And another one from nettime, with again India making an appearance, and then in a much more global context. I hope you find it as interesting/enlightning as I did. By 'global Indian ;-) Prem C. Cheerio, p+2D!
> ---------- Original Message ---------- > From: Prem Chandavarkar <prem....@gmail.com> > To: Nettime <nettim...@kein.org> > Date: 03/10/2022 3:43 PM > Subject: Re: <nettime> The War to come ... > > (In case you'd want to read the whole thread on nettime, it starts here: https://nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-2203/msg00021.html just follow up by date ...) > My thoughts: > > Let me start with your question on NATO’s eastward expansion. Yes - on > principle, one cannot deny the freedom of the Eastern European states to > choose their alliances. But the consequences must be dispassionately > assessed. Security could be on offer from an alliance toward the West, but > security concerns from Russia, as the military power to the East, must be > factored in the equation, particularly from the possibility of their > destabilising security. This was foreseen in the cable sent by William Burns > in 2008 which I cited in my previous email, where he predicted that NATO > expansion into Ukraine could provoke a military invasion by Russia, even > though such an invasion may not be Russia’s first choice. So what is the net > balance of security that is on offer in such a situation? One must factor > that NATO is an institution that is primary to allowing the US to keep Europe > within its sphere of influence, the eastward expansion appears to spring from > a blind belief that Pax Americana is the inherent history of the world to > come, and it is necessary to account for the reaction that may be provoked > from a military power that has historically been viewed with hostility by the > Pax Americana project. What would have happened if there had been follow > through on the proposal James Baker made to Gorbachev in 1990: a limitation > placed on Pax Americana through a pact between the US, Europe and Russia > where the Eastern European states are accepted by all as a buffer zone of > non-interference. Of course, such goals are far easier to state in an > international treaty than to implement, but that is the case with all > international treaties. Could such a treaty have led to greater security for > Eastern Europe? Given the hindsight of current events, I suspect that is a > likely possibility. > > I do not think people in the west understand that in parts of the world > outside North America and Western Europe, there is little seen in the > difference of foreign policy and hegemonic interference when comparing the > US, Europe, China or Russia. In India, there may be a greater sensitivity to > China because of the proximity, the current tensions on the border, and the > memory of a traumatic war in 1962, but Russia, Europe and the US are viewed > with equal suspicion in matters of foreign policy. I am always amazed at the > conversations I have with people in the US or Western Europe, and how they > automatically assume their countries are on the side of the angels. I > remember when I was living in the US in the early 1980’s (during the Reagan > era and the height of the Cold War), people would react with a mixture of > amazement and horror when I would say that I saw no moral difference between > the foreign policies of the US and the USSR. They would indignantly ask, > “What about Afghanistan?”, and have no satisfactory response to offer when I > would ask how that was different from Vietnam. I suspect the reaction would > be the same now if I equated Russia and USA, they would indignantly ask, > “What about Ukraine?” and would be hard pressed to respond when quizzed > about how that is different from the invasion of Iraq in the Second Gulf War. > > India is not in a direct conflict with the US, and Iraq and Ukraine are > contexts viewed in India from a distance. But even without conflict, and a > supposedly good relationship with the US, Pax Americana invades and disrupts > our everyday life in ways that are not tied to military campaigns. You have > asked for the specificities of a narrative discerned in the view from a place > like India. I give a few examples below. > > The first is the state of agriculture in India. The US has used its dominance > in WTO to push for rules that favour it. So direct income support to farmers > is seen as a subsidy that is not market distorting, and therefore permitted > under WTO, whereas purchases of agricultural produce by the state under a > guarantee of minimum prices is seen as a subsidy producing a market > distortion and is forbidden. How one is seen as distortionary whereas the > other is not evades logic. The US gets away with one of the highest levels of > agricultural subsidies, currently estimated in excess of $ 25 billion, with a > substantive portion going to large agribusinesses. India is forbidden to give > any subsidies unless it is under the same category of direct income > subsidies. No weight is given to the consideration that if the Indian state > wants to implement redistribution by subsidising food for the poor and > hungry, a direct program of public purchase is far more effective than an > indirect program of income subsidies. And in a fragmented and complex society > with a rigid digital divide, implementing a direct income subsidy program is > very hard to do. The result is not only to increase hunger, but a collapse of > equitable access by farmers to remunerative markets. Given that the majority > of farmers in India are marginal farmers with land holdings below five acres, > this has created a severe crisis. Since 1995, there have been over 300,000 > farmer suicides in India precipitated by economic distress, and this is the > official record, the actual count is believed to be