------------------------------------------------------------------------ **** WWW.GOANET.ORG ** C O M M U N I T Y ** A N N O U N C E M E N T **** ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Save Goa Campaign / Goa Bachao Abhiyan
Report all violations of Hill-cutting, Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) and other Land Use violations to: Nodal Officer & District Collector (Goa) Mr. Nikhil Kumar Office: 2223612; Residence (after 8PM): 2420710; mobile 9822123071 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ In the Economic & Political Weekly (EPW) of Dec 30, there is a review article by Amaresh Bagchi titled "India's defence budget: Lessons not learnt". From this we can glean a few lessons about the principles and practices of defence budgeting which may come in handy in dealing with the problem of the Navy in Dabolim. By way of background, of the total Rs 564 thousand crores of the 2006/07 budget, Rs 89 thousand crores (16% apprx) is accounted for by defence and that excludes pensions for defence personnel. This is the largest budget category next to "interest". The prospects are that in the budget exercise currently underway, the defence outlay may cross the Rs 100 thousand crore mark, a doubling of the amount spent in 1999 when there was an actual war fought over Kargil. This outlay does not seem commensurate with current threat perceptions which are on the decline. Instead there seems to be a big push for modernisation which results in nearly 50% going for new arms. The defence budget is not to be determind by external conditions alone. It must be moderated by internal priorities (i.e. guns vs butter). In addition, the mission of the armed forces has to be factored in whether offensive or defensive and whether state-of-the-(martial) art or of an effective deterrent nature. This has then to be translated into capability building requirements for which budgetary provisions have to be made. It seems very little political judgement is brought to bear on Indian defence budgeting. Actually what happens is that incremental plans are proposed (i.e. say 10% over last year) and the Ministry of Finance decides what can be accommodated in the aggregate. The author says defence budgets in India are focused on acquiring platforms rather than capability building. In lay man's terms this is like getting newer and newer toys to play with. The author says equipment is acquired without taking into account the personnel required and THEIR TRAINING (which, incidentally, Dabolim is primaily engaged in). The author goes on to discuss a number of other issues which we will touch upon as needed later. The bottom line for the present is there probably is not much of a rhyme or reason for the stranglehold on civil aviation being exercised at Dabolim. Its basically a bureaucratic regime in which the incumbent enjoys an undue advantage. One way out may be to push for a U.S. style periodic Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process which takes local socio-political inputs ("hearts and minds" of the affected people) into account to evaluate the net military value of a base like Dabolim and propose to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) whether re-configuration (i.e. re-location of activities) or closure is warranted. For example if Rs 75 thousand crores (80% of the annual budget amount for defence!) has actually been pumped into Dabolim over the past few decades as persistently claimed by the Navy then what is the actual national security benefit derived and at what socio-economic cost to the host, Goa? Cheers. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ **** WWW.GOANET.ORG ** C O M M U N I T Y ** A N N O U N C E M E N T **** ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Save Goa Campaign / Goa Bachao Abhiyan Report all violations of Hill-cutting, Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) and other Land Use violations to 24-hour Helpline +91 9822684372 ------------------------------------------------------------------------