Good gracious! In the following New York Times op-ed,
Leslie Gelb is proposing exactly the same solution that I have been
advocating on this list at least twice in the last four months. This is
that the good counsel that anthropology, evolutionary science and
neuroscience could offer might prevail. The NYT could have had
this advice for free if they'd invited me to write.
However, Leslie Garb avoids discussing two major consequences of the
three-state solution and they ought to have been considered in his
article. The first is one that I've already mentioned. This is that if
the Kurds were to be be given their own natural territory in northern
Iraq, then they would have control over the northern oilfields, too --
very large and, hitherto, largely undeveloped. In the unlikely event that
America would agree that a Kurdish government would have control over
contracts placed with oil corporations (though the Kurds might repeat
Saddam's decision to keep US and UK corporations out), then Turkey would
be very upset. Turkey would not only be upset by the independence of
Kurdistan in principle, but also that, thenceforth, it would have oil
revenues so large that could make it powerful enough to declare war on
Turkey and bite off a chunk of the Kurdish part of south- eastern Turkey
and incorporate it. America would probably need far more troops than it
has now in Iraq in order to keep the peace long enough for the new de
facto regime to become acceptable to Turkey. This might take 10-20
years to accomplish, even though the situation would be likely to be
stable, for ethnic reasons, from then onwards.
The second is that a Shia-dominated southern state might also give out
future oil contracts for the southern oilfields to oil corporations based
in nations other than America. China, now needing oil even more than
America because of its astonishing rate of economic growth, and
negotiating for oil almost everywhere in the world, might be able to
offer very attractive deals to a Shia government and, once again exclude
American-based corporations. Besides, it is possible that 'Shiastan'
might nuzzle up too closely to Iran -- one of Bush's 'evil states' -- for
America's comfort.
So, with great sadness, I don't think the three-state solution is
possible. With some constructive American military presence here and
there, it would work. But it's too neat and too sensible. America needs
Middle East oil too much.
Keith Hudson
<<<<
THE THREE-STATE SOLUTION
Leslie H. Gelb
President Bush's new strategy of transferring power quickly to Iraqis,
and his critics' alternatives, share a fundamental flaw all commit the
United States to a unified Iraq, artificially and fatefully made whole
from three distinct ethnic and sectarian communities. That has been
possible in the past only by the application of overwhelming and brutal
force.
President Bush wants to hold Iraq together by conducting democratic
elections countrywide. But by his daily reassurances to the contrary, he
only fans devastating rumors of an American pullout. Meanwhile,
influential senators have called for more and better American troops to
defeat the insurgency. Yet neither the White House nor Congress is likely
to approve sending more troops.
And then there is the plea, mostly from outside the United States
government, to internationalize the occupation of Iraq. The moment for
multilateralism, however, may already have passed. Even the United
Nations shudders at such a nightmarish responsibility.
The only viable strategy, then, may be to correct the historical defect
and move in stages toward a three-state solution Kurds in the north,
Sunnis in the center and Shiites in the south.
Almost immediately, this would allow America to put most of its money and
troops where they would do the most good quickly with the Kurds and
Shiites. The United States could extricate most of its forces from the
so-called Sunni Triangle, north and west of Baghdad, largely freeing
American forces from fighting a costly war they might not win. American
officials could then wait for the troublesome and domineering Sunnis,
without oil or oil revenues, to moderate their ambitions or suffer the
consequences.
This three-state solution has been unthinkable in Washington for decades.
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, a united Iraq was thought necessary
to counter an anti-American Iran. Since the Gulf War in 1991, a whole
Iraq was deemed essential to preventing neighbors like Turkey, Syria and
Iran from picking at the pieces and igniting wider wars.
But times have changed. The Kurds have largely been autonomous for years,
and Ankara has lived with that. So long as the Kurds don't move
precipitously toward statehood or incite insurgencies in Turkey or Iran,
these neighbors will accept their autonomy. It is true that a Shiite
self-governing region could become a theocratic state or fall into an
Iranian embrace. But for now, neither possibility seems likely.
There is a hopeful precedent for a three-state strategy Yugoslavia after
World War II. In 1946, Marshal Tito pulled together highly disparate
ethnic groups into a united Yugoslavia. A Croat himself, he ruled the
country from Belgrade among the majority and historically dominant Serbs.
