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Was wandering through the Washington
Post on my birthday and came up with this article. I found it
interesting.
REH
washingtonpost.com
Polarization Myths . . . By Robert J. Samuelson One of today's popular myths is that we've become a more "polarized" society.
We're said to be divided increasingly by politics (liberals vs. conservatives),
social values (traditionalists vs. modernists), religion (fundamentalists vs.
everyone else), race and ethnicity. What's actually happened is that our
political and media elites have become polarized, and they assume that this is
true for everyone else. It isn't. Anyone who lived through the 1960s, when struggles over Vietnam and civil
rights spilled into the streets and split families, must know that we're much
less polarized today. It's not a close call. Unlike then, today's polarization
exists mainly on the public stage among politicians, TV talking heads,
columnists and intellectuals. Still, the polarization myth persists. Consider a
new report from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, which
bulges with public opinion data that show (it says) "rising political
polarization and anger." Actually, the data -- stretching from the late 1980s
until now -- don't show that at all. It's true that over this period political allegiances have shifted slightly.
Republicans gained, Democrats lost. As late as 1987, about 35 percent of adults
considered themselves Democrats, 26 percent Republicans and 39 percent
independents (including those who "don't know"). Now it's a dead heat: 31
percent Democrats, 30 percent Republicans and 39 percent independents. Gaps on
some issues between political parties have predictably widened. If Democrats
favoring a stronger military become Republican, party differences on that issue
will rise. But polarization -- a visceral loathing of your opponent -- increases only if
partisans feel more rabidly about their views. Here, little has changed. One
standard survey question is whether Democrats and Republicans consider
themselves "strong" party members. In the late 1980s slightly less than half of
Republicans considered themselves "strong" Republicans; it's still slightly less
than half. Among Democrats, about half are now "strong" and were then, too. Beyond partisan divisions, Americans share many basic beliefs. After Sept.
11, 2001, patriotism remains high. Most people (two-thirds or more) believe that
hard work promotes success. Indeed, many opinions have hardly budged since the
late 1980s. Surveys asked whether: • The United States should be "active in world affairs" -- 87 percent said
yes in 1987, 90 percent now. • "Government should restrict and control people coming into our country"
more than it does -- 76 percent agreed in 1992, 77 percent now. • "There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few big companies"
-- 77 percent said so in both 1987 and 2003. What's more important is that the changes that have occurred -- generally
outside politics -- signal more, not less, tolerance, as the Pew data show.
There seems to be a general shift in attitudes, led by changes among the young.
Consider race. In 1987, 48 percent thought it "all right for blacks and whites
to date"; now 77 percent do. Something similar has occurred on homosexuality. By
a 51 percent to 42 percent margin, Americans believed in 1987 that "school
boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals''; now
that's rejected, 62 percent to 33 percent. Sociologist Alan Wolfe of Boston College, after conducting extensive
interviews with middle-class families, reached similar conclusions. "Reluctant
to pass judgment, they are tolerant to a fault, not about everything -- they
have not come to accept homosexuality as normal and they intensely dislike
bilingualism -- but about a surprising number of things, including rapid
transformation in the family, legal immigration, multicultural education and
separation of church and state," he wrote in "One Nation, After All" (1999). This tolerance, Wolfe argued, springs partly from middle-class fears that
"our society might become hopelessly divided." Cherishing "the belief in one
nation," many ordinary Americans disdain fierce moral combat. Wolfe decided that
the vaunted "culture war" is "being fought primarily by
intellectuals." Just so. Today's polarization mainly divides the broad public from political,
intellectual and media elites. Of course, sharp differences define democracy.
We've always had them. From Iraq to homosexual marriage, deep disagreements
remain. But the venom of today's debates often transcends disagreement. Your
opponents -- whether liberal or conservative -- must not only have bad ideas.
Increasingly, they must also be bad people who are dishonest, selfish and
venal. Among politicians, the bitterness reflects less political competition,
especially in the House of Representatives. Democrats and Republicans
increasingly have safe seats. In 2002, 83 percent of House incumbents won at
least 60 percent of the vote; in 1992 only 66 percent of incumbents won with
that margin. As a result, members speak more to their parties' "bases," which
provide most electoral and financial support. There's less need to appeal to the
center. The Founders saw the House as responding quickly to public opinion. But
"the barometer is broken," says veteran congressional correspondent Richard E.
Cohen of National Journal. As for media and intellectual elites -- commentators, academics, columnists,
professional advocates -- they're in an attention-grabbing competition. They
need to establish themselves as brand names. For many, stridency is a strategy.
The right feeds off the left and the left feeds off the right, and although
their mutual criticisms constitute legitimate debate, they're also economic
commodities. To be regarded by one side as a lunatic is to be regarded by the
other as a hero -- and that can usually be taken to the bank through more TV
appearances, higher lecture fees, fatter book sales and larger audiences and
group memberships. Polarization serves their interests. Principle and
self-promotion blend. All this is understandable and, in a democracy, perhaps unavoidable. But it
distorts who we are and poses a latent danger: Someday we might become as
hopelessly polarized as we're already supposed to be.
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