I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-barany-eap-gee-04
Reviewer: Spencer Dawkins
Review Date: 2007-01-17
IETF LC End Date: 2007-01-19

Summary: This draft is on the right track, but has open issues, identified in the review below.

Comments:

Please remember I'm not a security geek, or an EAP geek, so please push back on anything that seems bogus ("welcome to the IETF")...

My biggest concerns are

(1) the document is really inconsistent about how Type 1 and Type 2 work together (is Type 1 always access authentication?) and this seems to allow a level of flexibility that (I read in the security considerations section) increases vulnerabilities when you use that flexibility,
(2) I don't get the N/As in the access control matrix at all,
(3) I'm not sure how much 2119 language you need in this document, but it seems like you'd need more than you've got, at least in Section 5.3, (4) Section 7 has some speculation about future versions of GEE, but they aren't tagged quite clearly enough as "this COULD happen", (5) the security considerations section seems to make recommendations that I wasn't comfortable with.

Further details follow. Please note that "Spencer: Nit:" isn't technically part of the Gen-ART review, these are just things I noticed while writing the review, for your convenience.

Abstract

  The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a general
  authentication protocol that supports multiple authentication methods
  and typically runs directly over data link layers without requiring
  IP.  EAP can be used for different types of authentication, where

Spencer: Nit: the abstract text here doesn't seem as clear as the Section 1.1 text. Perhaps "EAP could be used to authenticate with multiple Authentication Servers, when multiple providers provide access to different types of services, but EAP itself does not have the ability to differentiate between multiple EAP conversations between a peer and an authenticator"? And I'm not sure whether GEE is required for multiple EAP conversations, or if it's only required for multiple EAP conversations done in parallel.

  multiple providers provide access to different services.  However,

Spencer: the specification seems to oscillate between "access to multiple services" and "access and service", and I'm not sure why. Is access a service? Is access to a service a service? I am confused. Could you pick one? :-)

  EAP itself does not have the ability to differentiate between
  multiple EAP conversations between a peer and an authenticator.  This
  document specifies the 3GPP2 Generic EAP Encapsulation (GEE) protocol
  for differentiating between multiple EAP conversations between a peer
  and an authenticator.

1.1.  Motivation

  A good example of the case where access and service authentications

Spencer: Nit: s/of the case//

  are performed separately is the case of Mobile Virtual Network
  Operators (MVNO).  In this case, the network provider providing
  Layer1 and Layer2 access is typically different from that providing
  Layer 3 service (i.e., IP level service).  Hence, separate access and
  service authentications are usually required to gain access to the
  respective networks and services.

  In cases where access and service authentications are performed
  separately, it may be desirable to do these in parallel, to avoid

Spencer: re-reading... this seems to conflict with the "do Type 1 and use the result to secure Type 2" recommendation in the Security Considerations section 7.2.2, or at least there could be text explaining why the two recommendations really are consistent...

  added latency resulting from a sequential execution of the two
  authentications.  When a peer is performing multiple EAP
  authentications, it is not possible to clearly differentiate between
  the two types of authentications using available means.  Also, the
  authenticator will need to distinguish the multiple EAP exchanges in
  order to route the packets to the correct EAP server.  Typically, the
  Identifier value in an EAP Response packet will be the same as that
  in the matching Request - however, the authenticator, while operating
  in pass-through mode, does not keep track of the value of the
  Identifier field.  Even if the authenticator could match up the
  values of the Identifier field, the two EAP servers performing the
  access and service authentication may generate the same Identifier
  (since the Identifier is a randomly chosen 8-bit field in the EAP
  Request/Response packets).  Hence, there is no available means to

Spencer: Nit: s/packets)/packets), and a collision would prevent correct routing/?

  allow multiple EAP authentications for a given peer to occur in
  parallel.

2.  Terminology

  Type 1 Authentication

     This refers to one authentications that is performed by the peer.
     For instance, it may be the Layer 1 and Layer 2 authentication
     that allows the peer to gain link layer access to the attached
     network.

  Type 2 Authentication

     This refers to a second authentication that is performed by the
     peer.  For instance, it may be the Layer 3 authentication that
     allows the peer to gain access to Layer 3 services.

