On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 11:36:49AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote: > > > > On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various > > > > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot. > > > > > > I think this needs more context. If the kernel is loaded via the EFI > > > boot stub, the kernel is aware of the UEFI secure boot state. Why > > > duplicate this functionality in order to avoid the EFI stub? > > > > It seems to me that this issue was discussed here [1] and here [2]. > > So, if you want me to improve the commit message I am OK with that. > > Yes, I think just providing an explanation for why it's currently > necessary for you to duplicate this is reasonable.
Sure, will do! Daniel _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel