How to get to the bottom of this? Who to trust with the answers? A *balanced* Presidential Commission, with open televised hearings might be the only way to go. Pick a staff of respected net experts, experts who are trusted and can't be muzzled.
arthur -----Original Message----- From: Selma Singer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 9:41 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Futurework] Fw: All the President's votes? [long; important] I believe this is the single most important issue facing Americans today, bar none. Selma ----- Original Message ----- : Tuesday, October 14, 2003 8:58 PM Subject: All the President's votes? > A quiet revolution is taking place in US politics. By the time it's over, > the integrity of elections will be in the unchallenged, unscrutinised > control of a few large - and pro-Republican - corporations. Andrew Gumbel > wonders if democracy in America can survive > > http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=452972 > > The Independent, London > 14 October 2003 > > Something very odd happened in the mid-term elections in Georgia last > November. On the eve of the vote, opinion polls showed Roy Barnes, the > incumbent Democratic governor, leading by between nine and 11 points. In a > somewhat closer, keenly watched Senate race, polls indicated that Max > Cleland, the popular Democrat up for re-election, was ahead by two to five > points against his Republican challenger, Saxby Chambliss. > > Those figures were more or less what political experts would have expected > in state with a long tradition of electing Democrats to statewide office. > But then the results came in, and all of Georgia appeared to have been > turned upside down. Barnes lost the governorship to the Republican, Sonny > Perdue, 46 per cent to 51 per cent, a swing of as much as 16 percentage > points from the last opinion polls. Cleland lost to Chambliss 46 per cent > to 53, a last-minute swing of 9 to 12 points. > > Red-faced opinion pollsters suddenly had a lot of explaining to do and > launched internal investigations. Political analysts credited the upset - > part of a pattern of Republican successes around the country - to a huge > campaigning push by President Bush in the final days of the race. They > also said that Roy Barnes had lost because of a surge of "angry white men" > punishing him for eradicating all but a vestige of the old confederate > symbol from the state flag. > > But something about these explanations did not make sense, and they have > made even less sense over time. When the Georgia secretary of state's > office published its demographic breakdown of the election earlier this > year, it turned out there was no surge of angry white men; in fact, the > only subgroup showing even a modest increase in turnout was black women. > > There were also big, puzzling swings in partisan loyalties in different > parts of the state. In 58 counties, the vote was broadly in line with the > primary election. In 27 counties in Republican-dominated north Georgia, > however, Max Cleland unaccountably scored 14 percentage points higher than > he had in the primaries. And in 74 counties in the Democrat south, Saxby > Chambliss garnered a whopping 22 points more for the Republicans than the > party as a whole had won less than three months earlier. > > Now, weird things like this do occasionally occur in elections, and the > figures, on their own, are not proof of anything except statistical > anomalies worthy of further study. But in Georgia there was an extra > reason to be suspicious. Last November, the state became the first in the > country to conduct an election entirely with touchscreen voting machines, > after lavishing $54m (33m) on a new system that promised to deliver the > securest, most up-to-date, most voter-friendly election in the history of > the republic. The machines, however, turned out to be anything but > reliable. With academic studies showing the Georgia touchscreens to be > poorly programmed, full of security holes and prone to tampering, and with > thousands of similar machines from different companies being introduced at > high speed across the country, computer voting may, in fact, be US > democracy's own 21st-century nightmare. > > In many Georgia counties last November, the machines froze up, causing > long delays as technicians tried to reboot them. In heavily Democratic > Fulton County, in downtown Atlanta, 67 memory cards from the voting > machines went missing, delaying certification of the results there for 10 > days. In neighbouring DeKalb County, 10 memory cards were unaccounted for; > they were later recovered from terminals that had supposedly broken down > and been taken out of service. > > It is still unclear exactly how results from these missing cards were > tabulated, or if they were counted at all. And we will probably never > know, for a highly disturbing reason. The vote count was not conducted by > state elections officials, but by the private company that sold Georgia > the voting machines in the first place, under a strict trade-secrecy > contract that made it not only difficult but actually illegal - on pain of > stiff criminal penalties - for the state to touch the equipment or examine > the proprietary software to ensure the machines worked properly. There was > not even a paper trail to follow up. The machines were fitted with thermal > printing devices that could theoretically provide