Dear colleagues, I'm happy to share a new paper that explores the role of regularized campaigns as an institutional innovation to strengthen environmental governance in contexts where formal institutions often struggle to ensure consistent enforcement.
Link to the paper: https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70052 Preprint on SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4371501<https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4371501> Traditionally, governance tools emphasize either institutions or ad hoc campaigns. While institutions offer continuity, campaigns are mobilized in moments of crisis or reform but tend to be unsustainable. Regularized campaigns combine features of both. The table below outlines key differences. Table 1. Comparison between (functional, governance-oriented) institutions, ad hoc campaigns, and regularized campaigns Governance Tool Continuity of Enforcement Intensity and Visibility Adaptability Signaling Function Effect on the Compliance Gap Institutions Continuous, rule-based, bureaucratized Typically, low to moderate Low; often rigid Weak or diffuse; absorbed into routine bureaucratic processes Often persistent due to entrenched discretion Ad Hoc Campaigns Temporary, time-bounded High during campaign periods High, but reactive Strong, but short-lived Short-term narrowing, then reversion Regularized Campaigns Periodic and structured, embedded in governance waves High during waves; moderate residual impacts Medium to high; can be targeted Strong and recurring; maintains credible central prioritization Sustained reduction Drawing on the case of China’s central environmental inspections (CEIs), we theorize and empirically test how institutionalizing high-intensity, periodic enforcement campaigns can reduce compliance disparities, particularly among economically influential firms that have historically evaded regulation under weak oversight. Using an original firm-level dataset that integrates multiple confidential government sources, we find that these compliance gaps narrowed significantly after CEIs became regularized. This study may be of particular interest to those engaged in research or practice on multi-level governance, regulatory capture, and enforcement asymmetries in both authoritarian and democratic systems. Best, Victoria ---------- Shiran Victoria Shen Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science Washington University in St. Louis Faculty Affiliate, Center on China’s Economy and Institutions Faculty Affiliate, Center for Human and Planetary Health Stanford University http://svshen.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "gep-ed" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/gep-ed/PH0PR14MB44873F39B03D9943B026B0C8A84BA%40PH0PR14MB4487.namprd14.prod.outlook.com.
