Hi all, I'm writing a paper about opposition within the EU to export of spent nuclear fuel to Russia or elsewhere outside the EU. I'm framing the paper as a study of (some of) the conditions under which domestic concerns about the commission of global environmental injustices abroad might cause countries to forbear otherwise advantageous exports of environmental hazards, even if the prospective importers are ready and willing. Thus far, I have found no studies in the academic literature that bear directly on this question. All of the studies of global environmental justice that I have seen have been (a) normative, (b) studies of the practices that lead to the export of hazards, (c) studies of the reasons why potential importers might agree to participate, or (d) studies of efforts by potential importers to stop such practices. Missing (as far as I can tell) are studies of the circumstances under which potential EXPORTERS might voluntarily change their own practices in response to INTERNAL criticism. Have any of you written about this, or do you know of anyone who has? Many thanks, Rob Darst Assistant Professor of Political Science University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
