On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 10:07 AM Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddh...@gotplt.org>
wrote:
> On 2023-08-08 10:04, Richard Biener wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 3:35 PM Ian Lance Taylor <i...@google.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 6:02 AM Jakub Jelinek via Gcc-patches
> >> <gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Aug 08, 2023 at 02:52:57PM +0200, Richard Biener via
> Gcc-patches wrote:
> >>>> There's probably external tools to do this, not sure if we should
> replicate
> >>>> things in the driver for this.
> >>>>
> >>>> But sure, I think the driver is the proper point to address any of
> such
> >>>> issues - iff we want to address them at all. Maybe a nice little
> >>>> google summer-of-code project ;)
> >>>
> >>> What I'd really like to avoid is having all compiler bugs (primarily
> ICEs)
> >>> considered to be security bugs (e.g. DoS category), it would be
> terrible to
> >>> release every week a new compiler because of the "security" issues.
> >>> Running compiler on untrusted sources can trigger ICEs (which we want
> to fix
> >>> but there will always be some), or run into some compile time and/or
> compile
> >>> memory issue (we have various quadratic or worse spots), compiler stack
> >>> limits (deeply nested stuff e.g. during parsing but other areas as
> well).
> >>> So, people running fuzzers and reporting issues is great, but if
> they'd get
> >>> a CVE assigned for each ice-on-invalid-code, ice-on-valid-code,
> >>> each compile-time-hog and each memory-hog, that wouldn't be useful.
> >>> Runtime libraries or security issues in the code we generate for valid
> >>> sources are of course a different thing.
> >>
> >>
> >> I wonder if a security policy should say something about the -fplugin
> >> option. I agree that an ICE is not a security issue, but I wonder how
> >> many people are aware that a poorly chosen command line option can
> >> direct the compiler to run arbitrary code. For that matter the same
> >> is true of setting the GCC_EXEC_PREFIX environment variable, and no
> >> doubt several other environment variables. My point is not that we
> >> should change these, but that a security policy should draw attention
> >> to the fact that there are cases in which the compiler will
> >> unexpectedly run other programs.
> >
> > Well, if you run an arbitrary commandline from the internet you get
> > what you deserve, running "echo "Hello World" | gcc -xc - -o /dev/sda"
> > as root doesn't need plugins to shoot yourself in the foot. You need to
> > know what you're doing, otherwise you are basically executing an
> > arbitrary shell script with whatever privileges you have.
>
> I think it would be useful to mention caveats with plugins though, just
> like it would be useful to mention exceptions for libiberty and similar
> libraries that gcc builds. It only helps makes things clearer in terms
> of what security coverage the project provides.
>
I have added a line to the Note section in the proposed text:
GCC and its tools provide features and options that can run arbitrary
user code (e.g., -fplugin).
I believe that the security implication already is addressed because the
program is not tricked into a direct compromise of security.
Do you have a suggestion for the language to address libgcc, libstdc++,
etc. and libiberty, libbacktrace, etc.?
Thanks, David
