RE: [Futurework] Because We Can

[Cordell . Arthur]

On controlling Palestinian terrorist groups.       What Palestinians can learn from a Zionist milestone The Altalena The New York Times  -     31 May 2003 International Herald Tribune NEW YORK The Palestinians have often been called the Jews of the Arab world: a stateless people dispersed in diaspora, living by their wits, pining for a return to their historic homeland. This is not a comparison either side likes. It implies an equivalency that both reject. Yet the comparison remains common, even among Israelis and Palestinians themselves. Palestinians study the milestones of the Zionist movement for guidance and often speak about the Israeli political system, with its freewheeling debate, as a model for their own. There is one milestone in particular that bears study today David Ben-Gurion's fateful decision in 1948 to end Jewish terrorist activities and bring armed splinter groups under government control. When Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers, met on Thursday night, one of the biggest issues they discussed was ending the terrorism of renegade Palestinian groups. Abbas said that by next week he hoped to have a pact with Hamas, the main Palestinian Islamic party, to halt violence against Israelis. Sharon and his aides say a cease-fire pact is not enough, however, that what is needed is to arrest and disarm the militants. What Israelis increasingly say is that the Palestinians need their own Altalena. Little known to the outside world, the Altalena episode is frequently invoked because without some equivalent, the Palestinian state may never come to be. In the final years of the British mandate in Palestine, there was not one Jewish militia but several, just as there are competing Palestinian groups today. The main one, the Haganah, was led by Ben-Gurion. A more violent and radical one, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, often called simply the Irgun, was led by Menachem Begin. The Irgun, along with an even more radical group, the Stern Gang, was responsible for a massacre of more than 200 Palestinians in the village of Deir Yassin in April 1948. A month later, after the British walked out of Palestine and Ben-Gurion declared the state of Israel, Arab armies attacked. On June 1, the Haganah and Irgun agreed to merge into the Israel Defense Forces, headed by Haganah commanders. The accord called on Irgun members to hand over arms and terminate separate activity, including arms purchases abroad. But there remained the question of an old U.S. Navy landing vessel bought by the Irgun's American supporters and renamed the Altalena. The ship, whose purchase had predated the June 1 agreement, was packed with 850 volunteers, 5,000 rifles, 3,000 bombs, 3 million cartridges and hundreds of tons of explosives. Ben- Gurion wanted every soldier and bullet he could get and ordered the ship to dock. But Begin said the arms should go to Irgun troops. Ben- Gurion refused, at which point, Irgun men headed to the beach to unload the arms. Ben-Gurion realized the challenge he faced. As he put it in his memoir, I decided this must be the moment of truth. Either the government's authority would prevail and we could then proceed to consolidate our military force or the whole concept of nationhood would fall apart. He ordered the Altalena shelled. After the volunteers disembarked, Begin boarded the ship, as did other Irgun fighters. The shelling began. When one hit and the Altalena burst into flames, Begin was hurled overboard by his men and carried ashore. The ship sank, along with most of its arms and more than a dozen Irgun members. Others were arrested, and the Irgun's independent activities were finally over. In his 1953 memoir, The Revolt, Begin says he had known hunger and sorrow in his life but had wept only twice once, out of joy, when the state was declared, and the second time, in grief, the night the Altalena was destroyed. The point for the Palestinians is that until their radical militias are put out of action, those groups will always be able to play the role of spoilers. In 1996, the Palestinian Authority showed itself capable of confrontation, making widespread arrests of extremists in the wake of several suicide bombings. Thousands of militants were arrested. But most were eventually let go. The Palestinians must do it again and in a definitive manner. The Altalena is a symbol of that task because it involved genuine confrontation yet little loss of life. As Ben- Gurion put it in his memoir: The incident caused near civil war among the Jews themselves. But in the eyes of the world we had affirmed ourselves as a nation. When the smoke cleared and the indignation died down, the population at large put itself squarely behind its government. The days of private armies were past, and, in the manner of every other well-organized state, we had the makings of a central command under government control.  -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 5, 2003 10:31 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Futurework] Because We Can Karen,   My guess is that it is:           just realized that all the pressure applied to the Palestinians to change their stripes and demote Arafat         will have the end result of exposing Israel's feet in concrete attitude since the Palestinians are moving         ahead   However, to move ahead, he is going to need to jettison his links with the Israeli far right and hook up with the Israeli center. If he doesn't move to do this, not much will happen. Also, while Hammaas made some conciliatory remarks, the Islamic Jihaad has not.   Bill   On Thu, 5 Jun 2003 07:18:03 -0700 "Karen Watters Cole" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Friedman is quite honest here, both in trying to "separate the wheat from the chafe" and in his attempts to cover his previous commentary where he was more approving of the Bush2 stated reasons for going to war.  