On Fri, 18 Mar 2016 08:21, w...@gnupg.org said: > I'll look at how we can improve the description on the web page.
Actually the current text does not look too bad: If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you can still verify the file's SHA-1 checksum. This is less secure, because if someone modified the files as they were transferred to you, it would not be much more effort to modify the checksums that you see on this webpage. As such, if you use this method, you should compare the checksums with those in release announcement. This is sent to the gnupg-announce mailing list (among others), which is widely mirrored. Don't use the mailing list archive on this website, but find the announcement on several other websites and make sure the checksum is consistent. This makes it more difficult for an attacker to trick you into installing a modified version of the software. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users