2013/4/29 Joerg Schilling <joerg.schill...@fokus.fraunhofer.de>

> Nikos Chantziaras <rea...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > This may be an option for things that really are optional.
> > >
> > > Libcap however is not something optional but needed to support a basic
> security
> > > feature.
> >
> > I thought it is optional, since it was mentioned that cdrtools can be
> > built and ran without it?
>
> If you call something that is needed in order to prevent security holes
> "optional", you may call it optional.
>
>
> > Unless you mean "recommended" instead of "required."  "Recommended"
> > means it's still optional.
>
> Is something to grant security optional or required?
>
>
> > > As mentioned above, we are talking about a library to support basic
> security
> > > features, so the code from that library would really belong into libc.
> Since
> > > Linux now by default supports fcaps in the filesystems, cdrecord would
> open
> > > a security hole if the library was not used - without that library,
> cdrecord
> > > cannot even see that is has been called with additional privileges
> that need
> > > to be removed before the main code is executed.
> > >
> > > Do you really like to go into a security risk with your eyes open?
> >
> > You don't know what my intentions are.  I might be doing testing,
> > debugging, who knows what.  It's the "trying to be smarter than the
> > user" thing.  The defaults of course would be to built the software in a
> > sane, secure way.  Only users who know what they're doing would disable
> > that, and they'd have their reasons.
>
> Would you call someone who shoots himself into the foot "smart"?
>
> Recent Linux kernels support fcaps in the filesystems and "somebody" evil,
> who
> knows what he does may even set up fcaps on executable files when the
> related
> support-software is not installed, just because the unstable kernel
> interfaces
> are accessible from libc.
>
> Do you like people to be able to open security holes?
>
>
>
>
>


Adding an option to enable/disable linkage to libcap does not hurt anybody
it just eases maintaining the package. You can enable it by default if you
wish.

As long as it is possible to remove libcap from the system the security
hole you are talking about is still there. The option does not change
anything. Currently one could still compile cdrtools without libcap and
afterwards install libcap and use setcap on cdrecord et al. which leads to
the same problem.

-- 
Regards
Daniel Pielmeier

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