---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Sukla Sen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Jan 27, 2006 8:46 AM
[The US ambassador has since apologised. But that hardly alters the reality in any substantive way. Mulford may be guilty of imperious undiplomatic ways, but not telling untruth. His tactless pronouncements have only made things difficult for the Indian government. But when it comes to the crunch, it's highly unlikely that the GoI will side with Iran, that too under radical rule spitting fire and brimstone, at the cost of its growing relationship with the US, which it values immensely. The fact that the US is using the prospect of withdrawal of the nuke deal to arm twist India so as to make it fall in line on the issue of Iran's (alleged) nuke programme only goes to show that the deal by itself is a (large) carrot. The "nationalist" line to oppose the deal and a possible vote on Iran toeing the US position is fundamentally flawed and unconvincing. The nuke deal has to be opposed on the ground that it makes the world even more dangerous – not because it's a 'sell out' on the part out of India, which it's definitely not. In fact, it's a bonanza. It's a bonanza to co-opt India as a sub-junior partner of the US in its mindless and cruel drive for establishing an unfettered global Empire. And it's on this ground any alignment with the US is to be opposed, opposed tooth and nail.] I. US links nuke deal with India to vote on Iran The Daily Mail (Islamabad) Thursday, January 26, 2006 Foreign Desk Report NEW DELHI-A landmark nuclear deal between India and the United States will "die" in Washington if New Delhi supports Iran at the upcoming meeting of the UN atomic watchdog agency, the US Ambassador said Wednesday. A week before the International Atomic Energy Agency meets to discuss Iran's nuclear program, US Ambassador David Mulford said that if India does not vote to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council, it would be "devastating" to the deal currently before the US Congress. "I think the Congress will simply stop considering the matter," Mulford told the Press Trust of India news agency. The deal, seen as a cornerstone of the emerging alliance between India and the United States, "will die in the Congress," he said. The US Embassy confirmed that Mulford was accurately quoted, and spokesman David Kennedy said: "The Ambassador just wanted to give his honest opinion on how he thought the US congress would react to such a scenario". Mulford's frank comments were the first time a senior US official has made a direct link between India's stance on the Iran issue and the nuclear deal. After Mulford's comments, India reiterated that the two issues should remain separate. "We categorically reject any attempt to link (Iran) to the proposed Indo-US agreement on civil nuclear energy cooperation, which stands on its own merits," Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna said in a statement. "The position that India will take on this issue at the IAEA will be based on India's own independent judgment." Under the deal, Washington is to share civilian nuclear technology and supply nuclear fuel to India in return for New Delhi separating its civilian and military nuclear programs and allowing international inspections of its atomic facilities. The separation is necessary because the United States has only agreed to recognize India as having a civilian nuclear program - not as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. The deal was signed in July when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington, and marked a major policy shift for the United States, which imposed sanctions on India in 1998 after it conducted nuclear tests. The restrictions have been lifted. IAEA referral of Iran to the Security Council could lead to economic and political sanctions against Tehran, which the United States and European powers fear could use its nuclear program to develop weapons. Tehran insists its program is for generating electricity. European countries believe they have enough votes at the IAEA, which will hold an emergency board session on Feb. 2, to haul Iran before the Security Council. But they are seeking support from Russia, China and key developing nations, such as India. New Delhi voted in September with the US and European powers on an earlier IAEA resolution that could have led to Iran's referral to the council. http://dailymailnews.com/200601/26/news/dmtopstory02.html II. Pressure on India Mounts in Advance of Bush Visit By J. Sri Raman t r u t h o u t | Perspective Tuesday 24 January 2006 Preparations are on, in full swing, for US President George Bush's visit to India - and protocol matters are the least of the concerns of the mandarins here. The presidential mission, I noted in my previous article on the subject (Waiting for Bush, January 6), was being used as a pressure tactic. The pressures on India, for compliance with exacting conditions for the great event to go through, are escalating. We have had a series of high-level US visitors here in recent weeks, presumably to prepare the ground for what many in the establishment here await as the mother of all state visits. In the second week of January, John Kerry, the defeated opponent of Bush anxious to distance himself from all those anti-war extremists, was here. Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana, and Representative Dan Burton, Republican of Indiana, were here, too. The most noteworthy visitor, however, was none other than US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. The President's point man for pushing through the process of a US-India nuclear deal of July 18, 2005 - and related matters like influencing or intimidating India on Iran - made no secret of his brief. He let it be known during his visit in the third week of January that the President might make it to India at last, in the first week of March. To those loyalists tingling with excitement at the prospect, however, he also made it loud and clear that they must hasten to meet the two conditions for the outcome they hoped for. Much of the tough and tortuous negotiations between Burns and India's foreign secretary Shyam Saran, assisted by their teams, focused on a politically sensitive part of the nuclear deal: the separation of India's civilian and military nuclear facilities in order to throw the former open to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India's peace movement has opposed the deal as the beginning of a process aimed at a US-India "strategic partnership." The country's hawks, however, have opposed the deal as an attempt at capping India's nuclear weapons program, with the separation of facilities designed in particular to serve this objective. This argument has found strident public expression in the statements of the far-right political leaders. It has also found unofficial but an open-secret endorsement from India's department of atomic energy (DAE). Pro-deal and pro-Bush opinion-makers, on the other hand, argue that meeting the US conditions will actually promote the cause of nuclear militarism in India. Illustrative is security analyst C. Raja Mohan's sneering description of the growing number of the deal's opponents as "fast-breeding reactionaries." Another like-minded analyst claims that, because of "decades of political self deception, the country has neither a successful civilian nuclear power program, nor a purposeful weapons program." The talks did not settle the issue. Evident at the end of the closed door confabulations was the impatience of Burns, as also the embarrassment of Saran. No key-hole journalism was needed to discover that the separation blueprint offered by India left Burns deeply unsatisfied. Especially unacceptable to the US was the obvious reluctance of India's establishment to throw its fast-breeder reactors open to IAEA inspections and subject them to international safeguards. In December 2005, Burns had exuded bubbly optimism about completing the preliminaries of the deal before the president boarded the plane to New Delhi. Said he: "We came to the conclusion that in fact we should be in a position to make a significant advance on this initiative before the visit of President Bush to India." Burns's stress this time was on the "difficulties" and "complexities" of the entire process. As he summed it up, "We will have to see if we can be successful. I hope we can because it is very important that this agreement be realized.... We would be working hard. But there are difficulties ahead." In working for the deal, Burns did not omit to use the bargaining chip of the Iran issue. Here, India faces a closer and tougher call. The US official made it clear once again that New Delhi would be expected to cast its vote and throw its weight with Washington and against Iran in the next meeting of the IAEA board of governors slated for February 2. At this meeting, the Western members of the board plan to make an Iraq of Iran by referring the latter's allegedly objectionable nuclear activities to the United Nations Security Council. On this count, too, the Under Secretary was not the optimistic self he was just a month ago. Then he had described India as an ally of the US on this issue who could be counted upon to make common cause with the West against the nuclear ambitions of Iran, despite its traditional ties with India. No expression of similar enthusiasm escaped from his lips this time. He had acquired a better idea of the extent of political and popular opposition within India to New Delhi's apparent readiness to crucify Iran in order to curry favor with Bush. While New Delhi's mandarins are getting ready to roll out the red carpet to the US President, several sections of the political spectrum and the people are all set to protest the welcome to a "war criminal," as left-wing intellectual Tariq Ali has described George Bush. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t. -- Knowledge is power... share it equitably! http://www.gnu.org
