The commentaries published byHarvard Solar Geoengineering Research Program on the recent United NationsEnvironment Assembly in Nairobi provide essential insights into the currentstate of climate policy and geoengineering governance. Here I draw out some key points from my pointof view as a geoengineering advocate. Prof. OlafCorry, International Relations, University of Copenhagen, notes the fissures that emerged about the ultimate aim ofgeoengineering policy, between control and oversight vs avoiding unduerestrictions, with a basic clash of worldview over whether geoengineering cansubstitute for emission reduction. I discuss this substitution debate below. Ina Möller,PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden, provides essential context, noting the traditionalfault lines of climate politics between rich and poor countries. Möller says “preserving the fragileclimate peace that was achieved with the Paris Agreement means countries likeGermany or the UK are extremely cautious in showing support for geoengineeringas a policy option, even if they are aware of its importance.” This excessivecaution goes to show the bankruptcy of diplomacy, how political consensus isseen as more important than having a policy that can achieve essentialgoals. Governments think it is better toall agree even if the end result is catastrophe. Mölleris cynical about the motives of Saudi Arabia and the Trump administration, sharingthe widespread interpretation that they will water down anything thatacknowledges the urgency of climate change. Another alternative seems likely, as discussed below, that the US wantsto be able to proceed with domestic geoengineering activities without beingconstrained by the UN. Dr. Joshua Horton, Engineeringand Applied Sciences, Harvard University saysthere are multiple conflicting and incomplete accounts of the discussions. He cites one sourceargument that “Saudi Arabia at least sees carbon removal forms ofgeoengineering as a means of sustaining fossil fuel use, while the UnitedStates argued that carbon removal is an alternative to emissions reduction” andthat “the US objected to language that suggested “geoengineering techniquesshould not be treated as a substitute for mitigation, or emissions cuts.” Apparently, the US “feared the resolutionwould constrain geoengineering research and development far more than othercountries feared that it could enable geoengineering.” The source “was atthe meeting but chose to speak anonymously due to professional concerns,” illustratingthe scale of intimidation that surrounds this core security problem for theworld. It is a tragedy that concernsabout funding and reputation stop scientists from participating in opendialogue and debate. Before people get too indignant about the USposition, the fact is that carbon removal could well be a substitute foremission reduction. It is possible thatthe USA is acting constructively by preventing unscientific agreement. How so? If we want net zero global emissions byany specific date, say 2030, we can theoretically achieve that through 100%emission reduction, 100% carbon removal or any combination of the two. There is a clear one-for-one substitution betweenvarious ways of getting carbon atoms out of the air and stopping them enteringthe air. All such methods could equallycontribute to the goal of stopping the rise of GHGs. The question of substitution is about cost,feasibility and effectiveness, not political morality. In fact, substitutingcarbon removal for emission reduction is good, because it starts a trajectory toincrease carbon removal to eventually become many times bigger than emissions,and achieve climate restoration, while getting the capitalist system on boardby easing the pressure to decarbonise the economy. We can keep emitting whileramping up carbon removal, even though that may be heresy in the UN. It seems from Dr Horton’s report that the US insistenceon enabling research on carbon removal may be a corrective to the efforts ofthose who see the problem through the prism of opposition to fossil fuelindustries. Can we really trustinternational governance of geoengineering when some of the proposed regulatorsmay secretly aim to shut down the whole research program for misguidedideological motives. Prof. Aarti Gupta, Environmental Policy,Wageningen University, looks at the failure of the resolution against its UNsetting, insisting the UN is the only legitimate setting for discussing the governabilityof climate engineering, saying “for a politically fraught issue such as climateengineering, a ‘non-politicized’ setting does not exist.” With respect, Isuspect climate engineering is only fraught because of baseless politicking byits opponents. Insisting on UNinvolvement appears to frame the debate in a way designed to delay action, potentiallyexcluding the possibility that immediate field trials of climate managementtechnologies can prevent dangerous tipping points. In the case of marine geoengineering, the UNhas already agreed a scientific framework for field trials in the LondonProtocol. Nations should proceed to approvetrials within that context, rather than setting up new international barriers. Bothsides in this debate claim evidence is on their side while their opponents areengaged in politicization. Matthias Honegger,Research Associate, Perspectives Climate Research & Institute for AdvancedSustainability Studies, describes a battleof paradigms, with the dominant view that geoengineering is a dangerousdistraction. The debate over whether SRM and CDR should be assessed togetherunder the heading of geoengineering saw the US argue in Nairobi that theproposed mandate to UNEP would have resulted in restriction rather thanenablement, constraining efforts to incentivise CDR implementation. Honegger givesan account that rebuts the dark imputation of denialist motives: he says the USrepeatedly expressed willingness to negotiate to separate CDR and SRM andbalance the language on governance, and appeared ready to support the finalproposal put forward by Switzerland on the last day. By contrast, the EU doubled down on itsopposition to geoengineering, expressing grave concern about risks andprecautions. The EU political confusion is well shown by the fact it has silentlybuilt CDR into its 2050 long-term strategy, eventhough CDR clashes with the EU’s climate policy paradigm. Discussion of the precautionary principle may seemsimple, but it appears to conceal hidden motives of delaying research based onthe priority of existing climate and environmental policy paradigms, much asthe church feared that Galileo and Darwin would upset their established ‘flatearth’ paradigm. The problem with precautionarylanguage about geoengineering is that the risks of geoengineering are far lowerthan the risks of not geoengineering. Theprecautionary principle only applies in situations where not acting carries lowrisks, manifestly not the case with the dangers of global warming. The perverse likely result of such delayingtactics is that when climate change gets much worse we will not have theevidence base in place to decide which geoengineering activities are best. Jesse Reynolds,University of California, Los Angeles School of Law, argues the resolution fractured a potential supportive coalition bycombining CDR and SRM and insisting UNEP be the implementing body. Noting that Bolivia and the Europeancountries tried to alter the resolution in ways that were likely to lead to itsfailure, Reynolds discusses the activities of advocacy groups that lobbied inNairobi to call for a prohibition on geoengineering. The absence of civilsociety advocacy groups in favour of geoengineering enables political influenceto support the narrative that geoengineering is the project offossil fuel interests, even though this political claim is poorly evidenced and misleading. Reynolds notes that at least the Nairobi failure should give IPCC themessage to give more attention to CDR and SRM, which it has largely neglected andavoided, and should promote discussion on an institutional home to govern SRM. Dr. Duncan McLaren,Lancaster Environment Centre, argues the Swissresolution was just intended to build knowledge about the climatic implicationsof geoengineering, and about potential social, environmental, economic,political and technical implications and side-effects. Noting that the US andSaudi Arabia criticised the resolution for threatening inappropriaterestrictions, he presents a different view from Honegger, saying thesecountries rejected all efforts at compromise. McLaren raises a key policy question, whether the call for a strongprecautionary approach by environmentalists is just intended to scupperagreement. A UN majority worries that geoengineeringcould undermine emissions reductions, while a minority supports carbon removal asa direct substitute for emissions cuts. The geoengineering debate raises arange of views on market-led research and innovation in new technologies,ranging from a narrow focus on climate impacts through to broader socio-politicalanalysis and regulation based on concerns about procedural injustice. Prof. Sikina Jinnah,Department of Politics, University of California Santa Cruz, discusses the double-edged fear that governance could be either overly enabling (i.e.slippery slope to deployment) or overly constraining (i.e. shutting downpotentially desirable research). Prof Jinnah suggests any revised proposalshould consider solar geoengineering and carbon dioxide removal strategies intandem not in sync, and should draw on UNEP’s core strengths as a convening body,rather than for assessment. UNEP/UNEA could encourage work on solargeoengineering in the IPCC’s 6thAssessment Report or recommend anIPCC special report on solar geoengineering and carbon removal, and couldwelcome ongoing US domestic work through the National Academies committee. Maria Ivanova, AssociateProfessor of Global Governance and Director, Center for Governance and Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Boston, comparesthe UNEA resolution to the Oxford Principles of Geoengineering, noting the need for a political lift to higher level and deeperand wider scientific foundation. The uncertainty about whether geoengineeringis a climate issue or a broader environmental issue raised problems about UNEAas the right forum. The lack of public discussionbeforehand meant there was limited understanding of the issues. The strongopposition to all forms of geoengineering, including research, from some NGOs, meantdelegations needed a lot more information on the science and the policyimplications. Scientists must do more to inform government officials and theiradvisors, like the UK parliament 2010 report on“The Regulation of Geoengineering”, the US National Academies of Sciences reports oncarbon dioxide removal and on “reflecting sunlight to cool Earth” in 2015, andthe 2018 study bythe US National Academies on the SRM research and governance agenda. The increasein discussion about geoengineering suggests the UN Secretary-General shouldconvene further work through a revived UN Scientific Advisory Board. Overall,these commentaries challenge the simple public messaging from climate activiststhat the USA scuppered the talks because it wanted to promote climatedenial. It seems the situation is morethat the USA does not trust UN systems to properly advance geoengineeringdiscussions, and is actually the country that is most supportive ofgeoengineering, at least of CDR. Robert Tulip -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. 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[geo] Harvard Commentaries on UNEA Nairobi Geoengineering discussion
'Robert Tulip' via geoengineering Thu, 04 Apr 2019 03:38:45 -0700