significantly higher. > This cannot be blamed primarily on US policy, the Indian state holds far > greater culpability, but the brand of global neoliberalism pushed by the US > is a significant part of the equation. > > Second, and this is an extension of the first point, is the way the US has > leveraged its economic dominance to push its neoliberal agenda down the > throat of the world. The way this is distorted to suit Western interests is > not perceived by the Western public. Both capital and labour are considered > major constituents of an economy, any Economics 101 textbook will tell you > that. Yet neoliberalism pushes the myth globally integrated economy that is > actually severely segmented, with an unrestricted flow of capital while > maintaining strong controls on the movement of labour. This becomes an > advantage to those countries that are capital rich and labour poor, and a > disadvantage to countries like India which are labour rich and capital poor. > So in India we see economic confrontations where the global confronts the > local in an immediacy berefit of the intermediaries of the past that offered > a buffer. This confrontation embodies a power imbalance that renders the > local as powerless. The West is often disliked for this reason. > > Finally, a more everyday example of how the story of the insular arrogance of > ’The Ugly American’ endures: the process of applying for a visa. If I apply > for a US visa, the interview can only be in English, I have no choice. If I > do not speak English, translators are available, but one feels vulnerable as > one cannot have a clear reading of the thoughts of the person who has the > power to pass unilateral judgment on you in this situation. In contrast, if I > apply for a Russian visa from a linguistically diverse country like India, I > see a conscious and proactive effort toward linguistic adjustment. My > interview will not need translators to engage with the visa officer, and can > be in Hindi in Delhi, in Bengali in Kolkata, in Marathi in Mumbai and in > Tamil in Chennai. The kind of Americans I encounter on Nettime are the more > informed ones who can perceive a non-American perspective, but they are the > exception not the rule, and I am amazed by the extent to which so many > Americans just naively assume that the rest of the world, by modernising, is > turning American. This penetrates diplomatic circles too. I remember seeing > an interview on television of a teacher of foreign languages in a US > university who remarked on how in the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-81, of the > 52 hostages, barely half a dozen had a working command of Farsi. He said that > the US position in the world will always have a degree of instability as long > as behaviour continues to feed the story of the ‘ugly American'. Just because > McDonalds has spread across the world does not mean that the world is turning > American (remember Thomas Friedman’s assertion that no two countries that > have McDonalds will go to war against each other). In fact, visit a McDonalds > in India and you will be surprised at how it has been forced to turn away > from American custom and localise - there is no beef on offer and you can > have a chicken tikka burger. > > This kind of history of hegemony has been prevalent and visible in such ways > since a long time. My personal experience of it comes from memories after > achieving adulthood in the 1970’s, and I have been reading examples of it or > hearing tales told of it from a time before I was born or I am too young to > personally remember. This is not to state that there is pure hegemony, there > has been benevolence and goodwill in the relationship as well. And that has > been the case with Russia/Soviet Union too. And one hears more cases of > Russians being aware of the problems their country causes overseas, and if > they do not speak about it, it is because of fear of domestic political > repression. Whereas Americans, and Western Europeans to a certain extent, do > not speak out because they do not know, remaining blithely unaware of the > hegemony their countries have imposed overseas: Western Europe dominating > until World War II, and America after that. Cracks in the edifice of this > blinkered gaze are needed for change, which will only happen with a more > balanced view of the history of hegemony of the last century. > > US hegemony has been balanced so far by US soft power: a reputation as a land > of widespread political freedom and economic opportunity. This is beginning > to change with: (a) an inward insular shift with growing anti-immigration > rhetoric with a racist bias; (b) rigid polarisation of the polity, where > politics is reduced to sloganeering with little accommodation to differing > views; and (c) more evidence emerging of how inequality and exploitation are > on a steep rise and hope of economic opportunity recedes on seeing how > survival of the bottom 80% is become more precarious by the day. This is > changing perceptions, and when people are looking for opportunities in the > West they are beginning to turn to options where a welfare state is more > prevalent. I read a recent study on students from India who go to study in > colleges overseas, and in 2021, for the first time in history, students going > to Canada outnumbered those going to the US. Till now, US numbers were ahead > of all others by a wide margin. Too soon to tell how this will play out in > the long term. > > Regarding leashing the imperial war machines - they will not change on their > own, are fuelled by internal forces such as capitalist oligarchy or the > military-industrial complex, and will reform only when forced to do so. This > can come only from global trends out of their control that destabilise them > or from popular movements. > > Let’s look at global trends