On Wed, 2005-03-16 at 12:39 +0100, Peter Conrad wrote: > I understood Ivan's scenario like this: > > 1. attacker creates Patch-A (harmless) and Patch-B (evil) with identical > checksums > 2. attacker submits Patch-A to maintainer > 3. maintainer integrates Patch-A into software, signing it
This is where your (Ivan's?) scenario is flawed: when the maintainer integrates patch-A into his archive, he doesn't sign patch-A at all. He creates a new patch from the changes made by merging patch-A and signs *that*. -- Matthew Dempsky <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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