(I originally composed this on a mobile device and it was held for moderation. Re-sending it from my laptop.)
===== (Apologies for the terseness: on a mobile device) > should not be viewed as "discussing a [...] nightmare scenario", I am darkly amused at someone who has not done the research into what the nightmare scenario *is* telling me that it's not a nightmare scenario. The nightmare scenario is malcontents realize the keyserver network is a multijurisdictional, redundant, distributed database from which data cannot be deleted... and decide this makes it an ideal way to distribute child porn. The moment that happens, the keyserver network goes down hard as every keyserver operator everywhere gets exposed to massive criminal liability. We've known about it for several years. We've been thinking about how to counter it for several years. It turns out that countering it is a *really hard job*. If you make it possible to delete records from a keyserver, you open the door to all kinds of shenanigans that governments could force keyserver operators to do on their behalf. How do you make it possible to delete records from a keyserver, while at the same time keeping the keyserver resistant to malicious tampering from adversaries? This is an incredibly hard question to address. And frankly, you're not adding a single iota to the discussion. But if you want to continue it, I'd suggest speaking up over at sks-de...@gnu.org, where people have been having this discussion off and on for years. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users