a written record of > voters' choices, but these were not activated. Consequently, recounts were > impossible. Had Diebold Inc, the manufacturer, been asked to review the > votes, all it could have done was programme the computers to spit out the > same data as before, flawed or not. > > Astonishingly, these are the terms under which America's top three > computer voting machine manufacturers - Diebold, Sequoia and Election > Systems and Software (ES&S) - have sold their products to election > officials around the country. Far from questioning the need for rigid > trade secrecy and the absence of a paper record, secretaries of state and > their technical advisers - anxious to banish memories of the hanging chad > fiasco and other associated disasters in the 2000 presidential recount in > Florida - have, for the most part, welcomed the touchscreen voting > machines as a technological miracle solution. > > Georgia was not the only state last November to see big last-minute swings > in voting patterns. There were others in Colorado, Minnesota, Illinois and > New Hampshire - all in races that had been flagged as key partisan > battlegrounds, and all won by the Republican Party. Again, this was widely > attributed to the campaigning efforts of President Bush and the > demoralisation of a Democratic Party too timid to speak out against the > looming war in Iraq. > > Strangely, however, the pollsters made no comparable howlers in lower-key > races whose outcome was not seriously contested. Another anomaly, perhaps. > What, then, is one to make of the fact that the owners of the three major > computer voting machines are all prominent Republican Party donors? Or of > a recent political fund-raising letter written to Ohio Republicans by > Walden O'Dell, Diebold's chief executive, in which he said he was > "committed to helping Ohio to deliver its electoral votes to the president > next year" - even as his company was bidding for the contract on the > state's new voting machinery? > > Alarmed and suspicious, a group of Georgia citizens began to look into > last November's election to see whether there was any chance the results > might have been deliberately or accidentally manipulated. Their research > proved unexpectedly, and disturbingly, fruitful. > > First, they wanted to know if the software had undergone adequate > checking. Under state and federal law, all voting machinery and component > parts must be certified before use in an election. So an Atlanta graphic > designer called Denis Wright wrote to the secretary of state's office for > a copy of the certification letter. Clifford Tatum, assistant director of > legal affairs for the election division, wrote back: "We have determined > that no records exist in the Secretary of State's office regarding a > certification letter from the lab certifying the version of software used > on Election Day." Mr Tatum said it was possible the relevant documents > were with Gary Powell, an official at the Georgia Technology Authority, so > campaigners wrote to him as well. Mr Powell responded he was "not sure > what you mean by the words 'please provide written certification > documents' ". > > "If the machines were not certified, then right there the election was > illegal," Mr Wright says. The secretary of state's office has yet to > demonstrate anything to the contrary. The investigating citizens then > considered the nature of the software itself. Shortly after the election, > a Diebold technician called Rob Behler came forward and reported that, > when the machines were about to be shipped to Georgia polling stations in > the summer of 2002, they performed so erratically that their software had > to be amended with a last-minute "patch". Instead of being transmitted via > disk - a potentially time-consuming process, especially since its author > was in Canada, not Georgia - the patch was posted, along with the entire > election software package, on an open-access FTP, or file transfer > protocol site, on the internet. > > That, according to computer experts, was a violation of the most basic of > security precautions, opening all sorts of possibilities for the > introduction of rogue or malicious code. At the same time, however, it > gave campaigners a golden opportunity to circumvent Diebold's own secrecy > demands and see exactly how the system worked. Roxanne Jekot, a computer > programmer with 20 years' experience, and an occasional teacher at Lanier > Technical College northeast of Atlanta, did a line-by-line review and > found "enough to stand your hair on end". > > "There were security holes all over it," she says, "from the most basic > display of the ballot on the screen all the way through the operating > system." Although the programme was designed to be run on the Windows 2000 > NT operating system, which has numerous safeguards to keep out intruders, > Ms Jekot found it worked just fine on the much less secure Windows 98; the > 2000 NT security features were, as she put it, "nullified". > > Also embedded in the software were the comments of the programmers working > on it. One described what he and his colleagues had just done as "a gross > hack". Elsewhere was the remark: "This doesn't really work." "Not a > confidence builder, would you say?" Ms Jekot says. "They were operating in > panic mode, cobbling together something that would work for the moment, > knowing that at some point they would have to go back to figure out