At 01:09 22/11/03 -0800, you wrote:
Keith,
Whether or not the Shias, the Sunnis, or the Kurds control the oil fields doesn't matter. Oil is fungible - you probably have some Iraqi petrol in your car now. What is important is that the oil gets out of Iraq and into the markets of the world.
Harry
I know that, you know that, but Bush doesn't know that. He wants to be syre that American oil companies get it first. In 10 or 20 years' time there won't be a free market in oil.
Keith
******************************************** Henry George School of Social Science of Los Angeles Box 655 Tujunga CA 91042 Tel: 818 352-4141 -- Fax: 818 353-2242 <http://haledward.home.comcast.net/>http://haledward.home.comcast.net ********************************************
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From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Keith Hudson
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 12:19 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Futurework] Iraq and Vietnam
Arthur,
At 12:41 18/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:Passing along this exchange from another site, with names addresses removed. arthur both the article and the reply are of interest. =============================== Subject: RE: Iraq already looks ominously like Vietnam - Gabriel Kolko
I think Kolko is more right than wrong and I follow with my comments on his interlocutor:
An interesting article from someone who obviously knows what he is talking about. This simply confirms my argument that considerations related to the presidential election of November 2004 will determine the conduct of the war in Iraq between now and then.
But of course! See my comment at the end.
There are, however, three important differences between Vietnam and Iraq, all of which work to the favour of the US. First, the US is not opposed by a united national front led by Ho Chi Minh and General Giap, supported by the USSR and China.
If I were an American general I would sooner face a single opponent, however clever he was, than at least four or five (or six or seven) quite hermetically different groups each probably led by clever people (e.g. probably one or two Sunni groups, one or two Shia, one fedayeen, one or tribal-Arabic). (I go along with John Simpson's argument which I copied here a couple of days ago, that Saddam is out of the fray in the desert somewhere. His best strategy is to make sure he's not captured.)
Second, the terrain is more favourable than Vietnam was to the US and Afghanistan was to the USSR, although the shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles may negate some of this advantage, as the Stingers did in Afghanistan.
The different terrain doesn't matter. Whoever knows it best can devise the best opportunities from it. Defenders of a territory will nearly always win unless the attacker has absolutely overwhelming firepower and is prepared to carry out a scorched-earth policy. And even Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld haven't got the Putin-like nastiness to do that. Or if they had American opinion wouldn't let them.
And finally, if "Iraquisation" is not successful, the Americans could always resort to "Divide and rule", turning power over to the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south. This would effectively partition Iraq into the three Villayets (provinces) that existed in 1914, and might even bring on a civil war, but would there really be questions in the US of "Who lost Iraq?" Only Democrats "lose" countries (e.g. China), not Republicans.
Rubbish. This would not be "Divide and Rule". This would be "Divide and Empower" -- each of them. This would be the best solution for Iraqis, but America wouldn't entertain it because the northern oilfields would then fall under the control of the Kurds, the massive Qurna oilfield would fall under the control of the Sunnis, and the southern oilfields would be under the control of the Shias. America couldn't guarantee supplies from any of them.
I think that the only way the Iraqi insurgents can win is if the US public turns against the war, as it did in 1968,
The question is not whether the Iraqi insurgents will win, but when are they going to win? Besides, why call them insurgents? The Americans are the insurgents. The "insurgents" who are going to do the most to defeat the Americans (that is, the Shias) are sitting on their hands at the moment, acting very un-insurgently and patiently in the hope that America means what it says about bringing democracy to Iraq.
and a Democratic candidate is elected on a platform of "Peace with Honour" and a pledge to "Bring the boys (and girls?) home by Christmas". However, do you really think that these Arab insurgents can turn the "Ramadan offensive" into the equivalent of a Tet offensive? The British, who created modern Iraq, were there for 41 years (1917-1958),
No, they weren't. The Iraqis obtained full independence by 1932.
and the Turks for 400 years before that. Surely the US can hang in there until 2008?
Not the slightest chance. They won't be there by end-2003, unless Bush resigns before then and the Americans give the place to the UN to control. Then maybe some American troops will remain under a UN general.
In my opinion Bush is already finished. It's a matter now on how he gets out of Iraq. He may have to be forced out. It's all got to be resolved by about June/July in time for a sensible presidential between two level-headed candidates.
