On 10/11/17 09:50, Francesco Ariis wrote: > A general word on expiry dates: you can always modify them as you > go (that's what I do), they are not set in stone?
Well, this depends on your threat model. If I can control what one of your peers sees, I could strip the self-signatures that change the expiry date, only keeping the ones that I agree with. So if you have a self-signature from 16 Dec 2010 that says the key does not expire, and a self-signature from 10 Nov 2017 that says the key expires in two years, I could manipulate it such that the second self-signature never reaches this peer but everything still verifies. Then the manipulated peer thinks the key will never expire, and I can "keep the key going" forever. If however you only ever extend the expiry dates, an attacker could only fake your still valid key to be expired, rather than the more troublesome case of faking your expired key to be still valid. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>
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