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I wonder what
the Carlyle Group has to say about this? - KWC THE STRATFOR WEEKLY by Dr. George Friedman, 02
September 2003 An Unlikely Alliance
Summary: Though the recent death of SCIRI leader Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir
al-Hakim would appear to be raising the level of turmoil within Iraq, it might
in fact help to push the United States and Iran toward a powerful -- if
seemingly unlikely -- alignment. Analysis: The death of Shiite
Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), appears to have exacerbated the turmoil in
Iraq. In fact, it opens the door to some dramatic shifts that might help
stabilize the U.S. position in Iran. Indeed, it might even lead to a
fundamental redrawing of the geopolitical maps of the region -- as dramatic as
the U.S.-Chinese alignment against the Soviet Union in the 1970s. To understand what is happening,
we must note two important aspects of the al-Hakim affair. First, though far
from being pro-American, al-Hakim was engaged in limited cooperation with the
United States, including -- through SCIRI -- participating in the
U.S.-sponsored Iraq Governing Council. Second, upon his death, Iran announced a
three-day mourning period in his honor. Al-Hakim, who had lived in exile in
Iran during much of Saddam Hussein's rule in Baghdad, was an integral part of
the Shiite governing apparatus -- admired and loved in Iran. We therefore have two facts.
First, al-Hakim was engaged in limited but meaningful collaboration with the
United States, which appears to be why he was killed. Second, he was intimately
connected to Iranian ruling circles, and not just to those circles that
Americans like to call "reformers." If we stop and think about it,
these two facts would appear incompatible, but in reality they reveal a growing
movement toward alignment between the United States and Iran. The United States has realized
that it cannot pacify Iraq on its own. One proposal, floated by the State
Department, calls for a United Nations force -- under U.S. command -- to take
control of Iraq. This raises three questions. First, why would any sane country
put its forces at risk -- under U.S. command, no less -- to solve America's
problems if it doesn't have to? Second, what would additional outside forces,
as unfamiliar with Iraq as U.S. forces are, add to the mix, save more
confusion? Finally, what price would the United States have to pay for U.N.
cooperation; for instance, would the U.N. presence place restrictions on U.S.
operations against al Qaeda? Another proposal, floated by
Defense Advisory Board Chairman Richard Perle, suggests that the way out is to
turn Iraq over to Iraqis as quickly as possible rather than prolonging a U.S.
occupation. The problem with Perle's proposal is that it assumes a generic
Iraq, unattached to any subgrouping -- religious, ethnic or ideological -- that
not only is ready to take the reins, but is capable of governing. In other
words, Perle's proposal would turn Iraq over to whom? Putting the Kurdish issue aside,
the fundamental fault line running through Iraqi society is the division
between Sunni and Shiite. The Shiite majority dominates the area south of
Baghdad. The Sunni minority, which very much includes Hussein and most of the
Baath Party's national apparatus, spent the past generation brutalizing the
Shiites, and Hussein's group also spent that time making certain that Sunnis
who were not part of their tribe were marginalized. Today, Iraq is a fragmented
entity where the center of gravity, the Baath Party, has been shattered and
there is no substitute for it. However, embedded in Perle's
proposal is a simple fact. If there is a cohesive group in Iraq -- indeed a
majority group -- it is the Shiites. Although ideologically and tribally
fragmented, the Shiites of Iraq are far better organized than U.S. intelligence
reports estimated before the war. This is due to the creation of a clandestine
infrastructure, sponsored by Iranian intelligence, following the failure of
U.S.-encouraged Shiite uprisings in the 1990s. While Washington was worried
about the disintegration of Iraq and the growth of Iranian power, Tehran was
preparing for the day that Hussein's regime would either collapse or be
destroyed by the United States. As a result, and somewhat to the
surprise of U.S. intelligence, organizations were in place in Iraq's Shiite
regions that were able to maintain order and exercise control after the war.
British authorities realized this early on and tried to transfer power from
British forces in Basra to local control, much to U.S. displeasure. Initially, Washington viewed the
Iranian-sponsored organization of the Shiite regions as a threat to its control
of Iraq. The initial U.S. perception was that the Shiites, being bitterly
anti-Hussein, would respond enthusiastically to their liberation by U.S.
