On Fri, Oct 04, 2024 at 10:35:02AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users wrote: > > A nation state with the ability to crack 1024 bit RSA would not spend > > years and billions of dollars on the messages/files of a single > > entity. > > They absolutely would, in a heartbeat, and they'd consider it a bargain. > > Imagine some major world power has a copy of an old message from Vladimir > Putin, signed in '99 using 1024-bit RSA. Is it worth a billion dollars to > break the key, allowing them to forge authentic-looking messages that could > be useful in disinformation campaigns?
I am not suggesting that world leaders should continue to use 1024 bit RSA to store their nuclear installation locations or sign their offical pronouncements. I am merely pointing out that for 99.9999% of GPG users dropping the old key format provided no benefit with respect to key length. They could continue to use such keys indefinitely to generate new messages with no real risk. Of course the bigger usability issue here is that old messages encrypted using the old key format still exist. Dropping support for decrypting such messages entirely means that users lose access to those messages and gain no potential benefit, even if they are a world leader. Bruce _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