how to > make it work more permanently." She found some of the code downright > suspect - for example, an overtly meaningless instruction to divide the > number of write-in votes by 1. "From a logical standpoint there is > absolutely no reason to do that," she says. "It raises an immediate red > flag." > > Mostly, though, she was struck by the shoddiness of much of the > programming. "I really expected to have some difficulty reviewing the > source code because it would be at a higher level than I am accustomed > to," she says. "In fact, a lot of this stuff looked like the homework my > first-year students might have turned in." Diebold had no specific comment > on Ms Jekot's interpretations, offering only a blanket caution about the > complexity of election systems "often not well understood by individuals > with little real-world experience". > > But Ms Jekot was not the only one to examine the Diebold software and find > it lacking. In July, a group of researchers from the Information Security > Institute at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore discovered what they > called "stunning flaws". These included putting the password in the source > code, a basic security no-no; manipulating the voter smart-card function > so one person could cast more than one vote; and other loopholes that > could theoretically allow voters' ballot choices to be altered without > their knowledge, either on the spot or by remote access. > > Diebold issued a detailed response, saying that the Johns Hopkins report > was riddled with false assumptions, inadequate information and "a > multitude of false conclusions". Substantially similar findings, however, > were made in a follow-up study on behalf of the state of Maryland, in > which a group of computer security experts catalogued 328 software flaws, > 26 of them critical, putting the whole system "at high risk of > compromise". "If these vulnerabilities are exploited, significant impact > could occur on the accuracy, integrity, and availability of election > results," their report says. > > Ever since the Johns Hopkins study, Diebold has sought to explain away the > open FTP file as an old, incomplete version of its election package. The > claim cannot be independently verified, because of the trade-secrecy > agreement, and not everyone is buying it. "It is documented throughout the > code who changed what and when. We have the history of this programme from > 1996 to 2002," Ms Jekot says. "I have no doubt this is the software used > in the elections." Diebold now says it has upgraded its encryption and > password features - but only on its Maryland machines. > > A key security question concerned compatibility with Microsoft Windows, > and Ms Jekot says just three programmers, all of them senior Diebold > executives, were involved in this aspect of the system. One of these, > Diebold's vice-president of research and development, Talbot Iredale, > wrote an e-mail in April 2002 - later obtained by the campaigners - making > it clear that he wanted to shield the operating system from Wylie Labs, an > independent testing agency involved in the early certification process. > > The reason that emerges from the e-mail is that he wanted to make the > software compatible with WinCE 3.0, an operating system used for handhelds > and PDAs; in other words, a system that could be manipulated from a remote > location. "We do not want Wyle [sic] reviewing and certifying the > operating systems," the e-mail reads. "Therefore can we keep to a minimum > the references to the WinCE 3.0 operating system." > > In an earlier intercepted e-mail, this one from Ken Clark in Diebold's > research and development department, the company explained upfront to > another independent testing lab that the supposedly secure software system > could be accessed without a password, and its contents easily changed > using the Microsoft Access programme. Mr Clark says he had considered > putting in a password requirement to stop dealers and customers doing > "stupid things", but that the easy access had often "got people out of a > bind". Astonishingly, the representative from the independent testing lab > did not see anything wrong with this and granted certification to the part > of the software programme she was inspecting - a pattern of lackadaisical > oversight that was replicated all the way to the top of the political > chain of command in Georgia, and in many other parts of the country. > > Diebold has not contested the authenticity of the e-mails, now openly > accessible on the internet. However, Diebold did caution that, as the > e-mails were taken from a Diebold Election systems website in March 2003 > by an illegal hack, the nature of the information stolen could have been > revised or manipulated. > > There are two reasons why the United States is rushing to overhaul its > voting systems. The first is the Florida dbcle in the Bush-Gore election; > no state wants to be the centre of that kind of attention again. And the > second is the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), signed by President Bush last > October, which promises an unprecedented $3.9bn (2.3bn) to the states to > replace their old punchcard-and-lever machines. However, enthusiasm for > the new technology seems to be motivated as much by a bureaucratic love of > spending as by a love of democratic accountability. According to Rebecca > Mercuri, a research fellow at Harvard's John F Kennedy School of > Government and a specialist in voting systems, the shockingly high error > rate of punchcard machines (3-5 per cent in Florida in 2000) has been > known to people in the elections business for years. It was only after it > became public knowledge in the last presidential election that anybody > felt moved to do anything about it. > > The problem is, computer touchscreen machines and other so-called DRE > (direct recording electronic) systems are significantly less reliable than > punchcards, irrespective of their vulnerability to interference. In a > series of research papers for the Voting Technology Project, a joint > venture of the prestigious Massachussetts and California Institutes of > Technology, DREs were found to be among the worst performing systems. No > method, the MIT/CalTech study conceded, worked more reliably than > hand-counting paper ballots - an option that US electoral officials seem > to consider hopelessly antiquated, or at least impractical in elections > combining multiple local, state and national races for offices from > President down to dogcatcher. > > The clear disadvantages and dangers associated with DREs have not deterred > state and county authorities from throwing themselves headlong into > touchscreen technology. More than 40,000 machines made by Diebold alone > are already in use in 37 states, and most are touchscreens. County after > county is poised to spend hundreds of millions of dollars more on computer > voting before next spring's presidential primaries. "They say this is the > direction they have to go in to have fair elections, but the rush to go > towards computerisation is very dubious," Dr Mercuri says. "One has to > wonder why this is going on, because the way it is set up it takes away > the checks and balances we have in a democratic society. That's the whole > point of paper trails and recounts." > > Anyone who has struggled with an interactive display in a museum knows how > dodgy touchscreens can be. If they don't freeze, they easily become > misaligned, which means they can record the wrong data. In Dallas, during > early voting before last November's election, people found that no matter > how often they tried to press a Democrat button, the Republican > candidate's name would light up. After a court hearing, Diebold agreed to > take down 18 machines with apparent misalignment problems. "And those were > the ones where you could visually spot a problem," Dr Mercuri says. "What > about what you don't see? Just because your vote shows up on the screen > for the Democrats, how do you know it is registering inside the machine > for the Democrats?" > > Other problems have shown up periodically: machines that register zero > votes, or machines that indicate voters coming to the polling station but > not voting, even when a single race with just two candidates was on the > ballot. Dr Mercuri was part of a lawsuit in Palm Beach County in which she > and other plaintiffs tried to have a suspect Sequoia machine examined, > only to run up against the brick wall of the trade-secret agreement. "It > makes it really hard to show their product has been tampered with," she > says, "if it's a felony to inspect it." > > As for the possibilities of foul play, Dr Mercuri says they are virtually > limitless. "There are literally hundreds of ways to do this," she says. > "There are hundreds of ways to embed a rogue series of commands into the > code and nobody would ever know because the nature of programming is so > complex. The numbers would all tally perfectly." Tampering with an > election could be something as simple as a "denial-of-service" attack, in > which the machines simply stop working for an extended period, deterring > voters faced with the prospect of long lines. Or it could be done with > invasive computer codes known in the trade by such nicknames as "Trojan > horses" or "Easter eggs". Detecting one of these, Dr Mercuri says, would > be almost impossible unless the investigator knew in advance it was there > and how to trigger it. Computer researcher Theresa Hommel, who is alarmed > by touchscreen systems, has constructed a simulated voting machine in > which the same candidate always wins, no matter what data you put in. She > calls her model the Fraud-o-matic, and it is available online at > www.wheresthepaper.org. > > It is not just touchscreens which are at risk from error or malicious > intrusion. Any computer system used to tabulate votes is vulnerable. An > optical scan of ballots in Scurry County, Texas, last November erroneously > declared a landslide victory for the Republican candidate for county > commissioner; a subsequent hand recount showed that the Democrat had in > fact won. In Comal County, Texas, a computerised optical scan found that > three different candidates had won their races with exactly 18,181 votes. > There was no recount or investigation, even though the coincidence, with > those recurring 1s and 8s, looked highly suspicious. In heavily Democrat > Broward County, Florida - which had switched to touchscreens in the wake > of the hanging chad furore - more than 100,000 votes were found to have > gone "missing" on election day. The votes were reinstated, but the glitch > was not adequately explained. One local official blamed it on a "minor > software thing". > > Most suspect of all was the governor's race in Alabama, where the > incumbent Democrat, Don Siegelman, was initially