first. I am seeing some writing on a potential > miscalculation made by the US (probably due to Pax Americana blinkers) which > could threaten the status of the dollar as the de facto reserve currency of > the world. Unilateral actions taken, starting with sanctions against Iran > which overrode a signed treaty, then the seizure of Afghanistan’s cash assets > after the Taliban took over, and now the seizure of the reserves of the > Russian Central Bank, are breeding a global insecurity on holding dollar > denominated assets that are vulnerable to unilateral US action (and one must > remember here that international perception has long regarded the US as > hegemonic rather than principled). A change in the dollar’s status as the > dominant reserve currency will affect the room the US has in managing its > debt, and could lead to severe constraints in domestic spending. This will > have internal political repercussions that could put constraints on foreign > policy. We are very far from any tipping point, and change will be very slow > as no country wants to risk the exchange rate volatility that would ensue > from rapid change. But it could be a slow and long-term trend that the US > will have to start taking into account. > > Moving on to popular resistance. There is an old adage in foreign policy that > states do not have principles and only have interests. This is the way the > imperial war machine works. However, a state cannot obtain political support > from its own population on the basis of interests, it must construct some > argument based on principles. The balance between these principles (or at > least the superficial appearance of them) and interests of the hegemonic > global state becomes important in sustaining the imperial war machine, and > one must ask whether the old means of achieving a balance will endure in the > future. In unstable times, democratic states must either change the focus of > public debate or turn more autocratic, and so far the signs are toward the > latter. And autocratic states, like China and Russia, are able to stabilise > only when offering a rate of economic growth whose benefits percolate to > enough of a population that is willing to trade political freedom for these > benefits. High growth rates are difficult to sustain over long periods of > time, especially in an era that must confront a frugality demanded by the > crises of climate change. China has sustained it by an export-led model > arbitraged by labour that is competitively priced by global standards, and > Russia by the world’s reliance on a fossil fuel based economy. Both trends > will be hard to sustain in the years to come. > > One must realise that the global/local confrontation that eviscerates the > local is not confined to a confrontation between the global north and south; > it also operates within the north and within the south. One is seeing a > geography of marginalisation within cities of the global north that begins to > resemble, more and more, that found in cities of the south. To offer a > personal and anecdotal example: I lived in Philadelphia in the 1980’s and > travelled often to Manhattan. I was struck by how the island had so many > large buildings, but the spatial division of commerce at the street level was > contrastingly fine-grained, with small stores dominating. This bred a complex > relationship between street and building, leading to a dynamic street life. > Small stores tend to be anchored by personalities, often eccentric, and local > residents often developed their own relationship with those personalities. > Jane Jacobs writes about how a local hardware store became a place where she > could leave her key so that a visitor who arrived in New York when she was > away at work could collect the key and enter the home. This has changed. Now > many small storefronts have been consolidated and taken over by global > brands. Where there were four small store fronts, there is one large store, a > global brand with one entrance and three large displays. Entering, one > interfaces with the brand rather than a personality one recognises. The > vibrancy of street life is reduced. The dynamic shaping the street has > changed beyond the changed relationship between inside and outside. Looking > at the people one sees on the street, one senses that middle class residents > are displaced, the middle and working classes are there only as a floating > population that offers its labour during working hours, and residences are > increasingly reserved for the affluent. Where lower income neighbourhoods > survive, they are increasingly ghettoised. Real estate values are driving > this shift of gentrification of the inner city, especially given that these > values are driven by global speculation rather than local investment, and > markets are shaped by a speculative logic based on repackaging debt that > grows more and more distant from the real world micro-economy of people and > neighbourhoods. This distance reaches a point where its logic becomes > self-referential: I heard a lecture by Saskia Sassen of Columbia University > where she showed that to earn profit from a real estate asset, it is no > longer necessary that the asset be used. How all this will play out in the > long run, I do not know, but I sense the history of hegemony cannot continue > to be what it has been. > > A revival of grassroots mobilisation is needed, but the hope of social media > fuelling this mobilisation has been dispelled by the short life of movements > like Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring. Social media is distorted by the > business logic of its creators, is dependent on short attention spans > interspersed with impulsive and nuance-free action, and is vulnerable to what > the Rand Corporation has termed as ’the firehose of falsehood’. And this > complicates a longer history of media in which the relationship between media > and truth has always been problematic (see Walter Lippmann, Noam Chomsky and > Edward Herman, Neil Postman, and many others). The post-truth era is not > something that has suddenly burst on the world in recent times. > > I suspect that we need a new theory of mobilisation. I have some thoughts on > this, but I have rambled on long enough, so will save that for another day. > > Cheers, > Prem > > > > > On 10-Mar-2022, at 10:32 AM, Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com > > mailto:bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > Prem, it is good to hear from you. It's obvious you have a lot to say about > > all this. I would like to hear more on some points. > > > > First I totally get it that the Pax Americana is a cover for US hegemony > > and how it has become a glaring fact. You say that to overcome it "we would > > need a frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since > > World War II." I'm totally curious about that and wonder if you perceive a > > particularly strong narrative like that in India, or beyond, in Asia or in > > other transnational circuits? As I imagine you know there are mountains of > > books about that here in USA (I'm an aficionado of such literature) and the > > antiwar left has a readymade read of that history; but I know from > > traveling and speaking other languages that people on the receiving end of > > empire often understand it better than those who willingly or unwillingly > > do the giving. > > > > Could US/Western hegemony become the theme of a social movement? Well, so > > far in the US there is a big move to understand how colonialism and slavery > > shaped social relations and even the landscape. That movement is led by > > Black, Indigenous and Latinx intellectuals, and no one knows how far it is > > going to go. Having the big newspapers report which of the "founding > > fathers" of the "land of the free" owned slaves is no small thing, a war in > > itself. But what could be on the table, and isn't yet, is the understanding > > of US foreign policy and economic power over the last century, what they > > do, how they shape the world. I think the misuse of power by the US, since > > WWII and more specifically since the Nineties, is a direct reflection and > > integral part of unjust and poisonous class/race relations in the domestic > > sphere. So there is a potential to go very far with that critique. However > > no viewpoint of that sort makes it out into the broad public sphere, which > > is structured to exclude any outside reference. So I understand your lack > > of optimism. > > > > Going further into your argument, Prem, I have a for and an against. I am > > for the recognition that Nato and "the West" cannot rule anymore by edict, > > there is no legitimacy for that, no one will bear it. Reading between the > > lines, I sense you may be saying that great Asian or Eurasian societies > > such as China, India and Russia have to be recognized as such, on a par > > with Europe and separately with America, I mean as civilizations that chart > > a unique course and can't be compelled by force, but instead need to engage > > with each other through some kind of diplomacy. I am for that too, it's the > > idea that there is no one superpower -- or rather, to some extent there > > still is, and it's unjust and dangerous. In the present instance, one would > > have to account for things such as the very real financial devastation > > unleashed by the so-called "Asian Crisis" of 1997-98, which people in > > Russia experienced as the one-two punch of the capitalist system, coming > > right after the "reforms" of the early Nineties. As I recall, that crisis > > wiped out all sorts of fixed-capital formation in South Korea, Russia and > > Brazil especially, but it had basically no impact on the US itself, nor > > particularly in Europe. There is a kind of violence, emanating from the US > > but also the EU, that is real and people in the old imperial centers need > > to know it, so that they can change their politics. > > > > Here's the thing though. Should Nato really have denied entry to all those > > Eastern European states that requested it? Remember that most of those > > states, they had been taken over but not absorbed by the Soviet Union. They > > lived for decades under significant degrees of political repression. Did > > they have a valid reason to want to join Nato after 1989? Looking at the > > brutality of the current war, it seems suddenly obvious to me that they did > > -- and by the same token, I have suddenly become less certain of what I > > always used to say, that Nato is an imperialist war machine that should be > > disbanded. Russia is also an imperialist war machine, for sure (and the two > > owe each other a lot). But maybe China is also an imperial war machine? And > > India, maybe not yet? > > > > Well, at this point I have no idea and would all the more like to hear your > > insights, Prem. > > > > The big question for me is how to get a rules-based international order out > > of a glut of imperial war machines. It's a serious one, and since the > > glorious leaders of our glorious empires aren't talking about it, we should. > > > > warmly, Brian > > > > > > On Wed, Mar 9, 2022 at 12:40 AM Prem Chandavarkar <prem....@gmail.com > > mailto:prem....