I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.
Document: draft-barany-eap-gee-04
Reviewer: Spencer Dawkins
Review Date: 2007-01-17
IETF LC End Date: 2007-01-19
Summary: This draft is on the right track, but has open issues, identified
in the review below.
Comments:
Please remember I'm not a security geek, or an EAP geek, so please push back
on anything that seems bogus ("welcome to the IETF")...
My biggest concerns are
(1) the document is really inconsistent about how Type 1 and Type 2 work
together (is Type 1 always access authentication?) and this seems to allow a
level of flexibility that (I read in the security considerations section)
increases vulnerabilities when you use that flexibility,
(2) I don't get the N/As in the access control matrix at all,
(3) I'm not sure how much 2119 language you need in this document, but it
seems like you'd need more than you've got, at least in Section 5.3,
(4) Section 7 has some speculation about future versions of GEE, but they
aren't tagged quite clearly enough as "this COULD happen",
(5) the security considerations section seems to make recommendations that I
wasn't comfortable with.
Further details follow. Please note that "Spencer: Nit:" isn't technically
part of the Gen-ART review, these are just things I noticed while writing
the review, for your convenience.
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a general
authentication protocol that supports multiple authentication methods
and typically runs directly over data link layers without requiring
IP. EAP can be used for different types of authentication, where
Spencer: Nit: the abstract text here doesn't seem as clear as the Section
1.1 text. Perhaps "EAP could be used to authenticate with multiple
Authentication Servers, when multiple providers provide access to different
types of services, but EAP itself does not have the ability to differentiate
between multiple EAP conversations between a peer and an authenticator"? And
I'm not sure whether GEE is required for multiple EAP conversations, or if
it's only required for multiple EAP conversations done in parallel.
multiple providers provide access to different services. However,
Spencer: the specification seems to oscillate between "access to multiple
services" and "access and service", and I'm not sure why. Is access a
service? Is access to a service a service? I am confused. Could you pick
one? :-)
EAP itself does not have the ability to differentiate between
multiple EAP conversations between a peer and an authenticator. This
document specifies the 3GPP2 Generic EAP Encapsulation (GEE) protocol
for differentiating between multiple EAP conversations between a peer
and an authenticator.
1.1. Motivation
A good example of the case where access and service authentications
Spencer: Nit: s/of the case//
are performed separately is the case of Mobile Virtual Network
Operators (MVNO). In this case, the network provider providing
Layer1 and Layer2 access is typically different from that providing
Layer 3 service (i.e., IP level service). Hence, separate access and
service authentications are usually required to gain access to the
respective networks and services.
In cases where access and service authentications are performed
separately, it may be desirable to do these in parallel, to avoid
Spencer: re-reading... this seems to conflict with the "do Type 1 and use
the result to secure Type 2" recommendation in the Security Considerations
section 7.2.2, or at least there could be text explaining why the two
recommendations really are consistent...
added latency resulting from a sequential execution of the two
authentications. When a peer is performing multiple EAP
authentications, it is not possible to clearly differentiate between
the two types of authentications using available means. Also, the
authenticator will need to distinguish the multiple EAP exchanges in
order to route the packets to the correct EAP server. Typically, the
Identifier value in an EAP Response packet will be the same as that
in the matching Request - however, the authenticator, while operating
in pass-through mode, does not keep track of the value of the
Identifier field. Even if the authenticator could match up the
values of the Identifier field, the two EAP servers performing the
access and service authentication may generate the same Identifier
(since the Identifier is a randomly chosen 8-bit field in the EAP
Request/Response packets). Hence, there is no available means to
Spencer: Nit: s/packets)/packets), and a collision would prevent correct
routing/?
allow multiple EAP authentications for a given peer to occur in
parallel.
2. Terminology
Type 1 Authentication
This refers to one authentications that is performed by the peer.
For instance, it may be the Layer 1 and Layer 2 authentication
that allows the peer to gain link layer access to the attached
network.
Type 2 Authentication
This refers to a second authentication that is performed by the
peer. For instance, it may be the Layer 3 authentication that
allows the peer to gain access to Layer 3 services.
