Hi all, Michael, sorry to hear about your computer and house problems, hopefully they are on their way to a quick resolution. And thanks again for your leadership in getting the website effort up and running.
I don't mean to be a buzzkill, but as discussions about the website have proceeded, several issues have cropped up that I think should be brought into sharper relief, to avoid difficulties down the road: 1. There are some obvious advantages to piggybacking on the Climate101 project, but there are also disadvantages, the most important of which is loss of independence. I appreciate what David says about complete editorial freedom, but the fact is this can never exist so long as the site is funded by NSF and NASA. I have nothing against either organization, but make no mistake that joining Climate101 will inevitably result in losing some editorial control, and this will ultimately affect site content. However, these costs may be worth the gains in efficiency. 2. In a similar vein, Ken raised the issue of whether we should address geoengineering on its own or as one element of broader climate risk reduction. There seems to be some consensus on the latter, and joining with Climate101 would make this effective, but there was never much debate or explicit agreement on this point. It's worth noting that this list is oriented toward "geoengineering," not "climate risk reduction including mitigation, adaptation, and geoengineering." If the proposed site were to adopt a broader climate risk management perspective, this would necessarily entail a change in focus. 3. There seem to be multiple conceptions of what the website should be, and there are important differences among them. This project is variously referred to as a website, a portal, an organization, a voice, etc. Some view it as purely informational, but others view it as a sovereign actor taking part in policy debates. One of the critical questions here is how proactive (for lack of a better word) this body should be--should it function as an educational resource, an advocate, or something in between? Obviously, the answer to this question also affects the question of Climate101 membership. These are some tricky issues, but I think it's better to raise them at the outset and reach some form of consensus rather than gloss them over and hope they never become real impediments. Josh Horton joshuahorton...@gmail.com On Aug 10, 6:18 pm, David Mitchell <david.mitch...@dri.edu> wrote: > Dear Mike, > > I think this type of presentation makes a lot of sense, and it would be > nice to develop some graphical indicator to show the relative level of > effort on each of these steps. But it seems that some of the > temperature estimates depend on climate sensitivity. Are you assuming > the Charney sensitivity adopted by IPCC of ~ 3 deg. C? If so, some > temperature predictions may look different if we used a climate > sensitivity based on paleoclimate data, such as 7.8 deg. C as advocated > by Jeff Kiehl and David Wasdell (see attached). These authors argue > that the uncertainty in climate sensitivity from paleoclimate > measurements is much less relative to GCM predicted climate sensitivity > since it is based on the Earth's climate system (i.e. whether we > comprehend it or not). Perhaps we could show an analysis similar to > what you describe but done twice; one for each climate sensitivity > assumption. > > Best, > David Mitchell > > On 8/10/2011 9:31 AM, Mike MacCracken wrote: > > > > > Dear David and Michael (and et al.)---I too think a formulation based > > on climate risk and the set of possible options make most sense, and > > David may recall that that was how I tried to frame the discussion in > > my introduction to the geoengineering symposium in Melbourne at the > > IUGG General Assembly. To sort of summarize the situation (and I use > > units of mass of C, not CO2), very roughly (others can do this all > > quantitatively with lost of scenarios, but this sort of sets the issue > > out a bit more simply, and I think is close): > > > 1. Situation faced if trends continue (so roughly a central fossil > > fuel estimate with few controls on emissions; including ongoing > > deforestation adds a bit more): Per capita global emissions of CO2 > > rover the 21st century rise to the present European average and > > continue a bit after (more reliance on coal would mean less useful > > energy from emissions of given amount). So, say an average of 3 tons > > of C/capita for 9 billion people gives emissions over century of 2700 > > GtC by 2100. Divide by 4 (roughly) to get ppm increase in CO2 > > concentration (and uptake of CO2 could go down, so divisor would be > > less) and one ends up with atmospheric concentration at 1000 ppm and > > rising significantly after 2100. So, very significant temperature > > increase. > > > 2. Aggressive mitigation (so collectively: conservation, efficiency, > > alternative sources of energy, ending deforestation, etc.): Keeping > > the CO2 concentration to 550 ppm in 2100 requires C emissions over the > > century be less than roughly (550-380 ppm) times 4, or about 640 GtC. > > Emissions in the year 2000 were roughly this, so keeping the CO2 > > concentration to 550 ppm (so CO2 doubling) means annual global > > emissions over the 21st century have to average about the emissions in > > the year 2000 when global per capita emissions were close to 1 ton of > > C per person per year, and then emissions have to be down 80+% or so > > after 2100. And this while the population is going from about 6.5B to > > 9-10B and the standard of living is rising. In addition, deforestation > > would need to be stopped. Achieving this would be quite an > > achievement---but it still equates to a global temperature increase > > of, say 2.5C or so above preindustrial and more if one counts the > > other species contributions (which needs to be done as SO2 emissions, > > and so sulfate loading and its cooling influence, go down). And we > > would be far above the 450 ppm that is likely maximum to avoid serious > > impacts form ocean acidification. [I should note that it would be > > great if this could do better than keep the CO2 concentration from > > exceeding 550 ppm, but that should perhaps be the norm that we aim for > > and indicate if we are ahead or behind on this---without this much > > effectiveness, it is hard to imagine