On 14 Jul 2021, at 23:52, Стефан Васильев via Gnupg-users 
<gnupg-users@gnupg.org> wrote:

It would tell me as 3rd party that for WoT puposes, if this is still used,
Alice and her good friend Bob were able to sign their pub keys remotely,
based on a free of charge verification method.
That’s what ordinary third-party sigs do. Adding medical data to a public key 
does not add anything to the process.

You should also beware that medical information is treated as sensitive 
personal data under GDPR, and this subject to stricter rules. Keyserver 
operators already have enough legal issues handling ordinary personal data 
(email addresses etc) without adding vaccination certificates to the dataset.

A
I would argue what he is proposing doesn't do that at all. It is like publically posting a password to your google account and telling people they can verify it is your account by trying to sign in! Once you send your 'proof of identity,' anyone can make the same claims even if you are not sharing this on a keyserver. It's made worse by this being something I expect people will be sharing to prove vaccination, so it will likely have many potential areas to be copied. If you tell me you have not shared it with anyone yet, that still means nothing because you could be impersonating the persons whose QR code you already received from an earlier exchange. Even if this was not the case, and it indeed was a verifiable secret never shared with anyone, it does not verify the identity of the public key owner because it's susceptible to a simple man-in-the-middle attack.

Assume Bob wishes to prove his ownership of public key pub_bob to Alice. Bob and Alice are communicating in a way compromised by Eve. Bob affixes his Vaccine QR code to a public key and transmits it to Alice. On route to Alice, Eve intercepts the public key, generates a key pair Pub/Priv_eve, adds bobs QR code to the public key Pub_eve, and sends it to Alice. Alice sees Pub_eve with Bob's QR code and concludes that Pub_eve is owned by Bob and signs it as verified.

Again, this is not a secure way to verify identity. Do not do this. It is considerably worse than just having a public key exchange over the phone/video call because it gives others a way to impersonate you. If you wanted to have a video call over the internet and show "proof of identity" over that call and that was sufficient for you, then fine, but whatever you do, don't attach your proof of identity to the public key.

Attachment: OpenPGP_0x255837AEF812E87E.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key

Attachment: OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

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