Spencer: "Type 1" and "Type 2" sound like two different kinds of services, but if I am reading correctly, Type 1 is always for access, and Type 2 is always for a layer 3 service. So it's not "for instance", it's "in every case", or am I confused?

3.  Architecture and Overview

  The proposed protocol operation remains mostly the same in the EAP
  multiplexing model as well as the EAP pass-through model.  At a high
  level, this protocol allows the peer and authenticator to perform
  multiple EAP authentications independently and potentially with
  different authentication servers in different provider networks.  The
  multiple EAP conversations may happen sequentially or in parallel.
  However, in accordance with RFC 3748, an EAP peer and authenticator

Spencer: Nit: since RFC 3748 is about 68 pages long, a section number for this reference would be really nice! Section 5, perhaps?

  MUST utilize only one authentication method (Type 4 or greater)

Spencer: Nit: I know the same terminology appears in 3748, but I'm not happy with "Type 4 or greater", especially since this document also has Type 1 and Type 2, which have nothing to do with the EAP request Type 1 and Type 2. Since 3748 says "1-3 aren't real", maybe you could drop the "Type 4 or greater" parenthetical remark?

  within an EAP conversation, unless the providers are the same and the
  peer is using the same credentials and EAP method for both types of
  authentication.

  Figure 2: GEE Protocol stack and Peer to Authenticator interaction in

Spencer: Nit: is this a busted Figure label? It seems incomplete, and the next text doesn't quite seem to complete a thought.

  Figure 2 shows the protocol stack for GEE in the EAP multiplexing
  model.

3.1.  Multiple Authenticator Model

  Depending on the architecture, the authenticator that is responsible
  for each authentication may be different.  This could be true
  irrespective of whether the EAP server is the same or different for
  each authentication.  However, in most practical cases, the need for
  multiple authentications arises only when the EAP servers performing
  the different types of authentications are different.  Figure 4 shows
  the architecture with each provider having a different authenticator
  that is engaged in different EAP exchanges that the peer performs.
  In 3GPP2 networks, single authenticator and multiple authenticator
  architectures are both possible.

Spencer: it's not quite clear to me from the document whether GEEv0 also supports multiple SNPs AND an ANP - I was thinking the answer is "yes", but I'm guessing, and the discussion of TIDs below made me wonder if I'm guessing correctly for GEEv0. If multiple SNPs are supported, a strategically placed "two or more" would be helpful. If multiple SNPs are not supported in GEEv0, this document advertises more flexibility than it delivers...

  Since GEE runs between the peer and the authenticator, it brings a
  slight variance when the authenticator for each EAP exchange is

Spencer: Nit: not quite sure what "variance" means here - "requirement for different handling"? I'm guessing. Mumble.

  different.  Since the multiple EAP authentications are over the same
  link, the EAP exchange between the peer and one of the authenticators
  may have to pass through another authenticator or enforcement point.
  Hence, the lower layers at each hop in this case must be able to
  indicate the presence of the GEE header.

4.1.  GEE Header Format

  Result flags/code (RFL)

     The last 2 bits in the GEE header are used to indicate the result
     of the EAP authentication in progress.  The leftmost bit in this
     field is the 'K' bit and indicates whether the MSK resulting from

Spencer: Nit: MSK is not expanded on first use.

     the EAP conversation being encapsulated by the particular GEE
     session must be bound with an MSK resulting from the second EAP
     conversation carried in a second GEE session.  If set, this
     implies that the peer MUST bind the MSKs to derive TSKs.  The
     process of MSK binding is described in Section 5.3.  In GEEv0, the
     last bit is the R bit and is reserved and MUST be set to zero at
     the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.

5.  Packet Processing Details

5.1.  Packet Handling at the Peer

  While Type 1 and Type 2 authentications are not explicitly defined in
  this document, these must be defined at the peer and authenticator
  for a given usage of this protocol.

Spencer: Good. I'm supposed to be confused here... :-)

  When the peer sends a GEEv0 packet in response to a GEEv0 packet
  received from the authenticator, the TID value MUST be copied from
  the corresponding packet received from the authenticator.  As in the

Spencer: Nit: s/As in the/As with the/

  packet from the authenticator, a value of 01 indicates that the EAP
  packet is for Type 1 authentication and a value of 00 indicates that
  the encapsulated EAP packet is for Type 2 authentication.  The RFL
  value MUST be set to 00.

