On Fri, Feb 20, 2009 at 11:12:25PM +0100, phcoder wrote: > Hello. For SHA-1 verified boot first sector needs to check the rest of > core.img. It will need heavy modifications. On the same time I would > like to avoid changes to current boot process so that both alternatives > are available (SHA-1 and plain boot). In the same time even in current > design the first sector plays a special role. So I propose first sector > to be moved to a separate file and then at install time grub-mkimage or > grub-setup can take care of choosing right one depending on options > supplied by user (plain or SHA-1 boot)
Have you looked at how the boot process works when using coreboot/GRUB ? By getting rid of the legacy stuff, things get much more flexible. Check the grub.cfg example in: http://grub.enbug.org/CoreBoot to see what I mean. Most pieces are there already. When we merge crypto support, it'll be possible for GRUB-in-chip to verify GRUB-in-disk. Then the chip becomes your root of trust, which is what you're pursuing, if I understood correctly. But if I was serious about security, I wouldn't make a BIOS blob my root of trust, GRUB is a much better option ;-) -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all." _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel