[Taking a cue from the parliamentary poll following the Kargil war, resulting from a massive intelligence failure on the Indian side, Modi will do his utmost to keep stoking hatred and thereby, also, deflect public attention from the huge failure of his Kashmir policy, as amply reflected in sharply rising number of casualties, on all sides, over the last four years or so. (Ref.: 'As Car Bomb Kills 44 CRPF Troopers, 94% Rise In Death Toll Of Security Forces in J&K In 4 Years' at < https://www.indiaspend.com/as-car-bomb-kills-44-crpf-troopers-94-rise-in-death-toll-of-security-forces-in-jk-in-4-years/> and < http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1562722&fbclid=IwAR1wV-DgCJ5BTJlwPFb7dVVFvxQILk29qHOlqmY2szNDG0RtEpLQ2Dq5tl0#.XGayFkXNo48.facebook >.)
While "coercive dplomacy", or whatever, is sure to fail to bring in any positive outcome for India - if past experience is any indicator (ref.: 'Pulwama terror attack: Punishing Pakistan — the options India has' at sl. no. I. below), it may, nevertheless, very well prove to be an effective vote-catcher. Who bothers about the consequences for India and Kashmir. (Ref.: 'Pulwama Aftermath: What’s Best for Modi May Not Be What’s Best for India' at sl. no. II. below.) There may also, again, be announcement of another round of dramatic "surgical strikes" in the midst of the poll. The declaration that the Army would "act" at a time of its own choosing keeps that possibility very much open, given the huge risks inherent in any serious military action. It's against this specific context, one has to ponder over the following. I. The plain fact is that both the concerned countries are armed with nuclear weapons along with all the three delivery platforms, necessary to ensure the capacity to strike back after being hit by the "first strike". A "war", thus, could too soon spin out of control and turn into a nuclear one wiping out, at least, much of the region, if not the humanity as a whole (ref.: 'India-Pakistan nuclear war could 'end human civilisation'' at < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/India-Pakistan-nuclear-war-could-end-human-civilisation.html >). Even a talk of "war" is too risky and utterly irresponsible. II. A suicide bomber is a highly motivated one, unlike a professional paid soldier, regardless of the (usual) big difference in skill levels. That cause/trigger of motivation needs be assessed. In the present case, for the young local boy - the suicide bomber, reportedly, the immediate trigger for turning a militant was having been bashed up and humiliated by the Indian troops (ref.: < https://in.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-bomber/kashmir-suicide-bomber-radicalised-after-beating-by-troops-parents-say-idINKCN1Q41M2 >). Also relevant: 'First time since 2000, more local recruits killed than foreign militants: J&K cops' at < https://indianexpress.com/article/india/pulwama-attack-crpf-first-time-more-local-recruits-killed-than-foreign-militants-jk-cops-5586695/?fbclid=IwAR2QZ6HHsuOJWILn2N3Dc2fdARympBDBYPHwsQRAVk3DGgDWSPxA0ztRyH4> and 'Army Fired to Kill, Used Civilians as Human Shields: Witnesses Recount Kashmir’s Bloody Weekend: Seven civilians, including minor boys, were killed in clashes that followed the encounter of three militants in south Kashmir’s Kharpora.' at < https://www.news18.com/news/india/army-fired-to-kill-used-civilians-as-human-shields-witnesses-recount-kashmirs-bloody-weekend-1976567.html >. III. The leaders of the Indian state must shed its persistent stupid refusal to "engage". *It's a well tried and tested failed method.* ***There has got to be persistent efforts to engage in dialogue with all the stakeholders. To begin with, it won't be easy, given the past history. Even then, this is the only way ahead. (Perhaps, it's about time to involve a credible third party, e.g. the UNSC Secretary General (or a neutral country like Norway), given the persistent failiure of the two concerned countries to sort out the issues all by themselves.)*** It doesn't mean letting one's guard down. It involves calibrated scaling down of "conflicts". IV. None of these can, however, be expected from a regime whose very survival depends on its ability to constantly stir up hatred against the real and constructed adversarial "others". V. Hence ...] I/II. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-punishing-pak-the-options-5588475/?fbclid=IwAR2R2m0x2tfTNepA8Itn3jIEwkbueGZETM7bGS7GDzsbG9ArxdOlPJ3Nrww Pulwama terror attack: Punishing Pakistan — the options India has Pulwama terror attack: As New Delhi considers coercive diplomacy after the terror attack in Kashmir, a look at the various measures it has tried in the past, and what their impact has been. Written by Nirupama Subramanian | Mumbai | Updated: February 18, 2019 11:19:55 am Punishing Pakistan after Pulwama terror attack: the options Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf with then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In 2001-02, following the attack on Parliament and then on an Army camp, India took a series of coercive measures. (Express Archive) In his book Choices — Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, former National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon writes that the reason India did not take the route of military retaliation against Pakistan after 26/11 was that there was more to be gained from not falling to that temptation. In the first place, an Indian military attack on Pakistan would have pushed back the terrorist attack on Mumbai from Pakistani soil, forcing the world to focus on the spectre of war between two nuclear-armed nations; second, it would have united civilian Pakistan behind the Army, whose national image had descended several notches in the newly democratic atmosphere suffused with popular anger over Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. Watch video: What is Jaish-e-Mohammed, the terror group that attacked the CRPF convoy A war with India was exactly what Pakistan wanted to buttress its internal standing. By not playing into the Pakistan Army’s hands, Menon says, India managed to bring international attention to the India-focused terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan — before 26/11, the US was worried only about getting Osama bin Laden and Pakistan-based Taliban groups that were targeting it. But Menon also noted that should there be another attack from Pakistan, with or without visible backing from the Pakistani state, it would be “virtually impossible” for any government of India to make the same choice again, mainly because of Pakistan’s stubborn refusal to act against the perpetrators of 26/11. “The circumstances of November 2008 no longer exist and are unlikely to be replicated in the future,” he warned. Read | Car-borne IEDs new challenge, talking with Army, police to counter it: CRPF DG No visible gain from strikes Last week’s suicide vehicle-borne IED attack on the CRPF convoy in Kashmir that killed 40 jawans has had an impact on the national psyche almost identical to that of the Mumbai attacks. And as Menon forewarned, the national circumstances are very different than they were 10 years ago — with the BJP in power under a leader who banks on an image of being “strong”, and with elections just weeks away, there are compulsive internal arguments for the government to choose military retaliation. Additionally, India no longer feels obliged not to undermine Pakistan’s civilian government — Prime Minister Imran Khan and his ministers repeatedly declare that the government and Pakistan Army are on the same page. Also read | After Pulwama attack, Govt withdraws security cover of five Kashmir separatists Yet, even in the changed circumstances of India, Pakistan and the world, it is not clear that India’s top decision-makers are confident that military retaliation will achieve anything of demonstrable benefit for India, even if it does not end up in a full-blown conflict. While escalation could backfire, and damage the government politically, a military option with visible results that can be declared as a success by the political leadership of the country would have to go beyond what India already did after Jaish-e-Mohammad’s attack on the Uri brigade headquarters in September 2016. 'Car-borne IEDs new challenge, talking with Army, police to counter it' The much-publicised surgical strike across the Line of Control, which won the Modi government brownie points among his supporters, yielded no change in the Pakistan Army’s behaviour. Success or failure in a military operation can be gauged only by the strategic objective it sets and meets. Revenge is not a strategic objective. Can India pull off a US-style aerial attack on the Jaish headquarters in Bahawalpur or the LeT headquarters in Muridke? As the US discovered from its drone attacks on Taliban leaders, such attacks, even if successful, would hardly spell an end to the terror infrastructure inside Pakistan. In fact, it could make Pakistan’s support for such groups stronger. Worse, such strikes are sure to cause civilian casualties. Punishing Pakistan after Pulwama terror attack: the options Pulwama terror attack: The suicide vehicle-borne IED attack on the CRPF convoy in Kashmir killed 40 jawans (Express Photo: Shuaib Masoodi) How far does coercion work? India has been at this juncture several times in the past, and over the last 18 years, short of an all-out war, has tried just about every kind of coercive mechanism in its efforts to induce behaviour change in Pakistan. But the changes, if at all, have been temporary. In 2001-2002, after Jaish’s attack on Parliament, India mobilised