Hi Arnt:
In general, you should wait for instructions from Ted Hardie with
respect my comments. At the end of the day, these are just suggestions.
I would also like to have some further comments on a few issues. I
delete the rest of the message where there is no need for further
discussion.
Arnt Gulbrandsen wrote:
Thanks! I'm sorry my reply is so late.
Miguel Garcia writes:
I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
2) Section 3, paragraphs 5 and 7. I think there is some initial
contradiction in the text, unless it is later clarified. The text here
reads:
"If the server
response was BAD or NO, the client MUST NOT turn on compression."
The contradiction is that the BAD result may also indicate that
compression is already active, in which case the text "the client MUST
NOT turn on compression" could be understood as "the client MUST stop
using compression", which obviously is not the intention.
I will leave a possible rewording up to you. I though something around
"not changing the compression state". Perhaps:
"If the server response was BAD or NO, the client MUST not change its
compression state, i.e., if compression was already active, it MUST
continue using compression; if compression was not active, it MUST NOT
turn on compression".
A more important side effect of this issue: I wonder now if there is a
technical problem if, for some reason (e.g., software bug), the client
thinks that compression is not active, but the server thinks that
compression is active.
You say compression, with lower case, so yes ;) The MUA with which I
type these words can negotiate TLS compression, but it doesn't know so.
It happens to be linked with a TLS implementation that negotiates
compression, but has no API to tell the application about it. One of the
IMAP servers I'm connected to uses a different TLS toolkit and API, and
_does_ know that TLS compression has been negotiated. One of the
implementers found the problem a few months ago, and I added the
COMPRESSIONACTIVE response code so the client can learn what's going on.
I wasn't worried about this case, for which I assumed what you just
mentioned about the different TLS APIs. I was worried about the
COMPRESSion at IMAP level.
In the case of IMAP-level compression it cannot happen.
Are you sure that software bugs will prevent the case?
If it does
happen the connection instantly becomes unusable (due to byte-level
syntax differences between DEFLATE and IMAP) and in general either the
client or server will close the connection after a few bytes. In the
worst case it takes half an hour, then RFC3501's inactivity timeout
strikes and the connection is closed.
I think the connection will still be usable, because the assumption is
that the COMPRESS command successfully reached the IMAP server, so I
don't think we have an unusable connection
The client sends COMPRESS and will get a BAD result. Reissuing the
comment will have the same effect. There is no mechanism to recover
from this loop: the client will not compress, the server will
compress. Have the authors or WG thought about this problem?
Yes.
That's a general IMAP problem. The same problem occurs in a slightly
different form if you try to select a mailbox for which you don't have
read access. Some clients will send 'select name.of.mailbox', get a 'NO
insufficient rights' response, and try the same command again
immediately. That's just one example, there are many other forms of the
problem. At a guess, I'd say around 50% of the IMAP commands can be
affected by such bugs, and the three most-used commands can all be
affected.
The problem is less severe in this case than for many existing commands,
so I didn't try to add a specific fix.
Ok, I am not so familiar with IMAP, so I didn't now this was a general
problem. Well, as I said, these are non-binding comments, so you should
consult Ted.
3) IANA considerations section. A few tips:
- Usually links are not welcomed in this section (they may change with
time).
Uh? IANA asked me to clarify when the previous revision of the draft did
NOT name the URL.
Weird, really weird. At least I know that the IESG members don't like
these URLs in the IANA considerations section.
- Accurately mention the registry IANA has to operate with. There
isn't an "IMAP extensions" IANA registry, but instead, "IMAP4
Capabilities Registry".
Good point. I can fix this in auth48 or (preferably) in an rfc-editor note.
Interesting... the fix should be done before IANA gets the draft, not in
auth48, which is post-IANA.
4) It is not clear to me if the draft mandates the implementation of
DEFLATE or not.
It implicitly does. The COMPRESS command has one mandatory argument, and
that argument has exactly one legal value. Servers must implement
DEFLATE in order to support the legal argument, and clients must in
order to use that argument.
Well, the thing I don't like is the "implicitly". I think the aim of the
draft is to mandate DEFLATE and leave the door open for future
algorithms, so I was trying to capture this sentiment with the suggested
wording.
If the extension is later widened to allow other compression algorithms,
DEFLATE may or may not be mandatory to implement. IMO that's desirable.
We don't know any reason why we'd want to widen it, and we know a good
reason not to, so we think it's better to defer the choice of M-T-I to
when there is a choice.
I disagree again. DEFLATE is always mandatory to implement, because the
only way to achieve interoperability is through the definition of at
least one mandatory compression algorithm.
In other words, if 10 years from now, someone comes and implement this
RFC-to-be, but rather than DEFLATE it implements some other algorithm,
can it say the implementation is compliant with this RFC? My opinion
is that the intention is to guarantee interoperability while allowing
extensibility. Thus, the draft should mandate the implementation of
DEFLATE, which at the moment does not. I would suggest to add a
sentence, somewhere, reading:
"Implementations according to this specification MUST implement the
DEFLATE algorithm [RFC1951] and MAY implement other compression
algorithms".
IMO, out of place in this document. Should be in the document that
defines a registry and more compression methods, if such a document is
ever published. (At the moment, there's general consensus among the
reviewers and myself that this won't happen. Instead TLS compression
will be improved until it eventually supersedes this extension.)
Again I disagree here. I have seen many RFCs that define a protocol
capability (such as COMPRESS) and one instantiation of that capability
(such as DEFLATE), and at the same time the open or not the registry for
other instantiations. Just to mention a document that does the same: RFC
3486, which defines the "comp" capability for SIP and the "sigcomp"
value for such capability.
5) idnits tool reveals two nits:
- This document has ISOC Copyright according to RFC 3978, instead of the
newer IETF Trust Copyright according to RFC 4748. You should consider
updating it; the new Copyright statement will be required from February
1st, 2007
- This document has an original RFC 3978 Section 5.5 Disclaimer, instead
of the newer disclaimer which includes the IETF Trust according to RFC
4748. You should consider updating it; the new disclaimer will be
required from February 1st, 2007
Ah, I must upgrade idnits again. (I think the version I use is all of
four months old.)
Or you can use the online version at http://tools.ietf.org/
BR,
Miguel
Arnt
--
Miguel A. Garcia tel:+358-50-4804586
sip:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Nokia Research Center Helsinki, Finland
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