Keith Hudson
-----Original Message----- From:
Subject: Iraq already looks ominously like Vietnam - Gabriel Kolko
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/11/09/1068329418505.html
The Age (Melbourne) November 10, 2003
Iraq already looks ominously like Vietnam
By Gabriel Kolko
There are great cultural, political and physical differences between Vietnam and Iraq that cannot be minimised, and the geopolitical situation is entirely different. But the US has ignored many of the lessons of the traumatic Vietnam experience and is repeating many of the errors that produced defeat.
In both places, successive American administrations slighted the advice of their most knowledgeable intelligence experts. In Vietnam they told Washington's decision-makers not to tread where France had failed and to endorse the 1955 Geneva Accords provisos on reunification.
They also warned against underestimating the communists' numbers, motivation, or their independent relationship to China and the Soviet Union. But America's leaders have time and again believed what they wanted, not what their intelligence told them.
The Pentagon in the 1960s had an uncritical faith in its overwhelming firepower, its modern equipment, mobility, and mastery of the skies. It still does, and Donald Rumsfeld believes the military has the technology to "shock and awe" all adversaries. But war in Vietnam, as in Iraq, was highly decentralised and the number of troops required only increased, even as the firepower became greater. When they reached half-a-million Americans in Vietnam, the public turned against the president and defeated his party.
Wars are ultimately won politically or not at all. Leaders in Washington thought this interpretation of events in Vietnam was bizarre, and they ignored their experts whenever they frequently reminded them of the limits of military power.
In both Vietnam and Iraq the public was mobilised on the basis of cynical falsehoods that ultimately backfired, causing a "credibility gap".
The Tonkin Gulf crisis of August 1964 was manufactured, as the CIA's leading analyst later admitted in his memoir, because "the administration was seeking a pretext for a major escalation". Countless lies were told during the Vietnam War but eventually many of the men who counted most were themselves unable to separate truth from fiction.
Many US leaders really believed that if the communists won in Vietnam, the "dominoes" would fall and all South-East Asia would fall under Chinese and Soviet domination. The Iraq War was justified because Saddam was alleged to have weapons of mass destruction and ties with al-Qaeda, but no evidence for either allegation has been found.
There are 130,000 American troops in Iraq now - twice the number Bush predicted would remain by this month - but, as in Vietnam, their morale is already low and sinking. Bush's poll ratings have fallen dramatically. He needs more soldiers in Iraq desperately and foreign nations will not provide them.
In Vietnam, president Nixon tried to "Vietnamise" the land war and transfer the burdens of soldiering to Nguyen Van Thieu's huge army. But it was demoralised and organised to maintain Thieu in power, not win the victory that had eluded American forces.
"Iraqisation" of the military force required to put down dissidents will not accomplish what has eluded the Americans, and in both Vietnam and Iraq the US underestimated the length of time it would have to remain and cultivated illusions about the strength of its friends.
The Iraqi army was disbanded but now is being partially reconstituted by utilising Saddam's officers and enlisted men. As in Vietnam, where the Buddhists opposed the Catholics who comprised the leaders America endorsed, Iraq is a divided nation regionally and religiously, and Washington has the unenviable choice between the risks of disorder, which its own lack of troops make likely, and civil war if it arms Iraqis.
Despite plenty of expert opinion to warn it, the Bush Administration has scant perception of the complexity of the political problems it confronts in Iraq. Afghanistan is a reminder of how military success depends ultimately on politics, and how things go wrong.
Rumsfeld's admission in his confidential memo of October 16 that "we lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror" was an indication that key members of the Bush Administration are far less confident of what they are doing than they were early in 2003.
But as in Vietnam, when defence secretary Robert McNamara ceased to believe that victory was inevitable, it is too late to reverse course and now the credibility of America's military power is at stake.
Eventually, domestic politics takes precedence over everything else. It did in Vietnam and it will in Iraq. By 1968, the polls were turning against the Democrats and the Tet offensive in February caught President Lyndon Johnson by surprise because he and his generals refused to believe the CIA's estimates that there were really 600,000 rather than 300,000 people in the communist forces. Nixon won because he promised a war-weary public he would bring peace with honour.
Bush declared on October 28 that "we're not leaving" Iraq soon, but his party and political advisers are likely to have the last word as US casualties mount and his poll ratings continue to decline.
Vietnam proved that the American public has limited patience. That is still true.
The real lessons of Vietnam have yet to be learned.
Gabriel Kolko is professor emeritus of history at York University in Canada and the author of Anatomy of a War, a history of the Vietnam War.
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