@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > > > > > The fearful scenarios you lay out are all highly plausible, and will > > > dominate till Putin is given greater options by considering a wider > > > history of hegemony in which the US is highly complicit: > > > > > > * In 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the Soviet Union > > > was beginning to disintegrate, US Secretary of State James Baker had a > > > conversation with Gorbachev in which he suggested the Soviet Union should > > > support German unification in return for a guarantee that NATO would not > > > expand an inch eastward. On Baker’s return to the US, this option was > > > rejected by George H.W. Bush. > > > * NATO’s eastward expansion is bound to be a sensitive matter for > > > Russia’s security. The Cold War established the history of Russia having > > > a hostile frontier to the east, a vulnerability that increased once the > > > buffer of the Warsaw Pact counties disintegrated in the early 90’s. > > > Russia, on its eastern front, is one large plain with no natural defence > > > features such as a mountain range or ocean, so the buffer between its > > > heartland and this hostile frontier is a major concern. > > > * Since the 1990’s, NATO has been on a major expansion spree eastwards, > > > adding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, > > > Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Albania > > > and Montenegro. > > > * This was bound to evoke a reaction from Russia, with Ukraine likely to > > > be the straw that broke the camel’s back. This was foreseen 12 years ago > > > by William Burns (then US Ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director) > > > who wrote in a confidential cable (released by WikiLeaks), "Ukraine and > > > Georgia’s NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they > > > engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the > > > region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to > > > undermine Russia’s influence in the region, but it also fears > > > unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect > > > Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly > > > worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with > > > much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a > > > major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that > > > eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision > > > Russia does not want to have to face.” > > > * As Siddharth Varadarajan pointed out in The Wire (a digital media > > > publication in India), “If Ukraine is to Russia today what Cuba was to > > > the US during the missile crisis of 1962 (when it allowed the stationing > > > of Russian nuclear weapons on its soil), then its resort to force – > > > reprehensible though it undoubtedly is – should not surprise us. Putin’s > > > ‘special military operation’ is as much the handiwork of a deranged > > > leader as Kennedy’s illegal ‘quarantine’ of Cuban ports was." > > > * NATO’s eastward expansion is driven by the Pax Americana project: a > > > global peace underpinned by global economic, political, and military > > > dominance of the US. This project is validated by Western governments by > > > the argument that “we are the good guys”, the ones supporting the quest > > > for a rule-based international order that has been the aspiration after > > > World War II. This validation is supported by Western mainstream media, > > > and largely accepted by the Western public. > > > * This “we are the good guys” perception is not one that is shared by > > > most other parts of the world, which sees the US as one of the major > > > violators of the rule-based International order. Some examples are the > > > invasion of Iraq in the Second Gulf War, NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, > > > support to Israel’s ruthless annexation of Palestinian territory, > > > interventions affecting regime change in many parts of Latin America, > > > long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba; and there are many more. > > > * The Pax Americana project is perceived by most of the world as nothing > > > more than a US quest for global hegemony. This would be felt with greater > > > acuity by Russia. > > > * We have now returned to the value-free and rules-free international > > > environment that existed before World War II, with the addition of a game > > > changing element of nuclear armed nations. > > > * Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under International law, a > > > violation of the assurances that Russia gave Ukraine as part of the 1994 > > > Budapest Memorandum, and must be condemned and resisted. But a way out of > > > the conflict depends on a stronger assurance of a rule-based > > > International order, > > > * A precondition for a implementing this is the acceptance that no single > > > superpower should possess global hegemony. To achieve this, we would need > > > a frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since World > > > War II. > > > * Due to domestic political concerns, it is unlikely that any Western > > > government will foreground, or even articulate, such a reading of > > > history. Change is only possible with a people’s movement within the > > > West. Sadly, one sees little ground for optimism on this count. > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 08-Mar-2022, at 5:50 PM, patrice riemens <patr...@xs4all.nl > > > > mailto:patr...@xs4all.nl > wrote: > > > > > > > > ... has already arrived . > > > > > > > > Aloha, > > > > > > > > Even though the last two posts on the list are mine, I have no > > > > intention to become (again) nettime's #1 poster! So this will be my > > > > last one for now. > > > > > > > > This said I still wanted to share my thoughts - was it only to be > > > > relieved of them - about 'the situation' with fellow nettimers. > > > > > > > > ExecSum: I think that war in Western Europe is now inevitable, and it > > > > will descend on us sooner than we all would wish for. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In my mind, there are three options about when NATO will actually go > > > > to, or be dragged into a war against Putin's Russia. > > > > > > > > Option Zero: There will be no war. Putin will enslave Ukraine after > > > > having laid it to waste, annex part of it, and transform the rest in a > > > > vassal state, or whatever 'solution' he has in mind after achieving > > > > 'victory'. And 'we' in the West, will accommodate with the new > > > > situation and try to make the best of it, even if it won't be fun at > > > > all on many front. And yet I would feel insanely optimistic if I gave > > > > it half a chance of happening - or even less than that. > > > > > > > > Having put his war machinery in movement, there is no turning back for > > > > Vladimir Putin, save a number of scenarios for his demise that have > > > > been discussed here and there and which are all entirely speculative. > > > > So by keeping it strictly to the current state of the situation, I see > > > > only three possible outcomes, all based on the assumption that the > > > > political and military deciders in the Western alliance (but also > > > > outside of it) have by now concluded that a war can no longer be > > > > averted, the only question being when it will start 'for real'. > > > > > > > > So there are in my mind three 'moments' when NATO will become involved > > > > in an armed conflict with Putin's Russia: > > > > > > > > Moment 1: The situation in Ukraine becomes so dire, the > > > > 'Grosnyfication' of Ukrainian cities so blatant, the masses of refugees > > > > into Ukraine's neighbours, fleeing the violence under the bombs so > > > > colossal, that 'in the West', populations, politicians, media, and even > > > > the military brass get so agitated as to decide that enough is enough - > > > > and that 'we will be next' any way. So there will be more and more > > > > support pouring into Ukraine that will less and less distinguishable > > > > from direct military intervention, a stage that in the eyes of Putin > > > > has been passed long ago in any case. > > > > > > > > Moment 2 happens if Putin indeed achieve his goals in Ukraine, at > > > > whatever cost to the Russian and to the Ukrainian people without NATO > > > > actually intervening, it having be paralysed by the fear of > > > > consequences Putin has repeatedly, and unequivocally threatened with. > > > > In which case there is no reason whatsoever to assume he will stop at > > > > that and now will go to menace, and, if unsuccessful, attack both > > > > ex-Soviet, but not NATO members Moldova and Georgia. Russia annexing > > > > Moldova will make Romania very angry and very anxious, doing the same > > > > with Georgia will rattle Turkey to an even larger extent, and greater > > > > consequences. And both Romania and Turkey are NATO members. At which > > > > stage the same 'we'll anyway be next' conclusion might prevail after > > > > all ... > > > > > > > > ... or not. Moldova and far-from-Europe (if not from Turkey) Georgia > > > > will be left to their fate of post-Soviet & pre-Imperial vassal states, > > > > whether they have resisted invasion (& be destroyed in the process) or > > > > not. Moment 2 in any case represents a 'between-in' scenario that > > > > could be triggered by the outcome of Moment 1, ... or not, or might > > > > just as well merge with ... > > > > > > > > Moment 3 which will happen when Putin's Russia will directly threaten > > > > NATO countries, arguing yet again that NATO, not Russia, is the > > > > 'structural' aggressor. Unfortunately, the trigger to make it is there, > > > > in plain sight, on the map: it is called the 'Suvalky gap' and it > > > > consist in the 90km long borderline between Poland and Lithuania that > > > > separates the Russian (semi-)exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast from > > > > Russia's vassal Belarus - by now, and surely by then, a nation in name > > > > only. No doubt Putin will demand a 'corridor' to put an end to this > > > > insufferable situation, itself the result from the evenmore > > > > insufferable existence of the formerly Soviet Baltic states as > > > > independent countries. And all NATO members, just as Poland. > > > > > > > > There will be no Czechoslovakia 1939. Having gone that far, the analogy > > > > with the precedent of Nazi Germany will have become too stark. NATO > > > > will go at war. What happens next is for any one and everyone to > > > > imagine. > > > > > > > > I am aware that there are a lot of holes that can (and will) be shot in > > > > my presentation. The most obvious one being whether Putin can hold > > > > Russia together as it is dragging it into a fratricidal annihilation > > > > war with Ukraine - with the economic disaster that it entails. And > > > > whether he can hold his power (and even his life) in the face of > > > > possible (probable?) mounting discontent, both of the Russian people > > > > and of his own clique. Beware of the Ides of March (in 6 days time!) > > > > and the 'Tu quoque' bit they say ... but this wishful thinking is > > > > surely part of my sentiment, but not of my reasoning. > > > > > > > > Conclusion: We - and this time without speech marks - are toast. Sorry. > > > > > > > > Cheers all the same, > > > > p+7D! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > > > > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > > > > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > > > > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > > > > # archive:http://www.nettime.org/ contact: nett...@kein.org > > > > mailto:nett...@kein.org > > > > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > > > > > > > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > > > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > > > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > > > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > > > # archive:http://www.nettime.org/ contact: nett...@kein.org > > > mailto:nett...@kein.org > > > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > > > > > >
