Thanks, Jouni. Updated draft. -Tiru
> -----Original Message----- > From: jouni.nospam [mailto:jouni.nos...@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, November 28, 2016 11:12 PM > To: Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) <tire...@cisco.com> > Cc: gen-art@ietf.org; draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls....@ietf.org > Subject: Re: gen-art review of draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-12 > > Hi, > > Sorry for being under the radar. See my comments below. > > > > On Nov 18, 2016, at 8:40 AM, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) > <tire...@cisco.com> wrote: > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: jouni.nospam [mailto:jouni.nos...@gmail.com] > >> Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2016 3:33 PM > >> To: gen-art@ietf.org > >> Cc: draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls....@ietf.org > >> Subject: gen-art review of draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-12 > >> > >> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area > >> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by > >> the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like > >> any other last call comments. > >> > >> For more information, please see the FAQ at > >> > >> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. > >> > >> Document: draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-12 > >> Reviewer: Jouni Korhonen > >> Review Date: 2016-11-17 > >> IETF LC End Date: 2016-11-16 > >> IESG Telechat date: 2016-12-15 > >> > >> Summary: > >> > >> The document is ready for publication. > >> > >> Comments/questions: > >> > >> o Section 3.1. has “first-come, first-served” port range. What port > >> range this actually is? Does it refer to ephemeral port range (rfc6335). > > > > User Ports, range is 1024-49151; assigned based on first come and first > served policy. > > Ok. Thanks. Could you state that in the document (with a reference)? > > > >> o Section 6 describes a case where an anycasted DTLS packet reaches a > >> DNS server that does not have an existing security association with > >> the client. A DTLS session resumption should initiated as a result. > >> Is it possible that the next DTLS message again reaches another DNS > >> server without security association, which would cause a new fatal > >> alert to be returned.. etc?? If this is the case there should be > >> some text pointing at this case. If I am just confused the current > >> text is fine. > > > > It's the same problem as DNS-over-TCP (see > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7766#appendix-A), routing changes can disrupt > TCP, DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-DTLS session. > > > > Please suggest additional text you would like us to add. > > Easiest way here would be saying something along the lines: > > OLD: > context from the DNS-over-DTLS handshake. But when the network > configuration changes, a DNS-over-DTLS packet can be received by a > server that does not have the necessary cryptographic context. To > encourage the client to initiate a new DTLS handshake, DNS servers > SHOULD generate a DTLS fatal alert message in response to receiving a > DTLS packet for which the server does not have any cryptographic > context. Upon receipt of an un-authenicated DTLS fatal alert, the > > NEW: > context from the DNS-over-DTLS handshake. But when the network > configuration or routing changes, a DNS-over-DTLS packet can be > received by a server that does not have the necessary cryptographic > context. Clients using DNS-over-DTLS need to always be prepared > to re-initiate DTLS handshake and in the worst case this could even > happen immediately after re-initiating a new handshake. To encourage > the client to initiate a new DTLS handshake, DNS servers SHOULD > generate a DTLS fatal alert message in response to receiving a DTLS > packet for which the server does not have any cryptographic context. > Upon receipt of an un-authenticated DTLS fatal alert, the ... > > - Jouni > > > > > -Tiru _______________________________________________ Gen-art mailing list Gen-art@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/gen-art