Spencer: "Type 1" and "Type 2" sound like two different kinds of services,
but if I am reading correctly, Type 1 is always for access, and Type 2 is
always for a layer 3 service. So it's not "for instance", it's "in every
case", or am I confused?
3. Architecture and Overview
The proposed protocol operation remains mostly the same in the EAP
multiplexing model as well as the EAP pass-through model. At a high
level, this protocol allows the peer and authenticator to perform
multiple EAP authentications independently and potentially with
different authentication servers in different provider networks. The
multiple EAP conversations may happen sequentially or in parallel.
However, in accordance with RFC 3748, an EAP peer and authenticator
Spencer: Nit: since RFC 3748 is about 68 pages long, a section number for
this reference would be really nice! Section 5, perhaps?
MUST utilize only one authentication method (Type 4 or greater)
Spencer: Nit: I know the same terminology appears in 3748, but I'm not happy
with "Type 4 or greater", especially since this document also has Type 1 and
Type 2, which have nothing to do with the EAP request Type 1 and Type 2.
Since 3748 says "1-3 aren't real", maybe you could drop the "Type 4 or
greater" parenthetical remark?
within an EAP conversation, unless the providers are the same and the
peer is using the same credentials and EAP method for both types of
authentication.
Figure 2: GEE Protocol stack and Peer to Authenticator interaction in
Spencer: Nit: is this a busted Figure label? It seems incomplete, and the
next text doesn't quite seem to complete a thought.
Figure 2 shows the protocol stack for GEE in the EAP multiplexing
model.
3.1. Multiple Authenticator Model
Depending on the architecture, the authenticator that is responsible
for each authentication may be different. This could be true
irrespective of whether the EAP server is the same or different for
each authentication. However, in most practical cases, the need for
multiple authentications arises only when the EAP servers performing
the different types of authentications are different. Figure 4 shows
the architecture with each provider having a different authenticator
that is engaged in different EAP exchanges that the peer performs.
In 3GPP2 networks, single authenticator and multiple authenticator
architectures are both possible.
Spencer: it's not quite clear to me from the document whether GEEv0 also
supports multiple SNPs AND an ANP - I was thinking the answer is "yes", but
I'm guessing, and the discussion of TIDs below made me wonder if I'm
guessing correctly for GEEv0. If multiple SNPs are supported, a
strategically placed "two or more" would be helpful. If multiple SNPs are
not supported in GEEv0, this document advertises more flexibility than it
delivers...
Since GEE runs between the peer and the authenticator, it brings a
slight variance when the authenticator for each EAP exchange is
Spencer: Nit: not quite sure what "variance" means here - "requirement for
different handling"? I'm guessing. Mumble.
different. Since the multiple EAP authentications are over the same
link, the EAP exchange between the peer and one of the authenticators
may have to pass through another authenticator or enforcement point.
Hence, the lower layers at each hop in this case must be able to
indicate the presence of the GEE header.
4.1. GEE Header Format
Result flags/code (RFL)
The last 2 bits in the GEE header are used to indicate the result
of the EAP authentication in progress. The leftmost bit in this
field is the 'K' bit and indicates whether the MSK resulting from
Spencer: Nit: MSK is not expanded on first use.
the EAP conversation being encapsulated by the particular GEE
session must be bound with an MSK resulting from the second EAP
conversation carried in a second GEE session. If set, this
implies that the peer MUST bind the MSKs to derive TSKs. The
process of MSK binding is described in Section 5.3. In GEEv0, the
last bit is the R bit and is reserved and MUST be set to zero at
the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
5. Packet Processing Details
5.1. Packet Handling at the Peer
While Type 1 and Type 2 authentications are not explicitly defined in
this document, these must be defined at the peer and authenticator
for a given usage of this protocol.
Spencer: Good. I'm supposed to be confused here... :-)
When the peer sends a GEEv0 packet in response to a GEEv0 packet
received from the authenticator, the TID value MUST be copied from
the corresponding packet received from the authenticator. As in the
Spencer: Nit: s/As in the/As with the/
packet from the authenticator, a value of 01 indicates that the EAP
packet is for Type 1 authentication and a value of 00 indicates that
the encapsulated EAP packet is for Type 2 authentication. The RFL
value MUST be set to 00.
