Basically, it looks like Genode is about the only way to be NSA-proof. Yes, the NSA will likely be able to tell that you're using Genode, but they won't be as able to hack it as with Tails. On Jun 14, 2015 6:01 PM, "Jookia" <166...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi! > > I use Tor as part of my threat model on my machine, and I think Genode > could > certainly help me manage things like this. I'm very interested in working > towards a Genode parallel of Qubes which could be used for such a thing > like > Whonix where routing is transparent to an extent. > > However, I would hesitate to say we could make a Tails equivalent. Like > with > Tor, everyone needs to be using the same tools to avoid fingerprinting. No > matter what you do, it's going to be obvious you're running Genode instead > of > Tails. Perhaps sitting a Tails virtual machine inside Genode would be a > better > idea given that if it's compromised it'd appear to just be Tails. > > For better integration, perhaps a block of memory could be established to > share > a shell and X11 windows, and have the virtual machine read to this. Such a > block of memory could be enabled by default meaning there'd be no way to > know it > was actually used. Of course this would also be useful for hardware > exploits, > but I don't think that's part of Tails' threat model. > > Cheers, > Jookia. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > _______________________________________________ > genode-main mailing list > genode-main@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/genode-main >
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