Why can keys not be signed with a signing subkey rather than a primary signing key? I just learned of this after going to my first signing party. Perhaps I have misunderstood the purpose of subkeys.
I have read that it is good practice to create a primary signing key, and then use subkeys on the card. This is the recommended method for setup of the FSFE card, which is just a fancy skin on the OpenPGP card. My problem is that now I have a DSA primary key on trusted media in a safe location, which I have to retrieve for any key signing I want to perform. I cannot simply sign the keys with the signing subkey stored on my OpenPGP card. Are there any security implications for using the same signing key for normal document signing *and* key signing? Would it be any less secure to: 1) generate the primary signing key as a 1024 bit RSA key, 2) create the encryption and authentication keys as 1024 bit RSA subkeys of the signing key, and 3) copy all of these keys to the OpenPGP card? I would also create all the keys using a machine with no network interfaces, booted from a trusted livecd. This procedure should allow me to make a backup copy of my private keys to removable media (usb drive or burn a CD), just in case the card is somehow damaged. It would also afford me the security and usefulness of the card for everyday use (as well as allow me to sign keys using the card). However, then I have to go meet everyone again to sign my new primary signing key. This brings me to my last question. Let us assume that I create a primary signing key with an expiration. I then get that key signed by several people. When the expiration date is near, do I simply create a new signing key and sign it with the original key (before it expires, of course)? Is the new key then considered just as trusted as the original key, which has all the signatures on it? Is there any method for transferring the signatures to the new key, or would the new key have to be resigned by everyone that signed the original? Using the default WoT model, doesn't this mean that every third time the key is renewed, it would not be trusted and would need to be resigned by everyone that signed the previous key? Yes, I have RTFM, and several mailing list postings, but I'm still a bit unclear on these questions. If you are still reading this - thank you for your time! I look forward to your reply. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users