Works for me.
Brian
On 28/11/2017 13:33, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> Thanks again. Please see:
> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/commit/871a80d12aa
>
>
>> On 27 Nov 2017, at 1:05 pm, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Mark,
>>
>> On 27/11/2017 12:38, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>>> Hi Brian,
>>>
>>> Thanks for the review. Responses below.
>>>
>>>> On 26 Nov 2017, at 2:44 pm, Brian Carpenter <brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>> [...]
>>>> Minor Issues:
>>>> -------------
>>>>
>>>>> 2.1. Syntax
>>>> ...
>>>>> Origin: An OPTIONAL sequence of characters ... that the
>>>>> sender believes this connection is or could be authoritative for.
>>>>
>>>> So, that implies that all data in the ORIGIN frame might be false.
>>>> Doesn't that deserve a bit of a health warning at the beginning of the
>>>> Security Considerations?
>>>
>>> The first paragraph of SC is already:
>>>
>>> """
>>> Clients that blindly trust the ORIGIN frame's contents will be
>>> vulnerable to a large number of attacks. See Section 2.4 for mitigations.
>>> """
>>>
>>> What would you suggest?
>>>
>>>> Also, using the word "believes" of a server
>>>> is strange. How would the server acquire uncertain knowledge in the
>>>> first place, and what algorithm would decide what it "believes"?
>>>
>>> This is to emphasise that ORIGIN is advisory only -- it does not constitute
>>> proof (crypto does that).
>>
>> Right. But I think it's the anthropomorphic choice of word that triggered
>> me. If you said "that the sender asserts this connection is or could be
>> authoritative for" I think I'd have nothing further to say, since it's
>> clearly an assertion that needs to be checked.
>>
>>>
>>>> Appendix A doesn't show any sign of a client checking whether an
>>>> Origin-Entry is real.
>>>
>>> As per Section 2.4, it isn't checked when the origin set is created or
>>> updated; it's checked when the value is used.
>>
>> OK
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>> 2.3. The Origin Set
>>>> ...
>>>>> o Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (SNI, [RFC6066]
>>>>> Section 3), converted to lower case
>>>>
>>>> In that reference:
>>>>
>>>>>> Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in "HostName".
>>>>
>>>> Is that an intended or unintended restriction for the ORIGIN frame?
>>>> In any case it should probably be mentioned explicitly to avoid confusion.
>>>> (If IPv6 literals were allowed, they might be very convenient for server
>>>> load balancing. But RFC6066 excludes that.)
>>>
>>> Good catch. I don't think there's cause for confusion here (the text there
>>> isn't about what can go on the wire), but there is a corner case we haven't
>>> covered (when a client that supports SNI omits it because it's an IP
>>> literal).
>>>
>>> My inclination there is to say that the host is the SNI value or the server
>>> IP if SNI is missing; what do people think?
>>
>>> From this reviewer's peanut gallery seat, that makes sense.
>>
>> Brian
>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> --
>>> Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/
>>>
>>>
>
> --
> Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/
>
>
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