*FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
*May 20, 2010
ALRC-CWS-14-03-2010

Language(s): English only

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Fourteenth session, Agenda Item 4, General Debate

*A Joint Written Statement to the 14th Session of the Human Rights Council
from Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) and the Asian Legal Resource Centre
(ALRC) *

*MYANMAR: The absence of minimum conditions for elections *

1. The Government of Myanmar has this year issued a raft of laws and rules
for the holding of national and regional elections for new parliaments under
the army-prepared 2008 Constitution. The elections are expected late in 2010
but no firm announcement has been made and they could be postponed until any
time in the future, as have so many other undertakings by the military
regime in Myanmar: the preparations for drafting the new constitution alone
took over a decade to complete. Anyhow, it is widely acknowledged that the
minimum conditions for free and fair elections are absent from Myanmar and
whatever takes place this year or thereafter will not constitute an
electoral process as understood in most other countries.

2. Although many groups and scholars have pointed to specific problems
associated with the electoral process, the Asian Legal Resource Centre
(ALRC) and Lawyers Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) are concerned to anchor these
in the larger and deeper obstacles to social and political change in
Myanmar. In this statement, we have chosen to drawn the Council's attention
to the absence from Myanmar of three basic minimum features of free and fair
elections: namely, the absence of a judiciary; the absence of a normative
framework for civil rights; and, the absence of opportunities for free
speech.

3. The absence of a judiciary

a. Myanmar has no judiciary capable of performing the functions required of
it to ensure fair elections. Without it, there is no agency capable of
addressing and settling disputes arising from the electoral process.

b. The absence of the judiciary is manifest in the handling of an
application from the National League for Democracy to the Supreme Court on
23 March 2010. This party won 392 out of 405 seats in the 1990 election, but
then--as now--there was no judiciary capable of enforcing results. The party
submitted a miscellaneous civil application to the court under the Judiciary
Law 2000 and the Specific Relief Act 1887. It asked the court to examine
provisions of the new Political Parties Registration Law 2010 that prohibit
convicted serving prisoners from establishing or participating in political
parties.

c. Whereas the 2008 Constitution prohibits convicted prisoners from being
members of parliament, the new party registration law prohibits these
persons from being involved in a political party at all. As the NLD has
hundreds of members behind bars--and hundreds of others who could be
detained, prosecuted and convicted at any time--its concern over these
provisions is obvious. Nor is it the only party in this situation. The
leaders of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which obtained the
second-largest number of votes in 1990, are also currently imprisoned; the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has opined that their detention is
arbitrary (Opinion 26/2008, A/HRC/13/30/Add.1).

d. The NLD's approach to the court was premised on the notion that the
Supreme Court would at very least be able to entertain its plaint. But
according to the NLD, the application did not even go before a judge.
Instead it was returned by lunchtime on the same day with an official giving
the reason that, "We do not have jurisdiction." Subsequently, an attempt to
approach the chief justice directly was also rebuffed.

e. In some countries, courts without effective authority over matters that
are technically within their domain go through the pretence of hearing and
deciding on these things at least to impress on the government and public
that they are cognizant of their responsibilities, even if they cannot carry
them out, and still have a degree of self respect that requires the keeping
up of appearances. But the courts in Myanmar have lost even these minimal
qualities of a judiciary. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that
Myanmar is without a judiciary--at least as far as any planned elections are
concerned--and that as a consequence the notion of an electoral process as
understood elsewhere is in Myanmar an absurdity.

4. The absence of a normative framework for civil rights

a. The Government of Myanmar has set down in the new laws conditions for the
forming of political parties that would have people associate in order to
participate in anticipated elections, but nowhere and in no way is the right
to associate itself guaranteed. While parties are required to have at least
a thousand members to enlist for the national election--500 for regional
assemblies--a host of extant security laws circumscribe how, when and in
what numbers persons can associate.

b. The notion of association without the right to associate is manifest in
the Political Parties Registration Law 2010, which has written into it
references to some preexisting laws that circumscribe free association.
According to section 12,

"A party that infringes any of the following will cease to have
authorization to be a political party: ... (3) Direct or indirect
communication with, or support for, armed insurgent organisations and
individuals opposing the state; or organisations and individuals that the
state has designated as having committed terrorist acts; or associations
that have been declared unlawful; or these organisations' members."

c. As in present-day Myanmar anybody can be found guilty of having supported
insurgents, of having been involved in terrorist acts, and above all, of
having contacted unlawful associations, the law effectively allows the
authorities to de-register any political party at any time. The ALRC has
documented many such cases. That of U Myint Aye is indicative. For founding
a local group of human rights defenders and speaking on overseas radio
broadcasts about what he saw in the delta in the aftermath of Cyclone
Nargis, Myint Aye was arrested and accused in a fabricated bombing plot. The
military tried and convicted him and two other accused in a press conference
during September 2008; in November a court did so officially, handing down a
sentence of life imprisonment.