It's been said that before a war there are some believed good reasons.  Afterwards, there are never any good reasons.  You always wonder if another way would not have been more productive and less costly.   However, this is not just about one local neighborhood, Iraq, it is about Israel and Palestine, the best case study for human ineptitude and institutionalized politics, historical animosity and historical opportunity as we have in prima geopolitics today.      Since I've posted many times here about the need for some heroic self-sacrifice on the part of the political leadership in Israel and Palestine, let me share that I am cautiously optimistic and holding my breath regarding recent developments.  I am waiting to see if Sharon has had a midnight "legacy conversion experience" or just realized that all the pressure applied to the Palestinians to change their stripes and demote Arafat will have the end result of exposing Israel's feet in concrete attitude since the Palestinians are moving ahead.  Lots of corny photo cops abound, but I am waiting to see not the Kodak moments, but the WYSIWYG, or What you see is what you get moments. - KWC   Because We Could By Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, June 4, 2003   The failure of the Bush team to produce any weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.'s) in Iraq is becoming a big, big story. But is it the real story we should be concerned with? No. It was the wrong issue before the war, and it's the wrong issue now.   Why? Because there were actually four reasons for this war: the real reason, the right reason, the moral reason and the stated reason.   The "real reason" for this war, which was never stated, was that after 9/11 America needed to hit someone in the Arab-Muslim world. Afghanistan wasn't enough because a terrorism bubble had built up over there - a bubble that posed a real threat to the open societies of the West and needed to be punctured. This terrorism bubble said that plowing airplanes into the World Trade Center was O.K., having Muslim preachers say it was O.K. was O.K., having state-run newspapers call people who did such things "martyrs" was O.K. and allowing Muslim charities to raise money for such "martyrs" was O.K. Not only was all this seen as O.K., there was a feeling among radical Muslims that suicide bombing would level the balance of power between the Arab world and the West, because we had gone soft and their activists were ready to die.   The only way to puncture that bubble was for American soldiers, men and women, to go into the heart of the Arab-Muslim world, house to house, and make clear that we are ready to kill, and to die, to prevent our open society from being undermined by this terrorism bubble. Smashing Saudi Arabia or Syria would have been fine. But we hit Saddam for one simple reason: because we could, and because he deserved it and because he was right in the heart of that world. And don't believe the nonsense that this had no effect. Every neighboring government - and 98 percent of terrorism is about what governments let happen - got the message. If you talk to U.S. soldiers in Iraq they will tell you this is what the war was about.   The "right reason" for this war was the need to partner with Iraqis, post-Saddam, to build a progressive Arab regime. Because the real weapons of mass destruction that threaten us were never Saddam's missiles. The real weapons that threaten us are the growing number of angry, humiliated young Arabs and Muslims, who are produced by failed or failing Arab states - young people who hate America more than they love life. Helping to build a decent Iraq as a model for others - and solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - are the necessary steps for defusing the ideas of mass destruction, which are what really threaten us.   The "moral reason" for the war was that Saddam's regime was an engine of mass destruction and genocide that had killed thousands of his own people, and neighbors, and needed to be stopped.   But because the Bush team never dared to spell out the real reason for the war, and (wrongly) felt that it could never win public or world support for the right reasons and the moral reasons, it opted for the stated reason: the notion that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction that posed an immediate threat to America. I argued before the war that Saddam posed no such threat to America, and had no links with Al Qaeda, and that we couldn't take the nation to war "on the wings of a lie." I argued that Mr. Bush should fight this war for the right reasons and the moral reasons. But he stuck with this W.M.D. argument for P.R. reasons.   Once the war was over and I saw the mass graves and the true extent of Saddam's genocidal evil, my view was that Mr. Bush did not need to find any W.M.D.'s to justify the war for me. I still feel that way. But I have to admit that I've always been fighting my own war in Iraq. Mr. Bush took the country into his war. And if it turns out that he fabricated the evidence for his war (which I wouldn't conclude yet), that would badly damage America and be a very serious matter.   But my ultimate point is this: Finding Iraq's W.M.D.'s is necessary to preserve the credibility of the Bush team, the neocons, Tony Blair and the C.I.A. But rebuilding Iraq is necessary to win the war. I won't feel one whit more secure if we find Saddam's W.M.D.'s, because I never felt he would use them on us. But I will feel terribly insecure if we fail to put Iraq onto a progressive path. Because if that doesn't happen, the terrorism bubble will reinflate and bad things will follow. Mr. Bush's credibility rides on finding W.M.D.'s, but America's future, and the future of the Mideast, rides on our building a different Iraq. We must not forget that.     http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/04/opinion/04FRIE.html