Through clever politics and personality, Tito kept the peace
peacefully.
When Tito died in 1980, several parts of Yugoslavia quickly declared
their independence. The Serbs, with superior armed forces and the
arrogance of traditional rulers, struck brutally against Bosnian Muslims
and Croats.
Europeans and Americans protested but stunningly and unforgivably did
little at first to prevent the violence. Eventually they gave the Bosnian
Muslims and Croats the means to fight back, and the Serbs accepted
separation. Later, when Albanians in the Serb province of Kosovo rebelled
against their cruel masters, the United States and Europe had to
intervene again. The result there will be either autonomy or statehood
for Kosovo.
The lesson is obvious overwhelming force was the best chance for keeping
Yugoslavia whole, and even that failed in the end. Meantime, the costs of
preventing the natural states from emerging had been terrible.
The ancestors of today's Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds have been in
Mesopotamia since before modern history. The Shiites there, unlike
Shiites elsewhere in the Arab world, are a majority. The Sunnis of the
region gravitate toward pan-Arabism. The non-Arab Kurds speak their own
language and have always fed their own nationalism.
The Ottomans ruled all the peoples of this land as they were separately.
In 1921, Winston Churchill cobbled the three parts together for oil's
sake under a monarch backed by British armed forces. The Baathist Party
took over in the 1960s, with Saddam Hussein consolidating its control in
1979, maintaining unity through terror and with occasional American
help.
Today, the Sunnis have a far greater stake in a united Iraq than either
the Kurds or the Shiites. Central Iraq is largely without oil, and
without oil revenues, the Sunnis would soon become poor
cousins.
The Shiites might like a united Iraq if they controlled it which they
could if those elections Mr. Bush keeps promising ever occur. But the
Kurds and Sunnis are unlikely to accept Shiite control, no matter how
democratically achieved. The Kurds have the least interest in any strong
central authority, which has never been good for them.
A strategy of breaking up Iraq and moving toward a three-state solution
would build on these realities. The general idea is to strengthen the
Kurds and Shiites and weaken the Sunnis, then wait and see whether to
stop at autonomy or encourage statehood.
The first step would be to make the north and south into self-governing
regions, with boundaries drawn as closely as possible along ethnic lines.
Give the Kurds and Shiites the bulk of the billions of dollars voted by
Congress for reconstruction. In return, require democratic elections
within each region, and protections for women, minorities and the news
media.
Second and at the same time, draw down American troops in the Sunni
Triangle and ask the United Nations to oversee the transition to
self-government there. This might take six to nine months; without power
and money, the Sunnis may cause trouble.
For example, they might punish the substantial minorities left in the
center, particularly the large Kurdish and Shiite populations in Baghdad.
These minorities must have the time and the wherewithal to organize and
make their deals, or go either north or south. This would be a messy and
dangerous enterprise, but the United States would and should pay for the
population movements and protect the process with force.
The Sunnis could also ignite insurgencies in the Kurdish and Shiite
regions. To counter this, the United States would already have redeployed
most of its troops north and south of the Sunni Triangle, where they
could help arm and train the Kurds and Shiites, if asked.
The third part of the strategy would revolve around regional diplomacy.
All the parties will suspect the worst of one another not without reason.
They will all need assurances about security. And if the three
self-governing regions were to be given statehood, it should be done only
with the consent of their neighbors. The Sunnis might surprise and behave
well, thus making possible a single and loose confederation. Or maybe
they would all have to live with simple autonomy, much as Taiwan does
with respect to China.
For decades, the United States has worshiped at the altar of a unified
yet unnatural Iraqi state. Allowing all three communities within that
false state to emerge at least as self-governing regions would be both
difficult and dangerous. Washington would have to be very hard-headed,
and hard-hearted, to engineer this breakup. But such a course is
manageable, even necessary, because it would allow us to find Iraq's
future in its denied but natural past.
Leslie H. Gelb, a former editor and columnist for The Times, is president
emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.
The New York Times -- 25 November 2003
>>>>
Keith Hudson, Bath, England,
<www.evolutionary-economics.org>