forces. In fact, the response was cautious and sullen. Officials in Washington
also assumed that the collapse of the Iraqi army would mean the collapse of
Sunni resistance. Under this theory, the United States would have an easy time
in the Sunni regions -- it already had excellent relations in the Kurdish
regions -- but would face a challenge from Iran in the south. The game actually played out
very differently. The United States did not have an easy time in the Sunni
triangle. To the contrary: A clearly planned guerrilla war kicked off weeks
after the conquest of Baghdad and has continued since. Had the rising spread to
the Sunni regions, or had the Sunnis launched an intifada with massed
demonstrations, the U.S. position in Iraq would have become enormously more
difficult, if not untenable. The Sunnis staged some protests
to demonstrate their capabilities to the United States, but they did not rise
en masse. In general, they have contented themselves with playing a waiting
game -- intensifying their organization in the region, carrying out some
internal factional struggles, but watching and waiting. Most interesting,
rather than simply rejecting the U.S. occupation, they simultaneously called
for its end while participating in it. The key goes back to Iran and to
the Sunni-Shiite split within the Islamic world. Iran has a geopolitical
problem, one it has had for centuries: It faces a threat from the north,
through the Caucasus, and a threat from the west, from whatever entity occupies
the Tigris and Euphrates basin. When both threats are active, as they were for
much of the Cold War, Iran must have outside support, and that support
frequently turns into domination. Iran's dream is that it might be secure on
both fronts. That rarely happens. The end of the Cold War has
created an unstable area in the Caucasus that actually helps secure Iran's
interests. The Caucasus might be in chaos, but there is no great imperial power
about to push down into Iran. Moreover, at about the same time, the threat
posed by Iraq abated after the United States defeated it and neutralized its
armed forces during Desert Storm. This created a period of unprecedented
security for Iran that Tehran exploited by working to reconstruct its military
and moving forward on nuclear weapons. However, Iran's real interest is
not simply Iraq's neutralization; that
could easily change. Its real interest is in
dominating Iraq. An Iranian-dominated Iraq
would mean two things: First, the only threat to Iran would come from the north
and Iran could concentrate on blocking that threat; second, it would make Iran
the major native regional power in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, were
Iranian-sponsored and sympathetic Shiite groups to come to power in Iraq, it
would represent a massive geopolitical coup for the United States. Initially, this was the opposite
of anything the United States wanted. One
of the reasons for invading Iraq was to be able to control Iran and its nuclear
capability. But the guerrilla war in the north has created a new strategic
reality for Washington. The issue at the moment is not how to project power
throughout the region, but how to simply pacify Iraq. The ambitions of April
have given way to the realities of September. The United States needs a native
force in Iraq to carry the brunt of the pacification program. The Shiites, unlike the United Nations, already would deliver a
fairly pacified south and probably would enjoy giving some payback to the
Sunnis in the north. Certainly, they are both more likely to achieve success
and more willing to bear the burden of pacification than is the United States,
let alone any U.N. member willing to send troops. It is not, at the moment, a
question of what the United States wants; it is a question of what it can have. The initial idea was that the
United States would sponsor a massive rising of disaffected youth in Iran. In
fact, U.S. intelligence supported dissident university students in a plan to do
just that. However, Iranian security forces crushed the rebellion effortlessly
-- and with it any U.S. hopes of forcing regime change in Iran through internal
means. If this were to happen, it would not happen in a time frame relative to
Washington's problems in Iraq or problems with al Qaeda. Therefore, the Iranian
regime, such as it is, is the regime the United States must deal with. And that
regime holds the key to the Iraqi Shiites. The United States has been
negotiating both overtly and covertly with Iran on a range of issues. There has
been enough progress to keep southern Iraq quiet, but not enough to reach a
definitive breakthrough. The issue has not been Iranian nuclear power.
Certainly, the Iranians have been producing a nuclear weapon. They made certain
that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency saw weapons-grade
uranium during an inspection in recent days. It is an important bargaining
chip. But as with North Korea, Iranian
leaders know that nuclear weapons are more valuable as a bargaining chip than
as a reality. Asymmetry leads to eradication
of nuclear threats. Put less pretentiously, Tehran must assume that the United
States -- or Israel -- will destroy any nuclear capability before it becomes a
threat. Moreover, if it has nuclear capability, what would it do with it? Even
as a deterrent, retaliation would lead to national annihilation. The value of
nuclear weapons in this context is less real than apparent -- and therefore
more valuable in negotiations than deployment. Tehran has hinted several times
that its nuclear program is negotiable regarding weapons. Officials also have indicated by word and deed to the United States
that they are prepared to encourage Iraqi Shiites to cooperate with the U.S.
occupation. The issue on the table now is whether the Shiites will raise the
level of cooperation from passive to active --
whether they will move from not doing harm to actively helping to suppress the
Sunni rising. This is the line that they are
considering crossing -- and the issue is not only whether they cross, but
whether the United States wants them to cross. Obviously, the United States needs
help. On the other hand, the Iranian price is enormous. Domination of Iraq
means enormous power in the Gulf region. In the past, Saudi Arabia's
sensibilities would have mattered; today, the Saudis matter less. U.S. leaders understand that
making such an agreement means problems down the road. On the other hand, the
United States has some pretty major problems right now anyway. Moreover -- and
this is critical -- the Sunni-Shiite fault line
defines the Islamic world. Splitting Islam along those lines, fomenting
conflict within that world, certainly would divert attention from the United
States: Iran working against al Qaeda would
have more than marginal value, but not, however, as much as Saudi Arabia
pulling out the stops. Against the background of the
U.S.-Iranian negotiation is the idea that the Saudis, terrified of a triumphant
Iran, will panic and begin crushing the extreme Wahhabis in the kingdom. This
has delayed a U.S. decision, as has the legitimate fear that a deal with Iran
would unleash the genie. But of course, the other fear is that if Iran loses
patience, it will call the Shiite masses into the streets and there will be
hell to pay in Iraq. The death of SCIRI leader
al-Hakim, therefore, represents a break point. Whether it was Shiite dissidents
or Sunnis that killed him, his death costs the Iranians a key ally and drives
home the risks they are running with delay. They are vulnerable in Iraq. This
opens the door for Tehran to move forward in a deal with the United States.
Washington needs to make something happen soon. This deal might never be
formalized. Neither Iranian nor American politics would easily swallow an overt
alliance. On the other hand, there is plenty of precedent for U.S.-Iranian
cooperation on a covert level. Of course, this would be fairly open and obvious
cooperation -- a major mobilization of Shiite strength in Iraq on behalf of the
United States -- regardless of the rhetoric. Currently, this seems to be the
most likely evolution of events: Washington
gets Tehran's help in putting down the Sunnis. The United States gets a civil
war in the Muslim world. The United States gets Iran to
dial back its nuclear program. Iran gets to dominate Iraq. The United States
gets all the benefits in the near term. Iran gets its historical dream. If
Roosevelt could side with Stalin against Hitler, and Nixon with Mao against
Brezhnev, this collaboration certainly is not without precedence in U.S.
history. But boy, would it be a campaign issue -- in both countries. |