half a million troops to its western border, the largest such build-up since 1971. India seriously considered an air-strike on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, but Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was persuaded to call it off by the US in light of a speech on January 12, 2002, by the then military ruler General Pervez Musharraf, in which he called the attack on Parliament a terrorist act and promised to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. But the Indian and Pakistani armies continued to eyeball each other well into 2002, and India came close to a strike again in May that year, after fidyaeen attackers killed 34 people, mostly family members of soldiers at the Kaluchak Army camp. Again India held off under assurances from the international community. Punishing Pakistan after Pulwama terror attack: the options Pulwama terror attack: Prime Minister Narendra Modi pays tribute to the CRPF jawans in New Delhi on Friday, February 15, 2019. (PTI Photo: Manvender Vashist) According to media reports in 2017, at the end of July 2002 India had also launched air-strikes against Pakistani bunkers at the LoC in the Kel area of Kupwara, the first such operation by the Air Force after the Kargil war. At the end of December 2001, India had withdrawn its High Commissioner to Pakistan, Vijay Nambiar, and asked the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi to cut down the number of officials and staff at the mission by 50%, and banned Pakistan International Airlines from Indian airspace. Pakistan responded by cutting the Indian diplomatic presence in Islamabad by half, and banning Indian flights from Pakistani airspace. In May 2002, India asked Pakistan High Commissioner Ashraf Jehangir Qazi to leave. India also considered withdrawing the MFN (most favoured nation) status — which is the step it has taken now — and abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty, deciding against both as unsound, and in the long run bad for India’s interests as these could become precedent-setters and used against India internationally. Also read | What is Most Favoured Nation status, how will it impact Pakistan Non-engagement tactic But along with coercive diplomacy, back-channel negotiations were on throughout the whole period to normalise relations. Full-scale diplomatic relations resumed a year later, in May 2003, when India appointed Menon as the High Commissioner to Pakistan and Aziz Ahmad Khan arrived in Delhi as Pakistan’s High Commissioner. The joint declaration of January 2004 that flowed from the landmark Vajpayee-Musharraf summit is seen by some as the result of India’s strong stand at the time of the Parliament attack. Since then, India has used non-engagement as its main weapon. Punishing Pakistan after Pulwama terror attack: the options Adil Ahmad Dar, the prime accused in the Pulwama attack. In July 2006, after the Lashkar-e-Toiba struck Mumbai with seven coordinated train bombs killing 209 people, India said it would “pause” the then ongoing composite dialogue with Pakistan for the time being. Indian officials said off the record then that there was no point in taking extreme steps and then walking back to the table. Rather, it was better to keep all options open while making Pakistan “sweat”. For Islamabad, diplomatic victory is to bring India to the talks table, and New Delhi sensed that to keep Pakistan guessing on this front would be punishment enough. The composite dialogue resumed only after the October 2006 Musharraf-Manmohan Singh Havana summit on the sidelines of the NAM meet. After the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, India pushed the pause button once again on the composite dialogue, and after that, efforts by the two sides to restart talks have failed repeatedly on what the talks should be about. India’s position is that talks can be held only to discuss cross-border terror; Pakistan says talks should include Kashmir as well. Pakistan’s early insistence that the two countries should go back to the 2004-08 composite dialogue was rebuffed by India, which saw in it a design by Islamabad to show that a line had been drawn under Mumbai. India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan at the time bore some fruit — the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hafiz Saeed were designated under UNSC 1267. But beyond this, the world did not stop doing business with Pakistan, seen as crucial to the West’s war in Afghanistan. Also read | How China keeps blocking India from listing Jaish chief Azhar a ‘global terrorist’ In 2015-2016, India called off plans to hold talks about talks, agreed upon at the Modi-Sharif meeting in Lahore, after the January 2016 Pathankot attack. The decision to call off planned foreign minister-level talks after Imran Khan became Prime Minister