From: bcsabha.kal...@gmail.com
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http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/make-no-mistake-this-is-modis-defeat-738518?pfrom=home-topstories
(Siddharth Varadarajan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Public Affairs and
Critical Theory, Shiv Nadar University)Narendra Modi, as the saying goes,
should have been careful about what he wished for. "Jo desh ka mood hai," he
declared during the election campaign for the Delhi assembly, "wahi Dilli ka
mood hai." Now that Delhi has given the Aam Aadmi Party 67 out of 70 seats and
54 per cent of the popular vote, the Prime Minister must be wondering what this
means for the emerging mood elsewhere in the country.
To understand the scale of the defeat that Modi - who was not just the face and
voice of his party's campaign but its totem as well - has just led his party
to, consider this simple statistic: the 3 seats the BJP managed to win under
his leadership this time represents a massive 95 per cent drop from the 60
assembly segments he delivered in the 2014 general election, and a 78 per cent
fall from what the party's local leadership managed on its own in December
2013. In that election, Rahul Gandhi, by contrast, had at least managed 20 per
cent of the Congress party's 2009 Lok Sabha tally. His MPs would fit in a bus,
people joked at the time. Modi's MLAs can get around Delhi in an auto-rickshaw.
Had the BJP won, the party would have exulted in the potency of the Modi wave
and the master strategizing of Amit Shah. But now that the Great Leader has
failed to get even the meager waters of the Yamuna to make way for his
juggernaut, this defeat will be pinned not on his "56-inch chest", or even on
Shah, but on the drooping shoulders of Kiran Bedi and the party's city
leadership. Success in the BJP has not many but only one father; failure, on
the other hand, can never be his fault.
I have written elsewhere about the blunders the BJP committed in the run up to
the Delhi election and the reasons behind the AAP's re-emergence. But the scale
of AAP's victory -- and the BJP's defeat -- suggests some fundamental shifts in
the political tectonics of Delhi, and perhaps even of India as a whole.
Modi's victory in 2014 was meant to represent that fundamental shift -- the
arrival of a new "aspirational" India that wanted economic betterment and did
not trust the "handout" politics of the past. When the voters of Delhi were
exhorted to "move ahead with Modi", the BJP was trying once again to hold out
the same promise of inclusive development that allowed it to increase its vote
share in the capital from 33 to 46 per cent last year. The fact that the BJP's
popular vote has fallen back to 33 per cent suggests the "aspirational" section
of the electorate deserted it this time.
Why did these voters leave the BJP and go over to the AAP? Because eight months
of Modi rule at the Centre have made it clear that while the BJP makes vague
announcements for the poor, it delivers concrete results for the corporate
sector. Like the ordinance which makes it easier for the land of farmers and
adivasis to be acquired and made over to industry. Like labour laws and
environmental reform which makes it easier for industry to violate existing
standards. The citizens of Delhi may not have experienced what these changes
mean, but they are clever enough to realise the development being pursued isn't
quite inclusive.
The aspirational voter also aspires to her vision of modernity, to a life in
which the individual's right to live, dress, work, travel, love and enjoy life
as she likes is as important as economic progress. For young voters, the Sangh
Parivar's cretinous attempts to dictate cultural and lifestyle choices are
completely unacceptable; and while they are not moved by the traditional
concerns about "secularism", they are smart enough to see the dangers that the
RSS's divisive sectarian agenda holds out for their city and country.
Modi's complicity-by-silence with the book burners, film vandals and religious
hate-mongers has not gone unnoticed among the swing voters he attracted just
one year ago.
I argued earlier that the BJP's '3 M strategy' - Modi, Money and Mud-slinging -
failed to cut any ice with Delhi's voters. One day before votes were cast, the
party played a fourth M card, majoritarianism, by trying to whip up hysteria
over the support declared by the Shahi Imam of the Jama Masjid for AAP. No less
a leader than Finance Minister Arun Jaitley was deployed in a last desperate
attempt to inject religious polarization, but the strategy failed when Aam
Aadmi leaders rejected the Imam's offer and accused the BJP of activating him
in order to communalise the campaign.
As we look beyond Delhi for the national implications of the BJP's spectacular
defeat, two questions loom large: one for the BJP, the other for the opposition.
First, will Modi and the BJP learn from the Delhi result and put an end to the
divisive politics of the Sangh Parivar? And will the PM realise he cannot carry
the electorate on announcements alone, that sooner rather later he must deliver
on the promises he made of mass employment, growth, sanitation and
infrastructure? A rational leadership would read the Delhi result as a
small-sample expression of the emerging national mood and put in place a major
course correction. But my sense is that Modi and Amit Shah are not likely to
act rationally. Already we see attempts to ring-fence the "national
government"and its policies. In the absence of any change, there is also the
danger that the BJP's negative, sectarian impulses may actually sharpen.
As for the opposition, the question on everyone's mind today is how easily can
the AAP's act of stopping the Modi wave be replicated elsewhere. The short
answer, of course, is "not very easily". Looking at the 2014 general election
and all the major state elections we have seen so far -- Haryana, Maharashtra,
Jharkhand, Jammu and Kashmir, and Delhi -- this "wave" needs two conditions in
order to prevail. First, a ruling party discredited by corruption, poor
governance and anti-incumbency. And second, the lack of a strong, clear
alternative to the BJP.
In 2014, the UPA was discredited and there was no real 'national' alternative
to the BJP. The same was true of Haryana, where the Hooda government was swept
aside by the Modi wave. But the Modi factor showed its limits in Maharashtra
because of the Shiv Sena, and in Jharkhand, where an alliance with the
All-Jharkhand Students Union was needed to push the BJP over the finishing
line. In Delhi, the AAP was unencumbered by negativity and was the obvious
choice for anyone unhappy with the BJP. That is why the Modi machine was
stopped in its track.
Can this set of circumstances be replicated in Bihar? Perhaps, if Nitish
Kumar's Janata Dal and Lalu Yadav's RJD stay united and strong, and remedy the
poor governance record of the past year. But in West Bengal, it is the BJP that
is looking to play the same 'third alternative' role to the Trinamool and the
Left that the AAP played in Delhi, and there it is likely to meet a measure of
success.
The victory of AAP has galvanised non-BJP parties everywhere. In Jammu and
Kashmir, the Peoples Democratic Party may feel tempted to drive a harder
bargain with the BJP now about a coalition government. However, in its most
essential sense, what has defeated the BJP in Delhi is not some tactical
alignment of political forces, but the emergence of New Politics. Only if this
New Politics -- whether under the leadership of the AAP or of other kindred
forces -- begins to take hold elsewhere, will Modi's national supremacy come
under serious strain.
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