declared the winner. > Sometime after midnight, when polling station observers and most staff had > gone home, the probate judge responsible for elections in rural Baldwin > County suddenly "discovered" that Mr Siegelman had been awarded 7,000 > votes too many. In a tight election, the change was enough to hand victory > to his Republican challenger, Bob Riley. County officials talked vaguely > of a computer tabulation error, or a lightning strike messing up the > machines, but the real reason was never ascertained because the state's > Republican attorney general refused to authorise a recount or any > independent ballot inspection. > > According to an analysis by James Gundlach, a sociology professor at > Auburn University in Alabama, the result in Baldwin County was full of > wild deviations from the statistical norms established both by this and > preceding elections. And he adds: "There is simply no way that electronic > vote counting can produce two sets of results without someone using > computer programmes in ways that were not intended. In other words, the > fact that two sets of results were reported is sufficient evidence in and > of itself that the vote tabulation process was compromised." Although talk > of voting fraud quickly subsided, Alabama has now amended its election > laws to make recounts mandatory in close races. > > The possibility of flaws in the electoral process is not something that > gets discussed much in the United States. The attitude seems to be: we are > the greatest democracy in the world, so the system must be fair. That has > certainly been the prevailing view in Georgia, where even leading > Democrats - their prestige on the line for introducing touchscreen voting > in the first place - have fought tooth-and-nail to defend the integrity of > the system. In a phone interview, the head of the Georgia Technology > Authority who brought Diebold machines to the state, Larry Singer, blamed > the growing chorus of criticism on "fear of technology", despite the fact > that many prominent critics are themselves computer scientists. He says: > "Are these machines flawless? No. Would you have more confidence if they > were completely flawless? Yes. Is there such a thing as a flawless system? > No." Mr Singer, who left the GTA straight after the election and took a 50 > per cent pay cut to work for Sun Microsystems, insists that voters are > more likely to have their credit card information stolen by a busboy in a > restaurant than to have their vote compromised by touchscreen technology. > > Voting machines are sold in the United States in much the same way as > other government contracts: through intensive lobbying, wining and dining. > At a recent national conference of clerks, election officials and > treasurers in Denver, attendees were treated to black-tie dinners and > other perks, including free expensive briefcases stamped with Sequoia's > company logo alongside the association's own symbol. Nobody in power seems > to find this worrying, any more than they worried when Sequoia's southern > regional sales manager, Phil Foster, was indicted in Louisiana a couple of > years ago for "conspiracy to commit money laundering and malfeasance". The > charges were dropped in exchange for his testimony against Louisiana's > state commissioner of elections. Similarly, last year, the Arkansas > secretary of state, Bill McCuen, pleaded guilty to taking bribes and > kickbacks involving a precursor company to ES&S; the voting machine > company executive who testified against him in exchange for immunity is > now an ES&S vice-president. > > If much of the worry about vote-tampering is directed at the Republicans, > it is largely because the big three touchscreen companies are all big > Republican donors, pouring hundreds of thousands of dollars into party > coffers in the past few years. The ownership issue is, of course, > compounded by the lack of transparency. Or, as Dr Mercuri puts it: "If the > machines were independently verifiable, who would give a crap who owns > them?" As it is, fears that US democracy is being hijacked by corporate > interests are being fuelled by links between the big three and broader > business interests, as well as extremist organisations. Two of the early > backers of American Information Systems, a company later merged into ES&S, > are also prominent supporters of the Chalcedon Foundation, an organisation > that espouses theocratic governance according to a literal reading of the > Bible and advocates capital punishment for blasphemy and homosexuality. > > The chief executive of American Information Systems in the early Nineties > was Chuck Hagel, who went on to run for elective office and became the > first Republican in 24 years to be elected to the Senate from Nebraska, > cheered on by the Omaha World-Herald newspaper which also happens to be a > big investor in ES&S. In yet another clamorous conflict of interest, 80 > per cent of Mr Hagel's winning votes - both in 1996 and again in 2002 - > were counted, under the usual terms of confidentiality, by his own > company. > > In theory, the federal government should be monitoring the transition to > computer technology and rooting out abuses. Under the Help America Vote > Act, the Bush administration is supposed to establish a sizeable oversight > committee, headed by two Democrats and two Republicans, as well as a > technical panel to determine standards for new voting machinery. The four > commission heads were supposed to have been in place by last February, but > so far just one has been appointed. The technical panel also remains > unconstituted, even though the new machines it is supposed to vet are > already being sold in large quantities - a state of affairs Dr Mercuri > denounces as "an abomination". > > One of the conditions states have to fulfil to receive federal funding for > the new voting machines, meanwhile, is a consolidation of voter rolls at > state rather than county level. This provision sends a chill down the > spine of anyone who has studied how Florida consolidated its own voter > rolls just before the 2000 election, purging the names of tens of > thousands of eligible voters, most of them African Americans and most of > them Democrats, through misuse of an erroneous list of convicted felons > commissioned by Katherine Harris, the secretary of state doubling as > George Bush's Florida campaign manager. Despite a volley of lawsuits, the > incorrect list was still in operation in last November's mid-terms, > raising all sorts of questions about what other states might now do with > their own voter rolls. It is not that the Act's consolidation provision is > in itself evidence of a conspiracy to throw elections, but it does leave > open that possibility. > > Meanwhile, the administration has been pushing new voting technology of > its own to help overseas citizens and military personnel, both natural > Republican Party constituencies, to vote more easily over the internet. > Internet voting is notoriously insecure and open to abuse by just about > anyone with rudimentary hacking skills; just last January, an experiment > in internet voting in Toronto was scuppered by a Slammer worm attack. > Undeterred, the administration has gone ahead with its so-called SERVE > project for overseas voting, via a private consortium made up of major > defence contractors and a Saudi investment group. The contract for > overseeing internet voting in the 2004 presidential election was recently > awarded to Accenture, formerly part of the Arthur Andersen group (whose > accountancy branch, a major campaign contributor to President Bush, > imploded as a result of the Enron bankruptcy scandal). > > Not everyone in the United States has fallen under the spell of the big > computer voting companies, and there are signs of growing wariness. Oregon > decided even before HAVA to conduct all its voting by mail. Wisconsin has > decided it wants nothing to do with touchscreen machines without a > verifiable paper trail, and New York is considering a similar injunction, > at least for its state assembly races. In California, a Stanford computer > science professor called David Dill is screaming from the rooftops on the > need for a paper trail in his state, so far without result. And a New > Jersey Congressman called Rush Holt has introduced a bill in the House of > Representatives, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act, > asking for much the same thing. Not everyone is heeding the warnings, > though. In Ohio, publication of the letter from Diebold's chief executive > promising to deliver the state to President Bush in 2004 has not deterred > the secretary of state - a Republican - from putting Diebold on a list of > preferred voting-machine vendors. Similarly, in Maryland, officials have > not taken the recent state-sponsored study identifying hundreds of flaws > in the Diebold software as any reason to change their plans to use Diebold > machines in March's presidential primary. > > The question is whether the country will come to its senses before > elections start getting distorted or tampered with on such a scale that > the system becomes unmanageable. The sheer volume of money offered under > HAVA is unlikely to be forthcoming again in a hurry, so if things aren't > done right now it is doubtful the system can be fixed again for a long > time. "This is frightening, really frightening," says Dr Mercuri, and a > growing number of reasonable people are starting to agree with her. One > such is John Zogby, arguably the most reliable pollster in the United > States, who has freely admitted he "blew" last November's elections and > does not exclude the possibility that foul play was one of the factors > knocking his calculations off course. "We're ploughing into a brave new > world here," he says, "where there are so many variables aside from > out-and-out corruption that can change elections, especially in situations > where the races are close. We have machines that break down, or are > tampered with, or are simply misunderstood. It's a cause for great > concern." > > Roxanne Jekot, who has put much of her professional and personal life on > hold to work on the issue full time, puts it even more strongly. > "Corporate America is very close to running this country. The only thing > that is stopping them from taking total control are the pesky voters. > That's why there's such a drive to control the vote. What we're seeing is > the corporatisation of the last shred of democracy. > > "I feel that unless we stop it here and stop it now," she says, "my kids > won't grow up to have a right to vote at all." > _______________________________________________ Futurework mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework _______________________________________________ Futurework mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework
