W dniu czw, 05.07.2018 o godzinie 13∶24 -0500, użytkownik William Hubbs napisał: > On Thu, Jul 05, 2018 at 03:36:09PM +0200, Michał Górny wrote: > > W dniu śro, 04.07.2018 o godzinie 18∶48 -0400, użytkownik Joshua Kinard > > napisał: > > > On 7/4/2018 5:24 PM, Michał Górny wrote: > > > > W dniu śro, 04.07.2018 o godzinie 23∶05 +0200, użytkownik Ulrich Mueller > > > > napisał: > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 4 Jul 2018, Michał Górny wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > -3. Key expiry: 5 years maximum > > > > > > +3. Key expiration: > > > > > > + > > > > > > + a. Primary key: 3 years maximum > > > > > > + > > > > > > + b. Gentoo subkey: 1 year maximum > > > > > > > > > > What problem are you trying to solve here? > > > > > > > > > > > > > The problem of having unjustified double standards. > > > > > > IMHO, one year for a signing subkey is too short. I see no problem with > > > three > > > years like the primary key. Especially since people will typically just > > > change > > > the expiration and advance it the minimum number of years, lather, rinse, > > > and > > > repeat. It's a solution looking for a problem. > > > > > > > I don't really know the original rationale for this. > > > > The NIST standard says 1-3 years. If I were to guess, I'd say 1 year > > was chosen for subkey because subkey expiring is a 'smaller' issue than > > the whole key expiring, i.e. other users see the primary key as being > > still valid. > > > > I suppose the advantage of having disjoint expiration times is that if > > you forget about it, you'd learn the hard way that you need to renew it > > before the primary key expired. > > > > That said, I'm open to using a different recommendation, e.g. 2 years > > as in riseup [1]. I suppose having the same time for both primary key > > and subkeys would make the spec simpler, and many developers are > > mistaking expiration times (as specified now) anyway. > > > > [1]:https://riseup.net/en/security/message-security/openpgp/best-practices#use-an-expiration-date-less-than-two-years > > Can you link the nist standard? I'm curious about it because their > password standards are quite different.They no longer recommend forcing > password changes unless there is a breach. >
I'm afraid that's PDF. Not sure if that will work for you: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-57pt1r4.pdf It's section 5.3.6: Cryptoperiod Recommendations for Specific Key Types. Quoting: | 1. Private signature key: | [...] | b. Cryptoperiod: Given the use of approved algorithms and key sizes, | and an expectation that the security of the key-storage and use | environment will increase as the sensitivity and/or criticality | of the processes for which the key provides integrity protection | increases, a maximum cryptoperiod of about one to three years is | recommended. The key shall be destroyed at the end of its | cryptoperiod. -- Best regards, Michał Górny
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part