that the other steps below could > > really make up for failing to do this, especially if post 2100 > > emissions are not really low.] > > > 3. Reducing the concentrations of relatively short-lived gases (CH4, > > tropospheric ozone, HFCs, etc.) and of black carbon (to extent not > > offset by reductions in associated light colored aerosols) can perhaps > > reduce the temperature increase by up to say 0.5 C (see UNEP-WMO > > assessment). Very helpful, but the temperature increase is still > > likely over 2 C (so perhaps still significant chance of exceeding > > some thresholds, like permafrost thawing and Greenland ice sheet > > melting, etc.) and no real help on ocean acidification. > > > 4. Adaptation---There needs to be more exploration of where the limits > > are to adaptation without really significant impacts. Some say 2 C, > > others would say less, even 0.5 C if the 350 ppm CO2 value is the one > > to be aiming for. What is clear is that already at 0.8 C we are seeing > > some quite troubling trends and very serious consequences for those in > > particular regions (e.g., the Arctic). > > > 5. Pulling C from atmosphere: There are some potentially inexpensive > > options, like reforestation and afforestation, perhaps iron > > fertilization, and maybe biochar that might be able to pull, say, as > > much as 200 GtC from the atmosphere, which ends up being 50 ppm > > equivalent, so maybe we are at 500 ppm (and if mitigation is less > > effective, we are higher). Whether industrial C removal (over and > > above capture at power plants) becomes practical at some reasonable > > level is still to be determined. Even if it matches the potential > > inexpensive options, the concentration is still at 450 ppm (and likely > > higher if mitigation can't be done). > > > 6. Regional climate engineering: There may be some potential (all > > still to be determined) to moderate some regional impacts, like Arctic > > warming (with spillover potential net benefits to mid latitudes), > > limited shifts in storm tracks, etc. to help us get by at 450-500 ppm > > impacts. This also may include some regional ocean buffering, etc. > > Capacity here would very likely be limited and useful only to get > > through a hump in impacts if the other steps are effective. Some, but > > perhaps manageable governance complications. > > > 7. Global SRM: There are two general classes of implementation: (a) > > wait until very significant changes are already underway and take > > actions for a significant global intervention to pull the climate back > > away from the brink (and it is not clear it is really possible to > > reverse major ice sheet loss of mass once that gets started, etc.); or > > (b) starting early and implementing at gradually increasing rate, > > seeking, for example, to limit further change and thus avoid the onset > > of rapid and dangerous change. Both options likely have very large > > governance and intergenerational aspects, to just name a few points. > > > 8. Suffering (what happens to environment and society when everything > > else had been considered---and one may do more of one and less of > > another, etc.--so whatever mix one wants to consider)---meaning > > discomfort (like this summer in some regions), > > relocation/environmental refugees, disruption, major losses of life > > and environmental extinctions, etc. IPCC results cover this basically > > omitting steps 5-7 and with a lot of uncertainty about step 4, and > > suffering ends up being very significant, even if the baseline case is > > a bit overstated above---even so, however, getting to step 2 is going > > to be a significant challenge without much more effort that is now > > being exerted by nations of the world. > > > Basically, the notion of risk management is minimizing step 8 in an > > optimal manner, and what one might hope to keep track of is what is > > happening in each of the various steps along the way---are the signs > > positive or negative. It might be interesting to figure out some sort > > of graphical indicator to show the relative level of effort on each of > > these steps and/or substeps (like the clock of the minutes before > > midnight originated, as I recall, by the Federation of Atomic > > Scientists). We do have the thermometer showing the likely temperature > > given current commitments to mitigation, but that is only one step > > along the process. > > > Mike MacCracken > > > On 8/10/11 1:11 AM, "David Mitchell" <david.mitch...@dri.edu> wrote: > > > Hello Michael, > > > Sorry to hear about your damaged computer and house. No problem > > regarding the delay. > > > I agree that Climate 101 seems like a good match for our needs. > > I'd be happy to assist on the editorial board as time permits. I > > concur with the guidelines proposed by Ken and yourself, which are > > repeated here: > > "I think key would be being as centrist and reasonable as > > possible. Make as few claims as possible as an organization. Make > > sure all such statements of the organization are well-founded and > > board approved. Avoid any statements that would make the > > organization seem outside the scientific or political mainstream. > > > Balance this with rapid response to developments in the news cycle > > to maximize media exposure. Participate in NGO activities around > > meetings of the parties of various conventions. > > > There are real political and strategic questions: is it better to > > promote a broad brush approach to reducing climate risk (including > > emission reduction, adaptation etc) or narrowly focus on CDR > > and/or SRM? (My preference would be the former.)" > > In addition, there may be "critical consensus" in the recent > > scientific literature (and soon-to-be published literature) such > > that the evidence can speak for itself to a large extent, and one > > function we can have is to ask critical questions in light of this > > evidence. > > > Best wishes, > > David > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: Michael Hayes <voglerl...@gmail.com> > > Date: Tuesday, August 9, 2011 12:01 > > Subject: Re: website for climate science and engineering > > ... > > read more » > > ClimateSensitivity_Wasdell_2011.pdf > 2018KViewDownload > > Kiehl_paleoclimate_Science_2011.pdf > 393KViewDownload- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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