5.3.  Multiple authentications and access control enforcement

  When both Type 1 and Type 2 authentications are carried out, access
  control MUST conform to the following cases.


               Type1                  Type2        Combined result

Case 1       Success               Success         Success
Case 2       Success               Failure         Type1 related access
only
Cases 3&4    Failure               S/F             Failure
Cases 5&6     N/A                  S/F             S/F


                          Access Control Matrix

Spencer: deeply confused here. There is no explanation of what "N/A" means in this table, and in the absence of that explanation it feels like you're talking about six cases when you should either be talking about four cases or eight. I didn't see draft-terrell-math-quant-ternary-logic-of-binary-sys listed as a reference, so I'm assuming that the explanation would help a lot :-)

  GEE requires that at least one of the authentications to be key
  generating and both authentications to be mutually authenticating.

Spencer: I am confused by the lack of 2119 language in this sentence. MUST? SHOULD? WOULD-BE-NICE?

  If one of the authentications is not key generating, then there MUST
  be a way for the authenticator to identify the two authentication
  conversations (Type 1 and Type 2) corresponding to a peer.
  Specifically, there MUST be a mechanism for the authenticator to
  correlate the Type 1 and Type 2 credentials; typically this is
  facilitated by backend network protocol support.  An example of such
  backend support is to be able to send an identifier that is unique to
  the peer across the authentications in an authenticated manner.  For
  instance, when both authenticators reside in the same node, the AAA
  transactions may return Chargeable-User-Identity (CUI) attributes
  [12] and the node can compare them for equality.  If there is a
  mismatch, or the node has not received such an identity from both
  transactions, the peer MUST be disconnected.

  If both Type 1 and Type 2 authentications are key generating and
  occur in parallel, one of the following techniques are used:

  MSK Binding

     In this case,even when there are multiple authenticators, we
     assume that there is only one access control enforcement point.
     Here, the combined MSK MUST be used to derive session keys
     (Transient session keys, TSKs).  Both authenticators deliver the
     MSK to the enforcement point and it computes the combined MSK as
     follows: Combined-MSK = f(MSK-Type 1, "GEE Combined Key" || MSK-
     Type 2), where f represents prf+ as defined in [3].  The length of
     the Combined-MSK MUST be 512 bits.  With GEEv0, the PRF is HMAC-
     SHA-256.

  Single Access Control Enforcement with Protected Result Indication

     In the event that there can be a protected result indication
     between authenticators and/or enforcement points with a way to
     correlate the peer IDs used in the EAP conversations, it is
     feasible to have the TSK generated from only one MSK.  A MiTM

Spencer: s/feasible/possible/

     attack may be plausible in this case, and hence it is NOT
     RECOMMENDED.

6.  GEE Extensibility

  GEE could be extended to support dynamic TID assignment, where an
  authenticator may pick an unused TID value.  The peer could
  participate in as many as 4 EAP conversations in parallel.

  In order for the peer to be able to understand the meaning of each
  TID, a new mechanism would be needed to send information about
  authentication type and other policy hints.  Such a mechanism could
  either operate on the layer that carries GEE, or in an extended
  version of GEE itself.  Note that RFC 4284 defines a mechanism for
  the authenticator to advertise a set of roaming realms.  With this
  information alone, the peer needs to readily understand the nature of
  authentication based on the realm information.  However, in some
  cases, a peer may have multiple credentials (e.g., for device and
  user authentication) for a give realm and for that or other reasons,
  providing a list of realms alone may not be sufficient.  In those
  cases, the realm information itself is insufficient.  Similarly, due
  to EAP MTU and other considerations, RFC 4284 can carry only a very
  limited amount of information, and it is not intended for carrying
  other policy information.  As a result, its applicability for this
  purpose is limited, and other mechanisms are likely to be needed.
  This document does not propose any such mechanisms at this time.

Spencer: wasn't entirely clear on what this is saying - something like "EAP with GEE is more likely to trip over limited EAP MTU than EAP without GEE, so don't plan on using EAP to carry large amounts of data"? The current text seems to be more about EAP limitations than about GEE limitations.

  Specifically due to the introduction of additional capability to use
  the identity hints and indicating the type of authentication via
  extensible options (TLVs), the restriction imposed in GEEv0 for the
  semantics of the TID field can be removed for future versions.

