> -----Original Message----- > From: Stephen Bash > Sent: Monday, November 26, 2012 3:56 PM > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Jason J CTR Pyeron (US)" > > Sent: Monday, November 26, 2012 2:24:54 PM > > Subject: git bundle format > > > > I am facing a situation where I would like to use git bundle but at > > the same time inspect the contents to prevent a spillage[1]. > > As someone who faced a similar situation in a previous life, I'll offer > my $0.02, but I'm certainly not the technical expert here.
Kind of what I am looking for as a side effect. > > > Given we have a public repository which was cloned on to a secret > > development repository. Now the developers do some work which should > > not be sensitive in any way and commit and push it to the secret > > repository. > > > > Now they want to release it out to the public. The current process is > > to review the text files to ensure that there is no "secret" sauce > > in there and then approve its release. This current process ignores > > the change tracking and all non-content is lost. > > > > In this situation we should assume that the bundle does not have any > > content which is already in the public repository, that is it has > > the minimum data to make it pass a git bundle verify from the public > > repositories point of view. We would then take the bundle and pipe > > it though the "git-bundle2text" program which would result in a > > "human" inspectable format as opposed to the packed format[2]. The > > security reviewer would then see all the information being released > > and with the help of the public repository see how the data changes > > the repository. > > > > Am I barking up the right tree? > > First, a shot out of left field: how about a patch based workflow? > (similar to the mailing list, just replace email with sneakernet) > Patches are plain text and simple to review (preferable to an "opaque" > binary format?). This is to only address the accidental development on a high side. Using this or any process should come with shame or punishment for wasting resources/time by not developing on a low side to start with. But accepting reality there will be times where code and its metadata (commit logs, etc) will be created on a high side and should be brought back to the low side. > Second, thinking about your proposed bundle-based workflow I have two > questions I'd have to answer to be comfortable with the solution: > > 1) Does the binary bundle contain any sensitive information? Potentially, hence the review. If the reviewer cannot prove the data he is looking at then the presumption is yes. > 2) Do the diffs applied to public repo contain any sensitive data? That is a great question. Can the change of code while neither the original or the resultant be secret while the change imply or demonstrate the secret. I think the answer is yes. > > Question 1 seems tricky to someone who knows *nothing* about the bundle > format (e.g. me). Maybe some form of bundle2text can be vetted enough > that everyone involved believes that there is no other information > traveling with the bundle (if so, you're golden). Here I have to trust > other experts. On the flip side, even if the bundle itself is polluted > (or considered to be lacking proof to the contrary), if (2) is > considered safe, the patching of the public repo could potentially be > done on a sacrificial hard drive before pushing. The logistics are well established and here and now is not a place to go in to that. But the above is the crux of what I am trying to get at. > > Question 2 is relatively straight forward and lead me to the patch > idea. I would: > - Bundle the public repository > - Init a new repo in the secure space from the public bundle > - Fetch from the to-be-sanitized bundle into the new repo > - Examine commits (diffs) introduced by branches in the to-be- > sanitized bundle > - Perhaps get a list of all the objects in the to-be-sanitized bundle > and do a git-cat-file on each of them (if the bundle is assembled > correctly it shouldn't have any unreachable objects...). This step may > be extraneous after the previous. Here we would be missing the metadata that goes along with the commit. Especially the SHA sums. Thanks. -Jason
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