also hewed to the set pattern. Though the “surgical strike” after the Uri attack, announced to the nation, was billed as a muscular response, it brought no improvement. Now, as India considers its choices in the wake of the latest attack in Kashmir, there is déjà vu about the options, and the limitations of each. As former High Commissioner to Pakistan Sharat Sabharwal has pointed out, revoking the MFN status has symbolic value only. It will hardly hurt the Pakistan state as the country’s exports to India are 2% of its global exports. Calling off the Kartarpur Corridor talks, scheduled in March, could be another option. But India has not even talked about this yet, underlining the difficulties on this front. II. https://thewire.in/diplomacy/narendra-modi-india-pulwama-attack Pulwama Aftermath: What’s Best for Modi May Not Be What’s Best for India The attack highlights Modi’s policy failure in Kashmir and Pakistan’s strategy to move geopolitics in its favour during the Trump presidency. Prime Minister Narendra Modi pay tribute to the CRPF jawans killed in the Pulwama attack, at AFS Palam in New Delhi, February 15, 2019. Credit: PTI/Manvender Vashist Sushil Aaron 19 HOURS AGO Narendra Modi was in Srinagar recently and was seen waving at someone while cruising on the Dal Lake. This generated some mirth on social media as people wondered who he was waving to when the civilian population was shut indoors owing to strict security measures. It may well be that Modi was greeting security force personnel who tirelessly man the perimeter of the lake, and indeed most of Kashmir, whether he is visiting or not. As Modi comes to terms with the suicide bombing in Pulwama district that has killed over 40 CRPF personnel, he must ask himself whether he has done all he can to protect those he professes to serve. The truth is that he has not had a plan to address the conflict in Kashmir – or if he has a policy it is the wrong one, judging from widespread civilian suffering and the deadly price the security forces have paid over the past three years. Also read: US Backs India’s Right to Self-Defence, Drops Customary Call for Restraint Modi and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval have pursued an approach that is based on the view that Kashmir is a purely military problem that can be solved through relentless security crackdowns. Since 2016, there has a huge surge in repressive tactics – scores of young civilians have died in shootings and houses have been destroyed in operations that have set off waves of rage and despair, a constant background spectacle in India’s politics. The tactics have barely elicited reactions from policy analysts in Delhi, who are otherwise quick to issue tweetstorms when terrorist attacks occur. The logic of counterinsurgency Modi and the BJP need only to turn to developments in Afghanistan to realise how futile a purely militarist approach to insurgency is. In 17 years of war, the US has spent $718 billion on operations, lost 2,372 military personnel with 20,000 service members injured – not to forget the 45,000 Afghan security forces who have been killed. Despite all the firepower the US is able to marshal, Washington is now having to conduct talks with the Taliban, while Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union that occupied Afghanistan not long ago, also plays host to peace negotiations involving associates of the mujahideen that fought it in the 1980s. The logic of counterinsurgency (COIN) is simple, whether it be a relatively large country like Afghanistan or a small patch like Gaza: one, that security operations cannot ultimately succeed unless states command the loyalty of a section of the population and, two, that counterterrorism efforts at best create the conditions for dialogue and are not a substitute for it. Modi and Doval have flouted these accepted COIN assumptions and have instead inflamed public sentiment in the Valley – including through the BJP’s efforts to withhold flood relief in 2014, undermining the PDP-BJP government on a regular basis, nurturing anti-Kashmiri narratives in the public sphere and deploying harsh security measures. The result is a spike in militant recruitment and violence – and a situation where the security forces now need to entirely avoid civilian populations when they travel, as reported in this story about how the Pulwama attack happened. These are not the conditions under which an insurgency can be overcome – in fact, they condemn security forces to a never-ending war, which is politically quite irresponsible given that CRPF and army personnel would like nothing more than for the conflict to end and for them to return to their families. Also read: Militant Recruitment Data in 2018 Is Telling of the Centre’s Failed Strategies in J&K The gross mistake that the Modi government has