On 6/26/2014 4:35 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > You mean except for that you must be capable of forging a mainkey > signature (if you don't control the sending system anyway in which case > you don't need the key any more)?
Nope. :) I meant what I said. The preference list on the key is advisory, not binding. There's nothing requiring an implementation to even look at the preference list on the key. For any OpenPGP certificate, you can send it 3DES-encrypted traffic and be in complete accordance with the spec and the recipient's preferences. A conformant implementation MUST choose a cipher that is listed in the certificate preferences, but (a) the spec is completely silent about *which* preferred cipher should be used, and (b) the spec guarantees 3DES will always be a preferred cipher. This is why I've always pushed to call them capability sets, instead of preference lists. The spec doesn't guarantee they'll be treated as preference lists. The spec only guarantees they'll be treated as a capability set. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users