2011-05-02 02:16:49 Markos Chandras napisał(a): > On Sun, May 01, 2011 at 04:31:08PM -0700, Brian Harring wrote: > > On Sun, May 01, 2011 at 11:23:40PM +0000, Duncan wrote: > > > What about having a dedicated server-based changlog-signing key? That's > > > still a lot of signing with a single key, but as you observed, the > > > hazards > > > of a loss of integrity there aren't as high as with most of the tree > > > content. It'd require changes, but I don't believe they're out of line > > > with that required for the rest of the proposal. > > > > It means the only real trust that clients can level is on that key- > > since it will be the last signer (thus /the/ signer) across all pkgs. > > > > Get at that key, and you've got the tree, versus the current form, > > crack all signing keys and you've got the tree. > > > > Mind you this is ignoring eclasses, but getting eclasses sorted will > > be mildly pointless if the rest of the solution has been > > weakened/gutted since. > > > > Point is, it's not *just* about having a signature on it- it's about > > mapping the trust of that signature back, and sectioning/containing > > compromises. What y'all are suggesting guts that layered defense. > > ~brian > > Then the only choice here is to ignore Changelogs from Manifests and > live with that. You have your changelogs unprotected but you keep your > ebuilds safe(?). As I said, it is a balanced choice that has to be made.
Generated ChangeLogs could contain server-side-generated signatures for themselves (gpg --sign --clearsign ChangeLog && mv ChangeLog.asc ChangeLog). (Manifests wouldn't contain entries for ChangeLogs.) -- Arfrever Frehtes Taifersar Arahesis
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