made is to abandon the Congress party’s playbook during 2004-14, which was to strive for improved India-Pakistan ties, bring down levels of militant violence, allow a semblance of normalcy and offer the state government some latitude to provide a glimpse of local ownership and control. The Congress was, to be sure, wrong-headed, cynical and repressive at several stages but the UPA government at least succeeded in generating a narrative about political solutions. The Modi government, instead, seeks to move Kashmir into a space where there is no scope for politics, and effectively reduce the Valley to being only a theatre of violence that polarises the rest of India. The tragedy is that civilians and security forces are both trapped in a morality play staged on TV and social media with no end in sight and the government having no plan for mitigating the misery of both. Also read: Opposition Parties Stand With Centre, Forces in Aftermath of Pulwama Attack What next? The Pulwama attack will set off outcomes that might benefit Modi politically but be detrimental to India’s interests at large. There may, in all likelihood, be a spike in Modi’s popularity should he choose to exercise a military option like surgical strikes. It is worth stating that the Jaish-e-Mohammed could not have conducted the Pulwama attack without Rawalpindi’s support and imprimatur – and this should prompt analysts to consider what the Pakistani deep state’s calculus is by staging an attack that bolsters Modi politically so close to the elections. Security agencies inspect the site of the Pulwama suicide bomb attack. Credit: PTI Be that as it may, there’s no guarantee that the situation will play out as Modi and India hope. Consider the diplomatic and military possibilities after Pulwama. India wants to internationally isolate Pakistan. Expressions of condemnation and support from other nations have come through but they have more symbolic meaning than substantive value. In themselves, they will not translate to much because Islamabad is bound to push back diplomatically perhaps militarily, in the hope of getting the international community to involve itself in conflict management. The prospect of a limited war is being discussed glibly. That really holds little terror for Pakistan as it reckons India would itself be wary of any escalation that would follow. Pakistan has nuclear weapons but the Indian side believes it can call Islamabad’s bluff. However, the Pakistani side has reasons to believe it can use a crisis to shift the geopolitical balance in its favour. Watch | National Security Conversations: Understanding And Responding to Pulwama How this happens has everything to do with the context. In the post 9/11 phase, India had successfully persuaded the international community to exert pressure on Pakistan to end “cross-border terrorism”. The US national security bureaucracy and European nations were attentive to Delhi’s concerns, owing to the size of India’s market and the potential of an India-Pakistan war distracting from their own operations in Afghanistan. That context has now changed. Donald Trump is a distracted, incompetent figure who sees international relations in transactional terms; he does not listen to his own national security professionals as the resignation of James Mattis shows, and he’s unlikely to intervene in an India-Pakistan crisis with the fervour that Bill Clinton did in Kargil. Also read: Modi is Leaving India Unprepared for a World Made by Trump and China In any case, the US is trying to get out of Afghanistan and now needs Pakistan as much as it always had. Furthermore, China has material interests in Pakistan owing to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). If an India-Pakistan war ensues, it will be in Islamabad’s interest to escalate the conflict in ways that alarm Beijing – and it will then be China’s turn to intervene, rather than the US. Islamabad would effectively be using this crisis and the window of the Trump presidency to add new dimensions to the Kashmir conflict and potentially create a precedent for China’s involvement in the future as well. India thus has a lot to lose with how the Modi government proceeds both on the Pakistan front and with its Kashmir policy. Right now, mobs are threatening and attacking Kashmiri students and professionals in Indian cities. This will not only tear India’s social fabric further apart but also reinforce resistance in the Valley. The BJP may yet win power after Pulwama, but its policies are laying waste to the landscape it wants to rule. Sushil Aaron is a commentator on India’s politics and international affairs. He tweets @SushilAaron. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to greenyouth+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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