On 10/1/2018 11:30 AM, Duy Nguyen wrote:
On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 3:46 PM Ben Peart <peart...@gmail.com> wrote:@@ -2479,6 +2491,7 @@ static int do_write_index(struct index_state *istate, struct tempfile *tempfile, if (ce_write(&c, newfd, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)) < 0) return -1; + offset = lseek(newfd, 0, SEEK_CUR) + write_buffer_len;Note, lseek() could in theory return -1 on error. Looking at the error code list in the man page it's pretty unlikely though, unless
Good catch. I'll add the logic to check for an error.
+static size_t read_eoie_extension(const char *mmap, size_t mmap_size) +{ + /* + * The end of index entries (EOIE) extension is guaranteed to be last + * so that it can be found by scanning backwards from the EOF. + * + * "EOIE" + * <4-byte length> + * <4-byte offset> + * <20-byte hash> + */ + const char *index, *eoie; + uint32_t extsize; + size_t offset, src_offset; + unsigned char hash[GIT_MAX_RAWSZ]; + git_hash_ctx c; + + /* ensure we have an index big enough to contain an EOIE extension */ + if (mmap_size < sizeof(struct cache_header) + EOIE_SIZE_WITH_HEADER + the_hash_algo->rawsz)Using sizeof() for on-disk structures could be dangerous because you don't know how much padding there could be (I'm not sure if it's actually specified in the C language spec). I've checked, on at least x86 and amd64, sizeof(struct cache_header) is 12 bytes, but I don't know if there are any crazy architectures out there that set higher padding.
This must be safe as the same code has been in do_read_index() and verify_index_from() for a long time.
