Let me condense and try again:

Let me preface by saying that I am answering based on what I think likely, not what I *know*, so take my comments in that context (and I welcome corrections from anyone who does know, of course).

1) Is it correct that this particular device maker designed a
sophisticated hardware-based system with the specific purpose of
thwarting the brute-forcing of ridiculously low-entropy user's
secret?
Yes/no?

I don't know.

However, it seems unlikely that you'll know the system internals so well that you can have true confidence in a "yes" answer, even if you suspect it to be yes, or the device maker claims it is yes. Therefore, for any applications where it actually matters, you'd be well advised to assume "no".

2) Is it possible for the user to circumvent the potential problem
of the device maker cooperating with his adversary to by-pass this
protection, simply by using a pass-phrase of an appropriate length?
Yes/no?

I imagine that the potential problem can be circumvented, yes, but not simply by using a longer passphrase. I don't know whether it even allows that option, but it really doesn't matter since you don't know what it does with that passphrase internally anyway. Since you don't know, you can't trust it.

However, remember that the device in question is a computer. It's not a phone, or a camera, or a GPS receiver, it's just a computer that happens to have supporting hardware to enable some of those functions. As such, one can write whatever software one wants for it, and that includes a correctly implemented encrypted data storage mechanism which does not require you to trust any decisions made by the manufacturer. *That* is how you circumvent the problem you're referring to.

The android world is more open to third party developers so it's probably easier there, but I expect it should be possible either way. Regardless, if the system relies on code you can't see, then (in principle) you can't trust it completely.

-Chris

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