140. An immoral solution for Iraq
Astounding! In an op-ed in today's New York Times, we have a
professor at an Institute of Peace giving an apologetic for the American
invasion of Iraq! Not only this, but he is offering a solution that would
forever subjugate the larger part of Iraq -- the Shia Moslems -- to a
rather nasty minority, just as Saddam Hussein did! Prof Baram may be an
expert on Middle East history, but whatever is this nonsense going on his
head?
His solution is also as impractical as it is immoral. Where is he going
to get the hundreds of America-loyal Iraqi-speaking representatives from?
And if he had them, how can he be sure that the information he gets from
them is going to be realistic? And how is he going to protect these
mini-ambassadors living in each sheikish subgroup? The Americans haven't
got anywhere enough troops in the country at the moment to keep the peace
in a general sort of way in only one or two cities, never mind
fanning-out into the whole countryside in order to protect the
representatives he describes. Above all, it would be a policy of
favouritism, and riddled through with opportunities for
corruption.
Prof Baram admits it's a risk. My word, it would be! Why don't the
Americans do the simple thing, the obvious thing -- what the Ottomans did
when they ruled? Split the country into three and give the Kurds, the
Sunnis and the Shias their autonomy. Whoops, I forgot! It is possible
that none of these governments will allow contracts with American oil
corporations. Just like Saddam. Oh dear! If only the Americans had not
been so disloyal to all of them in different ways and at different times
in very recent history.
Keith Hudson
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VICTORY IN IRAQ, ONE TRIBE AT A TIME
Amatzia Baram
While we do not yet know who was responsible for the latest series of
attacks across Iraq, there is no question that some of the bombings
including, American officials suspect, the missile attack on the hotel
where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was staying were the work
of forces loyal to Saddam Hussein. That these terrorists, mostly Sunni
Muslims from the so-called Sunni Triangle northwest of Baghdad, retain a
stubborn fealty to the former dictator seems to puzzle the coalition
leadership. But it should not their loyalty is rooted in part in
centuries-old tribal kinship and religious identity. Only by
understanding these ties and then using them to its advantage will the
coalition authority reduce the resistance.
A letter earlier this month signed by Saddam Hussein and addressed to the
sheiks of the Arab tribes in the Sunni Triangle insisted that Iraq
"has been a poison" to the American soldiers and that
"victory is near." It was one more sign that the former
dictator understands that the tribal values of Iraq are ripe for
exploitation.
But what works for Saddam Hussein can also be made to work against him.
The coalition is eminently capable of winning over many tribes. An old
saying in Iraq has it that you cannot buy a tribe, but you can certainly
hire one.
And the nation's Sunni minority is open to offers. With Saddam Hussein's
downfall, Sunnis, who make up only 15 percent of the population, were
deprived of their long-standing political hegemony. The Sunnis from the
triangle lost their prestigious and well-paying jobs in the armed forces
and internal security apparatus. They were humiliated in the conflict and
have had their homes and communities searched in its aftermath. Last but
not least they have been largely frozen out of the Governing Council and
the senior bureaucracy.
The Sunni network was held together by a web of patronage, perks and
favors that filtered down from the presidential palace to the tribal
sheik to the "tribesman in the field." Of course, retribution
played a role, too. Tribes were severely punished for transgressions
(like refusing to abide by the whims of Baathist officials or allowing
illicit traffic across borders without the dictator's permission), with
the sheiks occasionally deposed and sometimes executed. In the south,
whole villages were razed. But much more often the tribes were handsomely
rewarded for cooperation with money, weapons, state lands or even the
property of rival clans.
While this network has been fractured, many of the older tenets of tribal
life linger, and help to fuel the pattern of violence in the triangle
today. Attacks on coalition troops should be viewed through the prism of
tribal warfare. This is a world defined in large measure by avenging the
blood of a relative (al-tha'r); demonstrating one's manly courage in
battle (al-muruwwah); generally upholding one's manly honor (al-sharaf).
For some of these young men, killing American soldiers is a political
act, but it is also not unlike what hunting lions was to British colonial
officers in 19th-century Africa -- it involves a certain risk, but the
reward is great.
Yes, religious fanaticism may also serve as a motivation, but in Iraq the
rural tribes have generally been less inclined toward religious
fanaticism than the city dwellers. The problem for the coalition is that
religious fanaticism and tribal values are now working in the same
direction. The coalition leaders must bear in mind that while the
violence is endemic, it is not unstoppable in large part, we are dealing
with people who are open to persuasion.
Specifically, the Governing Council and its American supporters must come
up with a coherent tribal policy. Certainly they can be excused for not
having one they've racked up many other achievements while focusing on
more pressing problems. Moreover, the hesitation to give power to tribal
leaders has been understandable cultivating the tribes and the sheiks
might be seen as a contradiction of the new leaders' stated goal of
forming a democratic Iraqi civil society in a modern way. But to avoid
increasing violence in the Sunni Triangle, there is a need to rethink
that approach.
There are about 10 large tribal federations in central Iraq, but there
are hundreds of subgroups, each with its own sheik. He is the leader of
the people, and in return for his services mediation, arbitration,
attracting government services to the tribal area he is respected and
obeyed.
New efforts ought to be made to persuade the sheiks to assert their
influence and help keep the peace. The easiest would simply be to hire
the sheiks and their tribesmen putting them on salaries and allowing them
to spread the wealth among their people. In addition, sheiks in areas
where coalition soldiers and oil pipelines are coming under frequent
attacks should be told that the only way their tribes can receive
luxuries extra government services, construction aid, easy access to
senior officials in Baghdad is by making sure that there are no attacks
against coalition soldiers in their domain.
If a sheik refused to cooperate, not only could his perks be withheld,
they could be given to a neighboring sheik. This would eventually pit the
uncooperative sheik against his own tribesmen, who would see that he was
not serving their interests. If this weren't enough to get the sheik into
line, it wouldn't be too difficult for the coalition to enact
"regime change" on a small scale almost every tribal leader has
rivals within the group who covet his position.
For such a policy to be effective, however, it would require a deeper
sense of local history. The coalition forces and the Governing Council
(which is comprised largely of former exiles and urban Iraqis) must start
sending civil officials to rural areas for extended periods so they can
get a true picture of each region's tribal hierarchy and affairs. And
while military units must be rotated, the civil officers should stay on ,
serving as social guides to the newly arrived units.
It is vital that the coalition officers develop close relationships with
the sheiks and other influential figures in the tribes. These men will
provide the coalition forces and the Iraqi government with the best
information and advice. And the coalition authority should insist that
the new Iraqi government set up a bureau for tribal affairs to serve as a
repository for knowledge of the tribes and their traditions.
A policy giving special treatment to tribal leaders will have plenty of
critics, in Iraq and in America. Yes, it would allow a degree of
war-lordism. However, Iraq is not Afghanistan these tribes are not
miniature armies, and the Sunni Triangle is not surrounded by impassable
mountains that make policing almost impossible. Most important, the
central government in Iraq, with its foreign aid and eventual oil
profits, will have far more to offer its tribespeople in terms of
services and perks than does its Afghan counterpart.
In the Middle East, more often than not, tribes have been willing to give
up a great degree of their autonomy in exchange for government services,
and Iraq is no exception. The risk is worth taking.
New York Times -- 28 October 2003
Amatzia Baram is professor of Middle Eastern History at the University
of Haifa in Israel and a senior fellow at the United States Institute of
Peace.
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Keith Hudson, Bath, England,
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