern Muslim defeats that began with the
first Gulf
War and continued through the next decade with the Serbs' ethnic
cleansing campaigns against Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the repression of Islamist groups in Algeria and Egypt, Russia's brutal
military campaign against Chechen separatists, and the defeat of the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Islamists
see these cataclysmic events as opportunities to purify Muslim
souls and to prepare for an
ideological battle with the West.
Fundamentalists believe
they have every reason to anticipate victory in this battle, because the
story of the Mongol conquest of Baghdad didn't end in 1258. The Egyptian
Mamluks were able to halt the tide of Mongol victories in the Battle of
Ayn Jalut in Palestine two years later. In less than a century, the
Mongol
conquerors themselves converted to Islam, and Islamic power
resurged
in Turkey and India after being dislodged
from the Arabian heartland. The
lesson, according to Islamists, is that even the defeat of Muslims has a
place in God's scheme for Islam's eventual supremacy in the world.
In addition to the
historical narrative, Muslim fundamentalists also have prophecies
about the apocalypse attributed to the
Prophet Mohammed to buttress their cause. These signs are described in
hadith, the
sayings of Mohammed passed down through oral tradition before being
recorded at least 100 years after his death. One hadith
that has currently captured the attention of fundamentalists is "The hour
[of the world's end] shall not occur until the Euphrates will disclose a
mountain of gold over which people will fight." The "mountain of gold"
could be a metaphor for a valuable natural resource such as oil, and "the
Euphrates" may refer to Iraq, where the river flows. Just as some
Christian fundamentalists saw the creation of the state of Israel as
fulfillment of biblical prophecy heralding the Day of Judgment,
so too
will some Muslim fundamentalists interpret the U.S. occupation of Iraq as
setting the stage for the final battle between good, led by
Mahdi (the
rightly guided), and evil, represented
by Dajjal
(the deceiver).
Armed with prophecy and
history, Islamist movements see the humiliation of fellow believers as an
opportunity for mobilizing and recruiting dedicated followers. Muslims
have often resorted to asymmetric
warfare in the aftermath of military defeat.
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and his Fatah movement captured the
imagination of young Palestinians only after Arabs lost the Six-Day War
and East Jerusalem in 1967. Islamic militancy in Kashmir can be traced to
India's military victory over Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh war.
Revenge,
rather than willingness to compromise or submit to the victors, is the
traditional response of theologically inclined Muslims to the defeat of
Muslim armies. And for the
Islamists, this battle has no front line and is not limited to a few
years, or even decades. They think
in terms of conflict spread over generations. A call
for jihad against British rule in India, for example, resulted in an
underground movement that lasted from 1830 to the 1870s, with remnants
periodically surfacing well into the 20th century.
This fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam has failed to penetrate the thinking of most
Muslims, especially in recent times. But religious hard-liners can drive
the political agenda in Muslim countries, just as Christian and Jewish
fundamentalists have become a force to reckon with in secular nations such
as the United States. And with over 1 billion Muslims around the globe,
the swelling of the fundamentalist ranks poses serious problems for the
West. If only 1 percent of the world's Muslims accept uncompromising
theology, and 10 percent of that 1 percent decide to commit themselves to
a radical agenda, the recruitment pool for al Qaeda comes to 1
million.
Suspicions about
Western intentions date back to the British, who came as friends during
World War I and ended up colonizing and dividing Arab lands. Thus, the
Americans face the difficult task of overcoming Muslim mistrust.
The United
States must avoid any impulse to act as an imperial
power, dictating its
superior ways to "less civilized" peoples. It should be prepared to
accept
Islamic pride and Arab nationalism as factors in the region's politics,
instead of backing
narrowly based elites to do its bidding. Patient engagement, rather than
the flaunting of military and financial power, should characterize this
new phase of U.S. intervention in the heart of the Islamic
world.
If U.S. President
George W. Bush's promises of democracy in Iraq and a Palestinian state are
not kept and if the United States fails to demand reforms in countries
ruled by authoritarian allies, the umma
(community of believers) would have new
reasons to distrust and hate. The dream of helping Muslims overcome their
fear of
modernity will then remain
unfulfilled. And the world will continue to confront new
jihads.
Husain Haqqani is a
Pakistani columnist and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Foreign Policy magazine is published by
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington,
DC.
