Is it true that the independence of Indonesia is actually a gift from Japan? <https://www.quora.com/Is-it-true-that-the-independence-of-Indonesia-is-actually-a-gift-from-Japan> [image: Richardson Kilis] <https://www.quora.com/profile/Richardson-Kilis> Richardson Kilis <https://www.quora.com/profile/Richardson-Kilis>, Indonesianist Answered Aug 26, 2018 <https://www.quora.com/Is-it-true-that-the-independence-of-Indonesia-is-actually-a-gift-from-Japan/answer/Richardson-Kilis> <https://www.quora.com/#>
Indonesian independence *was* initially planned to be a gift from the Japanese. It was promised (*dijanjikan*) since 1944. (See the newspaper announcement below, from September 8, 1944.) In the current historical narrative, however, Indonesian independence is no longer considered a gift. Circumstances around Japan’s guarantee of Indonesian independence changed after August 9, 1945, when the United States dropped its second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. On August 7, one day after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Imperial Japanese Army Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi announced the creation of an all-Indonesian committee which would make preparations for the transfer of governmental authority from the Japanese armed forces to it. This committee would be known as the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, or *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (abbreviated as PPKI). Historian George McT. Kahin explains subsequent events in *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* <https://books.google.com/books?id=WDgBBzWQ2DAC> (1952): On August 8, 1945, Soekarno, Hatta, and Radjiman [Wediodiningrat] were called by General Terauchi to Dalat in Indochina. There on August 11 he promised them that *independence would be granted to Indonesia on August 24*. A constitutional assembly was to be called on August 19, and during the intervening week this was to round out and ratify the constitution which the previously established committees for the preparation of independence had been working on. The three returned on August 14 to find *the Indonesian undergrounds opposed to any Indonesian independence that was a gift of the Japanese* and absolutely determined to wrest unconditional independence from them by force. These underground movements in Java, and apparently those in Sumatra, were pledged to and organized for an uprising against the Japanese which was to coincide with the expected Allied attack against Java and Sumatra. When Sukarno and Hatta returned to Jakarta on August 14, they were met by underground resistance leader Sutan Sjahrir. According to Kahin, Sjahrir had received radio reports on August 10—one day after the Nagasaki atomic bomb— that Japan was considering surrendering to the Allies. This prompted Sjahrir and other resistance leaders to urge Sukarno and Hatta to preemptively declare the independence of Indonesia. However, Sukarno and Hatta were not convinced that Japan would surrender to the Allies. Should Japan continue to commit to the war, they believed Indonesian underground resistance fighters would be no match against the more organized Japanese armed forces. *The resulting conflict would cause needless bloodbath, so they opted to wait* until the promised independence on August 24. But Sukarno and Hatta were mistaken, and Sjahrir was correct. On the following day, on August 15, Japan announced its intention to surrender to the Allies. In the early hours of August 16, Sukarno and Hatta were kidnapped by members of a resistance group (this time led by the independence activist Sukarni) and taken to the garrison of the PETA volunteer army in Rengasdengklok. Sukarni’s group tried to persuade Sukarno and Hatta once again that they had the needed strength to fight the Japanese, but the two remained unconvinced. Furthermore, the diplomat Soebardjo later warned the group at Rengasdengklok that the Japanese authorities had learned about the kidnapping, which led Sukarno and Hatta to believe that the resistance no longer had the advantage of surprise. Thus, the Rengasdengklok meeting ended without a decision to declare independence. That same night, however, Sukarno and Hatta would have another meeting that changed their stance. Kahin elaborates: Upon returning to Jakarta late on the night of the sixteenth, Hatta immediately got in touch with the right-hand man of the commander in chief of the Japanese army on Java. This officer informed him that by the surrender terms the Japanese were “merely agents of the Allies” and that *they could by no means countenance a declaration of independence* by the Indonesians. It was thus clear to Hatta and Soekarno that *a bloodless revolution was impossible* and that the course advocated by Sjahrir, Sukarni, Wikana, and the other underground leaders was the only possible means of attaining independence. Sjahrir then visited Soekarno and elicited from him a promise to declare independence […] Upon learning that Japan could no longer provide the gift of independence, Sukarno and Hatta moved to proclaim Indonesia’s independence themselves on August 17. One clear evidence against the lingering idea of Indonesian independence being a gift is the reaction of Japanese authorities toward the proclamation. Tadashi Maeda, the Imperial Japanese Navy admiral whose house was used by Sukarno and Hatta to draft the proclamation, was jailed along with his entire staff. In and around Jakarta, the Kempeitai (military police) quickly tore down independence announcements. On August 18, Japanese authorities disbanded the PETA and Heiho volunteer armies. The Japanese military command attempted to quell uprisings by revolutionaries around Indonesia, per the terms of surrender to the Allies, but was cautioned by Sukarno that any attempt to suppress independence would result in a bloody conflict. Only after this warning did Japanese commanders relent.
