[Reproduced below is a rather longish excerpt - the concluding sub-section, from an article, 'Indian Nationalism, Hindutva and the Bomb', penned back on Sept. 28 2003 - in which it had been observed that ***"the most obvious and enduring outcome of Pokhran-II was evidently Chagai"***, followed by a latest report on Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation programme.
The latter report is in turn based on a report authored by Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor, George Mason University. It makes two very pertinent observations. One: "(T)he new report has identified South Asia as a region "most at risk" from a breakdown in strategic stability due to an "explosive mixture of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals"." Two: "(I)t is India which seems to be on Pakistan's radar, as the author himself highlighted that Pakistan primarily wants to use its nuclear weapons to deter India." In the given context, the more recent following comment by the present commentator may also be deemed relevant: (I)t needs be recalled that it is under the BJP-led NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee India turned an overtly nuclear weaponised state in May 1998 with five test explosions - three on May 11 and two on May 13. Initially it was claimed with a lot of chest thumping, in utter defiance of high-pitched global censure, that this development would now place India in an unassailable position as regards neighboring Pakistan [3]. But as things would turn out, Pakistan, in response, also went overtly nuclear with six test explosions, almost within a fortnight, on the following 28 and 30 (May). Then the apologists of the move claimed that (overt) nuclearisation, of both India and Pakistan, would stabilise relations between them [4]. What actually happened is that we had the Kargil War in the following May within a year of overt weaponisation because of armed intrusion from across the LoC after a gap of more than twenty seven years (since 1971 Bangladesh War). And an Indian Airlines plane would be hijacked the same year (1999) on December 24, and Indian Parliament would come under armed attack on December 13 2001. The biggest peacetime armed moblisation along the Pakistan border, Operation Parakram - supposedly a measure of "coercive diplomacy", which followed soon after causing exchange of threats of nuclear strikes by both the sides eventually ended in a whimper in about eleven months or so. In November 2003 India and Pakistan signed a ceasefire agreement. [5] (Source: 'India's Nuclear Doctrine: Up for a Makeover?' at <http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article32222#nb4>.)] I/II. The Consequences [of India's Open Nuclear Weaponisation] The strong international censure, which erupted almost instantaneously, and the attendant punitive measures, which would follow soon thereafter, apart - ***the most obvious and enduring outcome of Pokhran-II was evidently Chagai*** [emphasis added]. Just in a fortnight's time Pakistan retaliated with (the claim of) six blasts - in response to India's five now and another one eighteen years back to square off the account. Those who had gone euphoric proclaiming India's "strategic" superiority over Pakistan attained through the recent blasts and hailed it as the "Explosion of Self-Esteem" went livid with frustration and gave vent to their deep sense of bitterness by calling it a "Copycat" reaction. These descriptions, however, even if rather unwittingly, brought out a crucial element of the subcontinental reality. While Indian nuclearisation did not stem from any threat perception from Pakistan - having been rooted in its quest for Big Power status and the ascendancy of Hindutva politics, Pakistan's was a purely reactive one. Be that as it may, at one single stroke India's massive superiority in terms of extant military strength, estimated at around 2.5 (or 3) to 1, got virtually wiped out. Pakistan attained a 'parity" of sorts, through Chagai triggered off by Pokhran - to the great dismay of the Indian elite, through their own monumental folly. What, however, rather dramatically laid bare the depth of Indian ineptitude, amidst all sorts of fanciful and clamorous claims in the wake of Pokhran-II, is the utter lack of political anticipation and ground level intelligence on Pakistan's reaction. On the 28th of May, 1998 an MP in the Lok Sabha rose to seek confirmation during the ongoing session from the treasury benches regarding the Pakistani blasts by then already reported in the electronic media. It caused a veritable flutter among the cabinet members. The Prime Minister himself was present. The Defence Minister rushed out of the hall. After a while the news was confirmed. Subsequently, in response to the queries made by the journalists, the Prime Minister solemnly observed that it was quite unfair to expect him to keep track of the Pakistani moves while he was sitting in the Lok Sabha. Even a cursory look at the chain of events since 11th May '98 , which evidently constitutes a watershed in the history of this subcontinent , up to the present would clearly demonstrate that every bit of the claims and projections made by the proponents and apologists of Pokhran-II in its defence have been thoroughly falsified by the subsequent developments. It is not only the Kargil episode in the summer of 1999, when Pakistan indulged in military adventurism - albeit on a limited scale and in a clandestine manner, after a lapse of about thirty four years, even the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft, IC 814, in the following December, which obliged the Indian External Affairs Minister - a former army man himself, to personally escort the three Kashmiri militants released from Indian jails to Kandahar in exchange of civilian hostages, made nonsense of India's claim to greater glory and military strength - in relation to Pakistan in particular. The pathetic fizzling out of the Operation Parakram (Show of Might), the biggest peacetime military mobilisation on the international border as a demonstrative act of "coercive diplomacy", launched with much drum beating in the wake of terrorist attack on the Indian Parliment on Decmber 13, 2002, further underscored this predicament. By including Farooq Abdullah, the then Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, in the entourage of the Prime Minister on his ceremonial visit to the blast site after the explosions a deliberate linkage was made between Kashmir and the Bomb, evidently to intimidate Pakistan. In the process, the Kashmir issue got internationalised, as never before since 1949, and identified as the most inflammable nuclear flash point in the present day world. Instead of raising the level of India's autonomy, India since May 1998 has become, along with Pakistan, far more vulnerable to American pressure and interference than ever before. The US has emerged as the de facto, even if not yet de jure, arbiter between the two perennially feuding nuclear neighbours. The defence expenditure, even on conventional arms, has since sharply escalated - again contrary to the earlier claims. Most importantly, Pokhran-II has triggered off an open-ended nuclear, and non-nuclear, arms race between India and Pakistan - as the cause as well as effect of perpetually mounting tensions and hardening postures on both the sides. This has seriously degraded the security environment of South Asia, instead of bringing about any 'stability' as had been projected. A nuclear holocaust now is no longer a distant possibility. During the Kargil War itself threats of nuclear strike and retaliation were exchanged with frightening frequency. As recently as on September 1 2003, at its first meeting chaired by the Indian Prime Minister, the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) - eight months after its creation consequent upon finalisation and formal adoption of the triadic Nuclear Doctrine, has decided to further "consolidate India's nuclear deterrent". And, Pakistan's President in turn chaired a meeting of its National Command Authority only two days after, reminding very much the way Chagai had followed Pokhran in a prompt and almost reflexive tit for tat response, and announced that Pakistan would "keep upgrading its arsenal in order to maintain its minimum deterrent capability". It is quite self-evident that the term 'minimum' in the present context is only an euphemism for 'maximum possible'. This mutually reinforcing mindless drive for the weapons of mass destruction can only have spine-chilling consequences for the region. It is even more so, given the abysmally poor safety records of both the countries in all walks of life. Even an innocuous accident can very well lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Last but not the least, the nuclearisation of South Asia has also significantly contributed to the weakening of the process of global denuclearisation that was set in motion, howsoever tentatively, at the end of the Cold War. [Source: 'Indian Nationalism, Hindutva and the Bomb', dtd. Sept. 28 2003, at <http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article10225>] II. http://www.ibtimes.co.in/pakistan-will-have-200-nuclear-weapons-by-2020-primary-reason-deter-india-says-us-think-tank-614912 'Pakistan will have 200 Nuclear Weapons by 2020; Primary Reason to Deter India', Says US Think-tank By Mugdha Variyar November 24, 2014 11:20 IST 11 7 Terror-ridden Pakistan is said to have the fastest growing nuclear programme in the world, which can turn into a major risk to international security, especially for neighbour India. Nuclear weapon Workers examine a B53 nuclear bomb at the B&W Pantex nuclear weapons. [Representational Image] Reuters File Pakistan's nuclear cache could expand massively in the next five years to reach up to 200 nuclear devices by 2020, US think-tank Council on Foreign Relations has warned. Pakistan had about 100-120 nuclear warheads at the beginning of the year, according to data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute earlier this year, behind only China, which has 250, in the region. The United States and Russia lead the nuclear arms race with a stockpile of 7,300 warheads and 8,000 warheads respectively. ***However, the new report has identified South Asia as a region "most at risk" from a breakdown in strategic stability due to an "explosive mixture of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals".*** [Emphasis added.] ***"Though many states are downsizing their stockpiles, Asia is witnessing a buildup. Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear programme in the world. By 2020, it could have a stockpile of fissile material that, if weaponized, could produce as many as 200 nuclear devices," the think-tank said in its report 'Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age'.*** [Emphasis added.] ***The report goes on to name the United States to be the one country to 'lose' the most from a breakdown in strategic stability.*** [Emphasis added.] "The United States has more to lose from a breakdown in strategic stability than any other country due to its position as a global leader, the interdependence of its economy, and the network of security commitments it has around the world," author Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor, George Mason University said in the report. Koblentz has thus called for US and Europe to make Pakistan's growing nuclear stockpile a greater international priority. ***However, it is India which seems to be on Pakistan's radar, as the author himself highlighted that Pakistan primarily wants to use its nuclear weapons to deter India.*** "Pakistan has not formally declared the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons but has indicated that it seeks primarily to deter India from threatening its territorial integrity or the ability of its military to defend its territory," the report said. The report comes at a time when tension between nuclear-armed Russia and America has risen to what some deem as Cold War-like proportions, while Pakistan and India are seeing increasingly hostile relations owing to border conflicts and the Kashmir issue. What has further muddled the dynamic is the growing military partnership between Russia and Pakistan, even as India is buying more weapons from the US. Koblentz has urged the Obama administration to "create a forum for the seven established nuclear-armed states to discuss further steps to reduce the risk of deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons." -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
