On 10/08/17 11:42, William L. Thomson Jr. wrote:
> On Thu, 10 Aug 2017 10:50:45 +1000
> "Sam Jorna (wraeth)" <wra...@gentoo.org> wrote:
>
>> On 10/08/17 06:35, William L. Thomson Jr. wrote:
>>> FYI binpkgs have no hash. If someone did something malicious within
>>> the binhost to the binpkgs. You have no way of knowing. Yes the
>>> same can happen with ebuilds and manifest. But easy to sync portage
>>> and see if a manifest has changed.
>>
>> This isn't exactly true - see ${PKGDIR}/Packages on the binhost, which
>> is a manifest of built packages and related metadata. Granted this is
>> created by the binhost, it does exist and contains SHA1 and MD5
>> hashes, as well as package size. In that sense it's no different to
>> how a package Manifest file works within a repository.
>
> You are correct. I meant to say no verifiable hash. You can hash
> anything locally and claim it to be trustworthy. Thus mentioning
> syncing portage to compare manifest of ebuild/SRC_URI<snip>
> IMHO SRI_URI is more trustworthy than binhost, in the sense of
> verification. If you have means to verify the binhost stuff it maybe
> more trustworthy. That is left to the admin.This is no greater risk than syncing from a potentially compromised mirror. You would use a mirror you trust and, similarly (perhaps even more so) you would use a binhost you trust. It does raise the idea of some form of signing of the Packages file, similar to gpg-signed portage snapshots, but that's moving well beyond the scope of this thread. -- Sam Jorna (wraeth) GnuPG ID: D6180C26
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