>>>>> And if I pull, none of my backed-up systems are secure because anyone
>>>>> who breaks into the backup server has root read privileges on every
>>>>> backed-up system and will thereby "gain full root privileges quickly."
>>>>
>>>> IMO that depends on whether you also backup the authentication-related
>>>> files or not. Exclude them from backup, ensure different root passwords
>>>> for all boxes, and now you can limit the infiltration.
>>>
>>> If you're pulling to the backup server, that backup server has to be
>>> able to log in to and read all files on the other servers. Including
>>> e.g. your swap partition and device files.
>>
>> What if I have each system save a copy of everything to be backed up
>> from its own filesystem in a separate directory and change the
>> ownership of everything in that directory so it can be read by an
>> unprivileged backup user?  Then I could have the backup server pull
>> that copy from each system without giving it root access to each
>> system.  Can I somehow have the correct ownerships for the backup
>> saved in a separate file for use during a restore?
>>
>> - Grant
>>
>
> You could just as well use an NFS share with no_root_squash. It is
> really more a question of finding the right combination of tools to
> ensure proper separation of concern for server and client.
>
> In fact, I think we are intermixing three distinct problems:
> 1. (Possible) limitations of rdiff-backup with regard to untrusted
> backup servers or clients.

The limitation is real unfortunately.  All backups created by
rdiff-backup more than a second ago can be deleted something like
this:

rdiff-backup --remove-older-than 1s backup@12.34.56.78::/path/to/backup

> 2. The purely technical question which file transfer protocols protect
> against write access from backup server to backup client and backup
> client to older backups on the server.

rdiff-backup doesn't provide those sort of protections.  Do any file
transfer protocols?

> 3. The more or less organisational question what level of protection
> backups need and how fast security breaks have to be detected.

I think backups should be very well protected and security breaks
should not have to be immediately detected.

- Grant


> I think push vs. pull is just a secondary concern with regard to the
> second question and has practically no relevance to the third one.
>
> Regards,
> Florian Philipp

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