Spencer: can you provide a pointer to where this introduction will happen?

  Furthermore, in the result code and flags field the last bit may be
  set to indicate the presence of TLVs in the GEE header.

Spencer: not sure how to reconcile this with "In GEEv0, the last bit is the R bit and is reserved and MUST be set to zero at the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver." This is speculating about how a later version of GEE might work, perhaps? Something like "Furthermore, future versions of GEE may use the last bit of the result code and flags field to indicate the presence of TLVs in the GEE header"?

7.1.  Recap of use cases and interactions between network entities

  GEE encapsulates EAP so an authenticator can signal to the peer about
  the type of authentication the EAP request is meant for.  GEE also
  facilitates parallel execution of such authentications.  For
  instance, Type 1 and Type 2 authentication may take place in tandem

Spencer: Nit: s/in tandem/sequentially/

  (in any order) or in parallel.

7.2.  Threats and mitigation strategies

  The GEE header is not cryptographically protected.  Thus it is
  plausible for an eavesdropper to use Layer 2, GEE and EAP headers and
  collate information on how certain devices are authenticating
  themselves to their network providers: the order and combination of
  the different types of authentication are easily available in those
  headers.

  Note that if Type 1 (say, access) authentication occurs first and

Spencer: again, some of the text seems to assume that Type 1 IS access authentication, while other text does not seem to require this.

  subsequent authentication processes take place via a Layer 2
  encrypted channel, information about the rest of the authentications
  will not be available to passive observers on the path from the peer
  to the authenticator.

Spencer: this text could be recommending that Type 1 authentication happens before Type 2 authentication, but it's not recommending this, and the specification seems to go out of its way to NOT require this. I'm not sure why this text isn't SHOULD ("except in tightly-controlled environments"), if the alternative opens you to eavesdropping attacks. 7.2.2 seems to be a stronger statement than this one.

7.2.1.  Threats that might cause denial of service

  An adversary may change any of the contents of the GEE payload, the
  version field and/or the TID field, to cause either the peer or the
  authenticator to drop GEE encapsulated EAP packets.  Suppose an
  attacker consistently changes the value of the TID field, the AAA
  server may conclude that the peer's credentials may have been
  compromised and may revoke access so as to trigger an offline process
  for updating that peer's credentials.  As a result the peer may lose
  connectivity temporarily.  Note however that DoS attacks identical or
  similar to this are also possible on EAP conversations without GEE
  encapsulation.

Spencer: This might be clearer if you said "EAP conversations without GEE encapsulation are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, and GEEv0 does not change this vulnerability" someplace.

7.2.2.  Threats that might cause theft of service

  To mitigate this threat, i.e., when the EAP method used for one
  authentication (e.g., Type 2) is more vulnerable to attacks than the
  EAP method used for another authentication (e.g., Type 1), the
  authenticator needs to strictly enforce a policy of Type 1
  authentication first, and require that the Type 2 authentication
  occur within the secure channel established as a result of Type 1
  authentication.  Another possible solution is for the authenticator
  to maintain an association between the Layer 2 security association
  and Layer 3 address(es), to prevent rogue peers from stealing other
  peers' IP services.

Spencer: I'm not a security geek, but if the rogue peer goes first, wouldn't this proposed band-aid prevent the legitimate peer from "stealing BACK" its own IP services?

7.3.  Implications of multiple EAP authentications

  There are several possible mitigation strategies including the use of
  identifier binding between authentications (e.g., Layer 2 and Layer 3
  identifier correlation), or in case of sequential authentications,
  the use of key material from the first authentication to encrypt
  future authentications.  Other solutions require all authentications
  to be key generating and binding all the keys to generate the master
  key used to bootstrap the traffic key generation process or using
  multiple encapsulations using the generated keys.

Spencer: Nit: s/using/with/

  When the multiple authentications are key generating and occur in
  parallel, GEEv0 requires that the MSKs resulting from each
  authentication be all used for access control in order to

Spencer: Nit: s/the MSKs resulting from each authentication be all used/all of the MSKs resulting from each authentication be used/

  successfully prevent any MiTM attacks.  When only one of the
  authentications is key generating or when the authentications occur
  sequentially, other administrative policies must be used to ensure
that the threat is mitigated.


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