Anders Waldenborg <and...@0x63.nu> writes:
> @@ -1352,6 +1353,17 @@ static size_t format_commit_one(struct strbuf *sb, /*
> in UTF-8 */
> arg++;
>
> opts.only_trailers = 1;
> + } else if (skip_prefix(arg, "separator=",
> &arg)) {
> + size_t seplen = strcspn(arg, ",)");
> + strbuf_reset(&sepbuf);
> + char *fmt = xstrndup(arg, seplen);
> + strbuf_expand(&sepbuf, fmt,
> format_fundamental, NULL);
This somehow feels akin to using end-user supplied param to printf(3)
as its format argument e.g.
int main(int ac, char *av) {
printf(av[1]);
return 0;
}
which is not a good idea. Is there a mechanism with which we can
ensure that the separator=<what> specification will never come from
potentially malicious sources (e.g. not used to show things on webpage
allowing random folks who access he site to supply custom format)?