d. The inherent denial of the right to associate in the party registration
law speaks to the absence of any normative framework of civil rights, as
understood in terms of international standards, from Myanmar. The right of
association does not exist not only because of specific terms of law to
prevent it but more importantly, because of the conceptual absence of any
framework for rights at all.

e. The 2008 Constitution has confirmed that Myanmar citizens are expected to
live in a rights vacuum. Whereas the notion of a constitution is to
establish a normative framework under which the apparatus of state is
supposed to operate, in this constitution rights are at virtually every
point negated and qualified, including the right to associate. Under section
354 citizens have a "right" to form associations that do not contravene
statutory law on national security and public morality: which can be
construed to mean literally anything. This is a constitution without human
rights norms. In this it is at least consistent with other aspects of the
military government's project, in which democratic and rule-of-law concepts
and institutions are consistently inverted and defeated.

5. The absence of opportunities for free speech

a. When the Government in Myanmar passed new laws and rules for the planned
elections, it attracted a lot of interest in the global media. The only
place where the media did not pick up on the story was in Myanmar itself.
Aside from official announcements and some articles in news journals
iterating the facts as found in the state media, there was no analysis,
commentary or debate.

b. The lack of debate was not because the persons writing and publishing
periodicals did not want discussion, or even try to have some. Journalists
had in fact interviewed experts and prepared articles that they had thought
would be printable. But instead they were prohibited from analyzing the laws
at all, or from saying anything about parties already registering for the
ballot. The absurd situation thus arose of an election having been announced
and the process of party registration begun without any information about it
being given to the electorate.

c. The blackout on news about the electoral process is not merely a question
of media freedom. It is indicative of the wider and more profound incapacity
of people in Myanmar to communicate with one another, after half a century
of military rule. Where internal communication is blocked for a long time,
as it has been in Myanmar, it brings about all sorts of deep psychoses
hidden under the surface of day-to-day life. As different parts of society
are not able to communicate openly with each other, problems build up and
fester. People become deeply frustrated and angry, and occasionally the
frustration and anger burst out suddenly, as during the nationwide protests
of 2007. At such times, when the authorities use force to bring people back
under control the problems are again submerged and worsened.

d. Under these circumstances, the type of controlled communication that the
Government of Myanmar envisages for the anticipated elections is not a form
of communication at all. It is a mere contrivance aimed at a different type
of social control from what came before. In this way, the Government
attempts to construct a debate in which the public is an onlooker and
recipient of fabricated, sanctioned and sanitized views.

e. Constructed debate will, of course, do nothing to address or ease the
deep afflictions in Myanmar society, nor address its tensions, nor
contribute to the holding of meaningful elections. In fact, it will only
make things worse. Until there are enough opportunities for open
communication, the possibility of some kind of democratic government
emerging in Myanmar is zero. And if there is no significant political
change--not the type of superficial engineered change which the armed forces
are planning--there can be no hope of any significant change in the
country's appalling human rights conditions, which have been documented now
for over a decade by successive Special Rapporteurs on human rights in
Myanmar, and numerous other agencies and individuals both inside and outside
the United Nations for longer still.

6. In light of the above, Myanmar's planned elections can be nothing but an
elaborate farce, following on from the referendum on the new constitution
that coincided with the biggest natural disaster to hit the country in
living memory. If indeed the Government of Myanmar were sincere about the
elections it would start by, at an absolute minimum:

a. Releasing all prisoners of conscience, allowing all persons to engage
actively in the electoral process, and permitting the International
Committee of the Red Cross access to all detention facilities in accordance
with its international mandate.

b. Announcing the dates of elections sufficiently far enough in advance to
allow all parties time to prepare and engage in campaigning.

c. Guaranteeing that all media outlets are free to print any news and
analysis concerning the electoral process and ceasing requirements that they
submit copy for scrutiny and censorship prior to publication.

7. Some problems associated with the electoral process indicated above,
notably those of the judiciary and the 2008 Constitution, will take much
longer to address than the interim between now and the planned elections
allows. But if obvious, feasible, immediate steps like the three indicated
here cannot be taken then there can be no reason to expect that far more
intractable aspects of the anti-human rights regime in Myanmar will be
addressed any time soon. Under these circumstances, we also need to question
the limits of international pressure on Myanmar for change, and strategies
and approaches that the Human Rights Council ought to take. This question is
the subject of a separate written submission from the Asian Legal Resource
Centre to the Council’s 14th session.

# # #

*About the ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional
non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister
organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group
seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights
issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia. *

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