5.3. Multiple authentications and access control enforcement
When both Type 1 and Type 2 authentications are carried out, access
control MUST conform to the following cases.
Type1 Type2 Combined result
Case 1 Success Success Success
Case 2 Success Failure Type1 related access
only
Cases 3&4 Failure S/F Failure
Cases 5&6 N/A S/F S/F
Access Control Matrix
Spencer: deeply confused here. There is no explanation of what "N/A" means
in this table, and in the absence of that explanation it feels like you're
talking about six cases when you should either be talking about four cases
or eight. I didn't see draft-terrell-math-quant-ternary-logic-of-binary-sys
listed as a reference, so I'm assuming that the explanation would help a lot
:-)
GEE requires that at least one of the authentications to be key
generating and both authentications to be mutually authenticating.
Spencer: I am confused by the lack of 2119 language in this sentence. MUST?
SHOULD? WOULD-BE-NICE?
If one of the authentications is not key generating, then there MUST
be a way for the authenticator to identify the two authentication
conversations (Type 1 and Type 2) corresponding to a peer.
Specifically, there MUST be a mechanism for the authenticator to
correlate the Type 1 and Type 2 credentials; typically this is
facilitated by backend network protocol support. An example of such
backend support is to be able to send an identifier that is unique to
the peer across the authentications in an authenticated manner. For
instance, when both authenticators reside in the same node, the AAA
transactions may return Chargeable-User-Identity (CUI) attributes
[12] and the node can compare them for equality. If there is a
mismatch, or the node has not received such an identity from both
transactions, the peer MUST be disconnected.
If both Type 1 and Type 2 authentications are key generating and
occur in parallel, one of the following techniques are used:
MSK Binding
In this case,even when there are multiple authenticators, we
assume that there is only one access control enforcement point.
Here, the combined MSK MUST be used to derive session keys
(Transient session keys, TSKs). Both authenticators deliver the
MSK to the enforcement point and it computes the combined MSK as
follows: Combined-MSK = f(MSK-Type 1, "GEE Combined Key" || MSK-
Type 2), where f represents prf+ as defined in [3]. The length of
the Combined-MSK MUST be 512 bits. With GEEv0, the PRF is HMAC-
SHA-256.
Single Access Control Enforcement with Protected Result Indication
In the event that there can be a protected result indication
between authenticators and/or enforcement points with a way to
correlate the peer IDs used in the EAP conversations, it is
feasible to have the TSK generated from only one MSK. A MiTM
Spencer: s/feasible/possible/
attack may be plausible in this case, and hence it is NOT
RECOMMENDED.
6. GEE Extensibility
GEE could be extended to support dynamic TID assignment, where an
authenticator may pick an unused TID value. The peer could
participate in as many as 4 EAP conversations in parallel.
In order for the peer to be able to understand the meaning of each
TID, a new mechanism would be needed to send information about
authentication type and other policy hints. Such a mechanism could
either operate on the layer that carries GEE, or in an extended
version of GEE itself. Note that RFC 4284 defines a mechanism for
the authenticator to advertise a set of roaming realms. With this
information alone, the peer needs to readily understand the nature of
authentication based on the realm information. However, in some
cases, a peer may have multiple credentials (e.g., for device and
user authentication) for a give realm and for that or other reasons,
providing a list of realms alone may not be sufficient. In those
cases, the realm information itself is insufficient. Similarly, due
to EAP MTU and other considerations, RFC 4284 can carry only a very
limited amount of information, and it is not intended for carrying
other policy information. As a result, its applicability for this
purpose is limited, and other mechanisms are likely to be needed.
This document does not propose any such mechanisms at this time.
Spencer: wasn't entirely clear on what this is saying - something like "EAP
with GEE is more likely to trip over limited EAP MTU than EAP without GEE,
so don't plan on using EAP to carry large amounts of data"? The current text
seems to be more about EAP limitations than about GEE limitations.
Specifically due to the introduction of additional capability to use
the identity hints and indicating the type of authentication via
extensible options (TLVs), the restriction imposed in GEEv0 for the
semantics of the TID field can be removed for future versions.
