On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 2:48 PM, David Shaw <ds...@jabberwocky.com> wrote: > Look in the "Features" line for "MDC".
My key does indeed have this feature; thanks for the informative reply. > Back to your original issue though, note that if Fred can get access to your > (untrusted) drive, he can just replace the whole file with whatever he likes > (since he just needs your public key to encrypt a new file), with no fussy > message tampering needed. That may or may not be an issue in your > situation. Signing does help there since Fred presumably doesn't have access > to your secret key. I had failed to realise this, somehow. A separate manifest file (also encrypted) keeps track of which encrypted containers hold which files, so the attack is definitely harder (or at least more noticeable). I think it's still best to sign though, just to remove more possible attack vectors. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users