Praveen Swami is a spokesperson of the police and intelligence establishment - in the glorious tradition of 'embedded journalists'. He takes obedient dictation from the RAW!
On 13 April 2010 22:10, venukm <kmvenuan...@gmail.com> wrote: > Could he be seen as a serious journalist at all? > > On Apr 13, 5:54 pm, Sukla Sen <sukla....@gmail.com> wrote: > > [Quote > > The former Punjab Director-General of Police, K.P.S. Gill's signal > > contribution was demonstrating that alternatives to population-centric > > counter-insurgency could succeed. Instead of engaging in protracted, > > large-force operations, Mr. Gill focussed on offensive operations > targeting > > the leadership and cadre of Khalistan terrorists. In effect, > unconventional > > war-fighting methods were used to defeat unconventional > > war-fighting methods. Evidence that such tactics work has piled up. In > Jammu > > and Kashmir, the Special Operations Group succeeded in decimating the > > leadership of the Hizb ul-Mujahideen. Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds > destroyed > > a once-powerful Maoist insurgency. Tripura defeated an intractable tribal > > insurgency. > > Unquote > > > > Praveen Swami is calling for targeted killing of the insurgent leaders > (and > > cadres)! > > Understandably, away from the battlefields. Dragged out of homes or on > the > > city streets? A la Mossad!? > > And deriding Chidambaram for not doing that. For being "conservative"! > > > > He proclaims that "Indian forces are losing" - to justify his call for > > adoption of "unconventional" methods. > > Evidently the execution of this fiendish call would call for drumming up > of > > insane paranoia. > > > > If the "democratic" state starts emulating the Maoists, then the state > loses > > its legitimacy. Life, in general, radically degrades. Maoist, and such > > other, armed and systematic violence becomes the only feasible option for > > protest against state policies and actions. > > Violence escalates. Gory turns gorier. > > That's too nauseous.] > > > > http://www.hinduonnet.com/2010/04/13/stories/2010041362531000. > > > > *For a review of counter-insurgency doctrine* > > > > Praveen Swami > > > > *Key to India's failure in combating Maoist insurgency is an ahistorical, > > one-size-fits-all security doctrine.* > > > > Eric Hobsbawm wrote: “There is nothing in the purely military pages of > Mao, > > > > Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara or other manuals of guerrilla warfare which a > > traditional guerrillero or band leader would regard as other than simple > > common sense.” > > > > Last week, after the massacre of 76 police personnel in Dantewada, Union > > Home Minister P. Chidambaram urged Indians to “remain calm, keep your > nerve, > > and do not stray from the carefully chosen course that we have adopted > since > > November 2009.” > > > > The last of those recommendations may prove profoundly misguided. Few of > the > > strategists charged with executing the Minister's ambitious > counter-Maoist > > offensive appear to have grasped its doctrinal and tactical demands. > > Premised on the belief that counter-insurgency campaigns must be > > population-centric — in other words, dominate territories and thus deny > > insurgents contact with the population — the strategic foundation of > India's > > war against Maoist insurgents is flawed. The bottom line is this: Indian > > forces are losing. Last year, 312 security personnel were killed to 294 > > Maoists. This year, too, the figures are grim. > > > > For centuries, insurgents have known that a superior force can be > defeated. > > Napoleon Bonaparte believed that his 1808 occupation of Spain would be a > > “military promenade.” Instead, France found itself bogged down by a > > protracted guerrilla struggle that lasted six years and compelled to > commit > > three-fifths of its imperial army. Irish insurgents who fought the > British > > in 1848 were taught to “decompose the science and system of war.” “The > force > > of England,” advised the radical James Lalor, “is entrenched and > fortified. > > You must draw it out of position; break up its mass; break its trained > line > > of march and manoeuvre; its equal step and serried array.” > > > > Much of this would have been familiar to peasant rebels and bandits in > > India. Back in 1813, Kallua Gujjar led a successful series of raids > > targeting moneylenders, travellers and police posts in the > Saharanpur-Dehra > > Dun belt. His 1,000-strong irregular force was, on one occasion, able to > > loot a group of some 200 police personnel. Bhil insurgents staged a > series > > of revolt between 1820 and 1860 — driven, among other things, by the > > large-scale expropriation of Adivasi land by the state and growing > > exploitation by moneylenders. Despite the use of irregular formations > like > > James Outram's Bhil Corps and a policy of pacification that involved > pushing > > the Adivasis to become settled farmers, the Bhil raids continued for > > decades. > > > > Major-General Akbar Khan, who commanded the Pakistani irregular offensive > > directed at Srinagar in 1947, described the tactical mindset of such > > irregular warriors in his memoirs: “One Mahsud tribesman aptly described > to > > me their tactics as being like that of the hawk. The hawk flies high in > the > > sky, out of danger; he flies round and round until he sees his prey and > then > > he swoops down on it for one mighty strike and when he has got his prey, > he > > does not wait around, he flies off at once to some far off quiet place > where > > he can enjoy what he has got.” > > > > Ossified doctrine > > > > Key to India's failure in combating Maoist insurgency is an ahistorical, > > one-size-fits-all security doctrine. In essence, state responses have > > consisted of pumping in forces for conventional, ground-holding > operations > > in the hope of displacing guerrilla forces; maintaining high force levels > > over sustained periods of time; and, using this military presence to push > > forward with developmental and political initiatives to deprive > insurgents > > of their political legitimacy. > > > > Indian counter-insurgency tactics and strategy, Vijendra Singh Jafa > notes, > > “have remained fundamentally conservative and traditional, influenced > > substantially by accounts of British experiences.” Drawing on the British > > campaign against the Malayan Communist Party, Indian strategists believe > > that successful counter-insurgency campaigns must focus on winning > popular > > support. New work, like that of historian Karl Hack, has shown that the > back > > of the Malayan insurgency was, in fact, broken long before Britain set > about > > winning hearts and minds. Little of this revisionist literature, though, > has > > been studied seriously in Indian military academies. > > > > Despite plenty of evidence that population-centric strategies do not work > > —witness the durability of insurgencies in the northeast and Jammu and > > Kashmir — the doctrine has never been reappraised. > > > > The former Punjab Director-General of Police, K.P.S. Gill's signal > > contribution was demonstrating that alternatives to population-centric > > counter-insurgency could succeed. Instead of engaging in protracted, > > large-force operations, Mr. Gill focussed on offensive operations > targeting > > the leadership and cadre of Khalistan terrorists. In effect, > unconventional > > war-fighting methods were used to defeat unconventional war-fighting > > methods. Evidence that such tactics work has piled up. In Jammu and > Kashmir, > > the Special Operations Group succeeded in decimating the leadership of > the > > Hizb ul-Mujahideen. Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds destroyed a once-powerful > > Maoist insurgency. Tripura defeated an intractable tribal insurgency. > > > > In a thoughtful 1988 paper for the United States Air Force Airpower > Research > > Institute, Dennis Drew noted that counter-insurgency operations called > for > > an upturning of military thinking. Military professionals, he wrote, > believe > > “that the basic military objective in war is to conduct operations that > lead > > to the destruction of the enemy's centre of gravity.” India's policy of > > pumping company-sized formations into the Maoist heartland, and > attempting > > to dominate the territory around them, is one manifestation of this > > thinking. The problem is successful insurgents have no fixed centre of > > gravity — no bases that conventional forces may overwhelm. > > > > Population-centred counter-insurgency has received renewed legitimacy > from > > the apparent success of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq, which was marketed > as > > having subdued a growing insurgency. But, as scholar and soldier Gian > > Gentile has pointed out, the notion that the reduction of insurgent > violence > > in Iraq was “primarily the result of American military action is hubris > run > > amok.” In fact, Gentile argued, a “combination of brutal attacks by Shia > > militia in conjunction with the actions of the Iraqi Shia government and > the > > continuing persecution by the al-Qaeda against the Sunni community > convinced > > the insurgents that they could no longer counter all these forces and it > was > > to their advantage to cut a deal with the Americans.” > > > > Capacity crisis > > > > For many in the Indian intelligentsia, the defeat of insurgents is an > > inevitability: part, as it were, of the manifest destiny of the state. > Last > > week, Shekhar Gupta, editor of Indian Express, offered a ringing > endorsement > > of this received wisdom, arguing that insurgencies “follow a pattern > pretty > > much like a bell curve,” “The graph of violence,” he argued, “rises in > the > > initial period, producing more and more casualties on both sides. But at > > some stage the rebels come to the realisation that the state and its > people > > are too strong and resolute to be ever defeated, no matter what the > score, > > in a particular day's battle in a long war. That is the point of > inflexion > > when rebels see reason. There is no reason why the Maoist insurgency will > > not follow that same pattern.” > > > > But will it? Back in 1954, when India first committed troops to battling > > Naga insurgents, just one State was hit by insurgency. Now, 265 of 625 > > districts are affected by one form or the other of chronic conflict — a > > figure that excludes areas with unacceptably high levels of organised > crime, > > as well as cities periodically targeted by jihadist violence. It is far > from > > clear if the resources exist to address the problem. Italy has 559 police > > officers for every 1,00,000 citizens; Bihar has 60, Orissa 97, > Chhattisgarh > > 128 and Jharkhand 136. Even the Army, despite its apparently enormous > size, > > will be stretched if it is committed to internal security duties. The > United > > States has one soldier for every 186 citizens; India has one for 866. > > > > Worse, it is far from clear if the Indian state has the capacity needed > for > > rapid, transformative projects. The U.S., figures compiled by the > Institute > > for Conflict Management's Ajai Sahni show, has 889 federal employees, and > > 6,314 state and local employees for every 1,00,000 citizens. India's > Union > > government has 295 — and if one excludes railway employees, 171. > > Chhattisgarh has 1,067 government employees per 1,00,000 population; > Bihar, > > a pathetic 472. > > > > Even if forces are found to saturate the ground, experience shows, > > development will not necessarily follow. In both Jammu and Kashmir and > the > > northeast, state spending has yielded only limited results. Funds have > often > > been siphoned off by local contractors and politicians — and, worse, > preyed > > on by insurgents. In effect, the injection of cash into troubled regions > has > > subsidised insurgency. > > > > Learning from its own success stories, India needs to fight insurgencies > in > > smarter, leaner ways. Like Andhra Pradesh, States must invest in training > > facilities that meet their particular needs; expand intelligence > > capabilities; and use technology effectively. Instead of focussing on > simply > > expanding the size of Central forces, the Union government must > understand > > the need for them to be properly trained and equipped. Soldiers without > > skills have only one fate: defeat. > > > > In time, it is true, Indian forces may succeed in wearing down the Maoist > > insurgency, albeit at a horrible cost of lives — but there are reasons to > > worry that they may not. India's strategic strengths are manifest. But as > > the work of military scholar Ivan Arreguin-Toft teaches us, the weak do > > sometimes win. Instead of despatching ever-greater numbers of men to > support > > those already flailing in the face of insurgent fire, a dispassionate > review > > of both doctrine and tactics is needed. > > > > -- > > Peace Is Doable > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Green Youth Movement" group. > To post to this group, send an email to greenyo...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > greenyouth+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<greenyouth%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth?hl=en-GB. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To post to this group, send an email to greenyo...@googlegroups.com. 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