Spencer: can you provide a pointer to where this introduction will happen?
Furthermore, in the result code and flags field the last bit may be
set to indicate the presence of TLVs in the GEE header.
Spencer: not sure how to reconcile this with "In GEEv0, the last bit is the
R bit and is reserved and MUST be set to zero at the sender and MUST be
ignored by the receiver." This is speculating about how a later version of
GEE might work, perhaps? Something like "Furthermore, future versions of GEE
may use the last bit of the result code and flags field to indicate the
presence of TLVs in the GEE header"?
7.1. Recap of use cases and interactions between network entities
GEE encapsulates EAP so an authenticator can signal to the peer about
the type of authentication the EAP request is meant for. GEE also
facilitates parallel execution of such authentications. For
instance, Type 1 and Type 2 authentication may take place in tandem
Spencer: Nit: s/in tandem/sequentially/
(in any order) or in parallel.
7.2. Threats and mitigation strategies
The GEE header is not cryptographically protected. Thus it is
plausible for an eavesdropper to use Layer 2, GEE and EAP headers and
collate information on how certain devices are authenticating
themselves to their network providers: the order and combination of
the different types of authentication are easily available in those
headers.
Note that if Type 1 (say, access) authentication occurs first and
Spencer: again, some of the text seems to assume that Type 1 IS access
authentication, while other text does not seem to require this.
subsequent authentication processes take place via a Layer 2
encrypted channel, information about the rest of the authentications
will not be available to passive observers on the path from the peer
to the authenticator.
Spencer: this text could be recommending that Type 1 authentication happens
before Type 2 authentication, but it's not recommending this, and the
specification seems to go out of its way to NOT require this. I'm not sure
why this text isn't SHOULD ("except in tightly-controlled environments"), if
the alternative opens you to eavesdropping attacks. 7.2.2 seems to be a
stronger statement than this one.
7.2.1. Threats that might cause denial of service
An adversary may change any of the contents of the GEE payload, the
version field and/or the TID field, to cause either the peer or the
authenticator to drop GEE encapsulated EAP packets. Suppose an
attacker consistently changes the value of the TID field, the AAA
server may conclude that the peer's credentials may have been
compromised and may revoke access so as to trigger an offline process
for updating that peer's credentials. As a result the peer may lose
connectivity temporarily. Note however that DoS attacks identical or
similar to this are also possible on EAP conversations without GEE
encapsulation.
Spencer: This might be clearer if you said "EAP conversations without GEE
encapsulation are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, and GEEv0 does
not change this vulnerability" someplace.
7.2.2. Threats that might cause theft of service
To mitigate this threat, i.e., when the EAP method used for one
authentication (e.g., Type 2) is more vulnerable to attacks than the
EAP method used for another authentication (e.g., Type 1), the
authenticator needs to strictly enforce a policy of Type 1
authentication first, and require that the Type 2 authentication
occur within the secure channel established as a result of Type 1
authentication. Another possible solution is for the authenticator
to maintain an association between the Layer 2 security association
and Layer 3 address(es), to prevent rogue peers from stealing other
peers' IP services.
Spencer: I'm not a security geek, but if the rogue peer goes first, wouldn't
this proposed band-aid prevent the legitimate peer from "stealing BACK" its
own IP services?
7.3. Implications of multiple EAP authentications
There are several possible mitigation strategies including the use of
identifier binding between authentications (e.g., Layer 2 and Layer 3
identifier correlation), or in case of sequential authentications,
the use of key material from the first authentication to encrypt
future authentications. Other solutions require all authentications
to be key generating and binding all the keys to generate the master
key used to bootstrap the traffic key generation process or using
multiple encapsulations using the generated keys.
Spencer: Nit: s/using/with/
When the multiple authentications are key generating and occur in
parallel, GEEv0 requires that the MSKs resulting from each
authentication be all used for access control in order to
Spencer: Nit: s/the MSKs resulting from each authentication be all used/all
of the MSKs resulting from each authentication be used/
successfully prevent any MiTM attacks. When only one of the
authentications is key generating or when the authentications occur
sequentially, other administrative policies must be used to ensure
that the threat is mitigated.
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