Following my side-interest of history as a buff, I had the good fortune to read 
back-to-back two books. First by  Nigel Cliff on "HOLY WAR: How Vasco Da Gama's 
Epic Voyages Turned the Tide in a Centuries-Old Clash of Civilizations."   This 
was followed by "The Fortunes of War: Four Great Battles of World War II" by 
Andrew Rooney. 

Nigel Cliff's book has some extensive collection of (Lisbon based) factual 
data.  However many of his interpretations of facts are twisted to fit the 
title of his book - the whole thing was about "Holy War."  I would expect such 
an approach by Goa-based authors and historians; who may look at Vasco Da 
Gama's and Alphonso Albuquerque's military actions as a Goa-centric operation.  
I would expect better from a London-based author. Nigel's goal (of linking all 
to religion) was to make his book interesting to casual arm-chair readers and 
naive historians who likely have never been in battle even for a day.

Portuguese military actions (Da Gama's and Albuquerque's) were similar to 
landmark world conflicts involving and impacting entire regions and not limited 
to a single battle field.  Both, Portuguese monarchs and their naval admirals 
viewed their task from an Indian Ocean perspective - extending from the entire 
east coast of Africa, to the full length of the Middle East to the whole west 
coast of India.  
 
This was not unlike the Americans' viewing their WW II encounter with Japan 
across the Pacific and the numerous small and large islands; Eisenhower 
planning D-Day (Operation Overlord) not merely as one battle in Normandy; or 
Hitler looking at his invasion of the East (which later became the Soviet 
Union) and Russian counter-action against Germany. 

Da Gama and Albuquerque had the ability of fighting from the safety of the 
ocean with much more powerful cannons (superiority in military technology).  
But in their wars, they had NO or LITTLE knowledge of the enemy, absolutely NO 
supply-lines for food, ammunition, replacement of men, fighting materiel and 
ships.   In addition to the physical enemy on land or sea, the captain and his 
sailors had the adversity of the ocean and any changes in climate and wind.  
For all these reasons, time is not on the side of the ship's captain.  While  
time well-served a land-based army who can reinforce and optimize its position. 
Naval warfare does not permit taking of prisoners of war who have to be fed, 
occupy the cramped space of sailors and quickly deplete limited medical 
resources, if there are any on the ship.   

Thus naval warfare like aerial warfare is instantaneous kill-or-be-killed.  
Good or bad lessons learned from one experience (or heard from others) are 
applied to the next situation.  In short there is very little room for patience 
and no second chances.  All parties used ingenuity, cunning, false pretenses to 
fairly or unfairly gain the advantage and upper-hand. Wars are and have always 
been about surviving, victory, moving forward, loot and territory.  Yet the 
Portuguese (fighting from ships) did not have boots-on-the-ground; and their 
enemy (at the dozen or so ports) knew it. 

Only the naive and the uninformed think the Crusader Movement (or Bush-Blair 
war) was about religion.  I would have thought the foreign authors with access 
to all that is written and analyzed would know that.  Portuguese wars were not 
about religion.  It was about making money and dominating the lucrative trade 
from the East; while eliminating existing players. The game-plan was mutual 
among the warring factions.   

Regards, GL

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